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Chapter 1
Introduction
This book picks the influence of proximity on the innovative behavior of firms out as
a central theme. We follow Whetten (1989), who introduces three questions which
should help to disclose the essential elements of a theoretical contribution: Why?
What? How? We will give short answers to get an idea of the purpose and scope of
this work.
Why?
This question asks about the relevance and logic underlying the contribution.
Why should other researchers be interested in this topic and what view of the econ-
omy does the author take?
In our understanding the main driver of competition between firms is knowledge.
Firms differ in their knowledge about production technologies and consumer needs.
Further, knowledge is seen as the major input factor for the introduction of organi-
zational or production improvements as well as for the design of new products. The
first idea is related to process innovations and the second to product innovations.
Different forms of proximity have an impact on the build-up and exchange of knowl-
edge. Therefore, the appreciation of the role of knowledge - and economically useful
knowledge1 especially - becomes crucial when talking about innovative competition
between firms.
Knowledge is of major importance not only for the single firm but the whole
economy. Some authors even state that we live in a knowledge economy (Nonaka
and Takeuchi, 1995; Cooke and Leydesdorf, 2006). Indeed, there appears to be a deep
connection between research and development activities (R&D) and the economic
performance of a country as technology accounts for at least 50% of the economic
growth (Solow, 1956; Lambooy, 2005).
The European Union (EU) acknowledged this argument and put priority to
knowledge and economic growth in the Lisbon Agenda constituted in the year 2000
1The notion of economically useful knowledge is mentioned in Lundvall (1992).
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by the European Council. The goal of this agenda is to make the European Union
the ’most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’ which at
the same time accredits the leading role of the USA . The political measures within
the scope of the Lisbon Agenda were initiated because it is believed that economic
growth enables the achievement of political, economic, social, and environmental
objectives of the enlarged Union, besides, a policy aiming at cohesion tends to fos-
ter economic growth, and sustained growth is necessary to ensure cohesion of the
EU (Sapir, 2004).2 Hence, we are convinced of the significant role of knowledge for
the economic performance at a firm, national and supra-national level. Despite the
fact that the relevance of knowledge is widely accepted we discover a gap in the
current literature that is related to the mechanisms and economic consequences of
the dependency on knowledge. This brings us to the next point.
What?
The second question highlights the selection of factors which explain the phenom-
ena of interest. Here the right factors have to be included and the theoretical model
has to abstract from other factors which do not lead to many additional insights.
First, we admit that we concentrate on innovative competition between firms
which are at the same time competitors on goods markets. We neglect possible
positive or negative effects of the spread of knowledge among economic actors from
other industries. Our main interest lies in the trade-off for firms which emerges due to
the acquisition of external knowledge versus the potential loss of economically critical
knowledge. The first aspect is typically considered to have a positive influence on
the economic situation of the firm as additional knowledge helps to develop and
adopt innovations. The second aspect may impose negative consequences on the
economic profits as firms want to differ from competitors in order to earn economic
rents.
Second, in this work we abstract from all locational factors but learning through
knowledge spillovers. This endeavor is interesting and can be justified because knowl-
edge spillovers can at the same time be convincing for one firm and deterring for
another firm preventing its becoming an active member of the knowledge exchange
process.
Third, we concentrate on two forms of proximity as main influencing factors for
learning: Geographical and technological proximity. In order to shed light on the
impact of the two types of proximity on knowledge spillovers we give two simple
examples. We argue that geographical proximity favors the exchange of ideas and,
hence, the flow of knowledge. In university, there are many opportunities for personal
contact and researchers also seek direct communication at conferences and meetings,
2See Chapter 8 for a critique on this proposition.
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which can be interpreted as geographical proximity, too. This is done because it
is often easier and faster to explain scientific methods and results face-to-face than
using other sources like research articles. Further, one can imagine a situation where
a researcher is very active in his community and another researcher who fully focuses
on one topic and does not seek the regular exchange with other scholars from his
discipline. Being more involved in the actual discussions helps to develop or extend
new arguments which increase existing concepts in many small steps. But one would
expect that a greater scientific breakthrough challenging the usual thinking is more
likely to be caused by a researcher in isolation because he is not so much involved
in the group. We see that geographical proximity might have important impact on
learning and the build-up of knowledge.
Technological proximity is related to specialization. Let us assume a student in
economics who has to decide upon three fields: Microeconomics, Macroeconomics
and Econometrics. He may study those subjects in equal shares to achieve a more
balanced knowledge. On the other hand, he might decide to pick a major and
concentrate on e.g. Microeconomics or - even more specialized - on Industrial Orga-
nization as a part of Microeconomics. The labor market will show which would have
been the best strategy. The wage and economic situation of the student depends
on the chosen majors of his fellow students as well as on the needs of firms and
public institutions as potential employers. The same holds for firms in economic
competition when they decide upon their innovation strategy.
We believe that the influence of geographical and technological proximity on
learning and its consequences for innovative competition are so far not fully under-
stood. Therefore, we will attempt to show how this topic can be handled in an
economic model and what kind of results can be obtained.
How?
After the identification of the topic and main factors an author should reveal
the relationship between the chosen factors. Here this is done with the help of
formalization in a simulation model which is analyzed in computational experiments.
We decided to use the method of agent-based simulations to represent our ideas
of innovation and proximity in a formal model. The relationship of the several fac-
tors and the assumptions about the (economic) behavior of the agents are described
by formulas which are implemented in a computational program. The repetition of
several simulation runs with different parameter settings allows the testing of our
hypothesis, while the computational experiments act as a tool for theory building.
We choose agent-based simulation because it allows to capture dynamic interactions
and a useful representation of knowledge, uncertainty, and heterogeneity. Those as-
pects are argued to be essential for handling innovation, technological change, and
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learning in a theoretical model. The main advantages of our model are the repre-
sentation of an endogenous technological development in the form of process and
product innovations, the quantification of learning effects depending on geograph-
ical and technological proximity, and the quantification of the economic value of
knowledge. These features help to disentangle relevant mechanisms for the impact
of proximity on the innovative competition between firms and the emergent outcome
in the form of technological development and clustering of firms in an agglomeration.
Another methodological distinctive feature is given due to the fact that we take
two different perspectives in the analysis: First, we try to indicate innovation strate-
gies which help firms to earn more profits. Second, we investigate the outcome from
the viewpoint of economic policy. While doing so we reveal potential policy measures
and confront them with the industry model to evaluate their effectiveness. For both
- firms and policy - the topic of innovation is important and we give an example how
issues from both fields can be assessed with the same methodology.
In the following we provide a list of research questions which are investigated
in this book. Although the list does not contain all of the results presented in the
corresponding chapters, it might be useful to give an overview and to subsume the
findings in a nutshell. Furthermore, we had these questions in mind while developing
and modifying the theoretical model which might have had an influence on the model
as it is now. The answers to our research questions are presented in Chapter 8 as
part of the conclusions.
Research Questions:
1. Should firms seek for geographical proximity to competitors? Do positive ef-
fects of external learning outweigh negative effects due to the loss of knowledge
lead?
2. Does the importance of geographical proximity change during time?
3. What kind of firms enter agglomerations: Technologically advanced or tech-
nologically weak firms?
4. Are firms that specialize in their innovation efforts more economically success-
ful than firms that diversify?
5. What kind of agglomerations emerge: Technologically specialized or diversified
agglomerations?
6. What technological environment supports the flow of knowledge spillovers?
7. Can political interventions aiming to foster the technological development be
justified?
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8. What are possible measures of regional innovation policy in this context, and
do they work?
In order to address these research questions the book is divided into four parts.
The first Part I has an introductory character and reviews the relevant literature on
innovation and proximity. We start in Chapter 2 with a discussion of the relation-
ship between knowledge, innovation, competition, and economic growth. Here the
concept of knowledge spillover and its dependency on proximity is elaborated. We
focus on geographical and technological proximity and present our interpretation of
these notions. The main findings in the literature propose that geographical proxim-
ity enhances learning and that the relation of learning and technological proximity
takes a non-linear form. Chapter 3 summarizes previous attempts to incorporate
aspects of innovation and proximity in formal economic models. Although there
exist promising efforts to build analytical models, we argue that the usage of sim-
ulation models in the context of innovation and proximity can be justified. We list
and debate various simulation models which deal with geographical and/or techno-
logical proximity, but there appears to be no industry model available which would
combine both types of proximity and relate them to innovative competition.
Part II introduces our proposal to fill this research gap. In Chapter 4 we con-
struct an agent-based simulation model of an innovative industry where hetero-
geneous firms decide upon market entry and exit, quantities, geographical location,
and investments in R&D which is connected to technological and market positioning.
Learning in the form of knowledge spillovers increases with geographical proximity
and when the absorptive capacity of the firm approaches the technological gap be-
tween the interacting partners. Profits are realized due to the interaction on product
markets with consumers characterized by heterogeneous preferences. In Chapter 5,
the parametrization of the simulation model is discussed in the context of model
verification. Further, we perform model validation and compare simulation outcome
with data and stylized facts found in the empirical literature. Findings suggest that
our model appears to replicate major industry characteristics.
Part III applies our model to several problems which are related to our research
questions. Chapter 6 is devoted to an analysis from the viewpoint of a firm. We begin
by looking at our understanding of specialization. Then, we point out the effect of
different firm strategy parameters on firm profits with the help of a regression analy-
sis. The next section deals with the incentive of firms to seek geographical proximity.
Despite the fact that in early times many firms choose a location in the agglomer-
ation, the number of cluster firms decreases over time. We provide two reasons for
this result: An adverse selection and a lock-in effect where both work against the
benefits of a location in close geographical proximity to competitors. Furthermore,
several scenarios with different strategy settings indicate that firms should prefer
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to establish their own technological competencies and avoid coordinated behavior
as this strengthens competition and reduces firm profits. Chapter 7 treats issues of
economic policy. We begin by showing the technological development in scenarios
which differ in the number of firms located in the agglomeration. We demonstrate
that learning helps to increase average knowledge but isolation favors best-practice.
Two archetypes of an innovative industry are examined in a section on technological
regimes and the results approve structural differences of the technological develop-
ment in the two scenarios. We then confront our virtual industry with interventions
in the form of regional innovation policies. We consider four policy options which
aim at increasing the incentive for geographical proximity, fostering learning, raising
appropriability, and controlling specialization of the agglomeration. We detect large
policy cost differences and potential conflicts between goals of several policies. In
general we recommend a support of appropriability conditions and local learning
mechanisms broadening the local knowledge pool. Problems of political influence on
competition come in the form that mostly firms with lower technological capabili-
ties are supported and that a better technological development is often connected
to monopolistic tendencies.
Part IV summarizes the conclusions of the other chapters and returns to the
research questions mentioned above. Finally, the limitations of our approach and
potential extensions for future research are highlighted.
6
Part I
Motivation
7
Chapter 2
Foundations of Innovation and
Proximity
This chapter introduces the main concepts which constitute the basis for the mod-
eling approach and analysis of the model. We introduce arguments to underline
the relevance of innovation and proximity and start in Section 2.1 by asking why
innovations are important. We show that innovations are the driving force behind
economic growth and that most innovations are established by private firms. This
brings us to the topic of competition between firms in terms of knowledge and the
potential transfer of knowledge through knowledge spillovers. At this point two dif-
ferent interpretations of proximity come into play. In Section 2.2 we investigate the
influence of geographical proximity on innovation while studying the literature on
local knowledge spillovers and agglomeration. The second aspect of learning is con-
nected to the idea of technological proximity. Therefore, Section 2.3 sheds light on
the discussion whether a specialized or a diversified environment promotes knowl-
edge spillovers. Further we introduce our understanding of technological proximity
as proximity between technologies, technological gap and its relation to a product
space. But first, we want to explain why the notion of innovation has become so
widely used by firm managers and politicians.
2.1 Innovation and Knowledge Spillovers
This book aims at understanding the process of innovation and technological change
and its relation to proximity. In this connection innovation and technological change
seem to be crucial for understanding economic growth (see e.g. Hall, 1994; Griliches,
1998) and continuing economic growth is one of the main goals of economic pol-
icy. For example the German Stabilita¨tsgesetz1 promotes the fostering of economic
1’Das Gesetz zur Fo¨rderung der Stabilita¨t und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft’ established on
June 8th, 1967.
8
growth. In order to justify this analysis it is important to define innovation, discuss
its origin, and show its potential influence on economic growth.
Following Fagerberg (2005) it might be useful to differentiate between invention
and innovation: ”Invention is the first occurrence of an idea for a new product or
process, while innovation is the first attempt to carry it out into practice” (Fagerberg,
2005, p. 4). This introductory article further mentions that both notions are linked
to one of the most influential social scientists of the twentieth century: Joseph
A. Schumpeter. In his work Schumpeter focuses on the role of innovation and its
impact on social and economic change and in his view every new combination of
existing resources represents an innovation. Schumpeter stresses the importance of
dynamics and defines innovation as activities like the introduction of new products,
implementation of new production methods, establishing of new markets, capturing
of new sources of supply, and, finally, initiation of new ways to organize business
(Schumpeter, 1912, pp. 100-101). Of the five types of innovation the first two
especially, namely product and process innovations, are argued to be crucial for
understanding technological development (Schmookler, 1966).
Another important distinction can be made between incremental and radical in-
novations. Freeman and Perez (1988) point out that incremental innovations occur
more or less continuously in any industry and often result from proposals by users
or from improvements suggested by engineers of production processes. Despite the
incremental change of the product or production process the cumulative impact on
the economy is often extremely important and leads to a steady growth of produc-
tivity. An example of an incremental innovation is the steady increase of quality
and decrease of production cost of industrial products like airplanes or printing ma-
chines. On the other hand, radical innovations are more discontinuous events and
usually emerge from intended research activities by firms and public institutions.
Furthermore, radical innovations are often the ”potential springboard for the growth
of new markets” (Freeman and Perez, 1988, p. 46). For a certain time a radical in-
novation is connected to dramatic structural changes as new products and markets
eliminate others, but their aggregated economic impact is rather small. If several
radical innovations appear at the same time, and Schumpeter (1939) observed that
they often do so, the overall impact on the economy can be quite large. For example
a single radical innovation is nylon and the emergence of several synthetic materials
created a whole new type of industry.
One of the most important questions in the context of innovation asks how inno-
vations occur. In earlier times the emergence of innovations was understood to be
a random phenomenon and a factor impossible to formalize in growth models like
Solow (1956). Some scholars phrased it in the way that innovations fall like manna
from heaven (Fagerberg, 2005). In the literature two opposing views concerning
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the main source of innovation can be distinguished, see e.g. Hall (1994). The first
science- or technology-push model argues that innovations originate in science and
are later applied for commercial use. In line with this view is the linear model of
innovation which differentiates between basic research, applied research, develop-
ment, as well as production and diffusion (Bush, 1945). To the contrary the second
market or demand-pull approach claims that only market demand determines the
path for successful experimental and applied research (Schmookler, 1966). Other
scholars argue that both factors are interlinked and that supply as well as demand
side play a crucial role for innovations (Rosenberg, 1982).
Apart from the science-push versus demand-pull debate the properties of in-
novation found in several empirical studies highlight the role of knowledge as the
main input factor of innovations. In the following we follow Do¨ring and Schnellen-
bach (2006) and define knowledge as the sum of all cognitions and abilities that
individuals use to solve problems, make decisions and understand information.
For example the nature of innovation and its dependence on knowledge is ana-
lyzed by Dosi (1988a) where the author works out the following properties of inno-
vation: Innovations always incorporate an element of uncertainty, rely on scientific
knowledge, emerge due to search activities in formal organizations like firms rather
than individuals, rest on informal learning processes, and technological change is
a cumulative activity.2 The characteristics of innovation are also connected to the
concepts of technological paradigms and technological trajectories (Nelson and Win-
ter, 1977; Dosi, 1982, 1988b). Hence, formal and informal research activities have
an impact on the amount of knowledge, which again influences the probability for
successful innovations.
Before we go into a deeper analysis of knowledge and learning we take a look
at the relationship between R&D and economic growth. The analysis by Maddison
(2001) postulates that economic growth really started only in 1000 AD after a long
period of stagnation. Since then economic growth has been increasing, in particular
after the Industrial Revolution. During and after the 1970s several economists stud-
ied the issue of economic growth in empirical studies, see Freeman (1994); Griliches
(1998) or Verspagen (2005) for a recent overview. In these econometric models the
relationship between the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and knowledge in the form
of R&D is examined and typical results yield that knowledge has a significant impact
on productivity growth.
This approach is also taken in a recent study by Legler and Krawczyk (2007).
One of their results is shown in Figure 2.1, where each point represents data of a
country averaged over several years3. On the abscissa the change of real expenses
2In Section 3.3 it is debated that these properties have to be part of the theoretical model.
3Data points represent average value of years 1994 till 2004 for all except GBR, ITA, SWE
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of R&D and on the ordinate the change of GDP is measured and all values are
indicated in percent. The distribution of the data points and an estimated linear
regression curve give evidence that expenses for R&D, which generate additional
knowledge, favor growth of the economy. According to Fagerberg (2005) mainly two
mechanisms underlie the causal relationship between innovation and economic per-
formance: First, firms and countries compete mostly in technological competition,
and second, innovations open up possibilities for further innovations, which leads to
continuing structural and economic change.
Figure 2.1: The relation between R&D and economic growth during 1994-2004 in
the Group of Twelve. Source: Legler and Krawczyk (2007)
Taking the positive relation between R&D and economic growth into account we
turn to the question whether public or private research activities are the main source
of technological change. Fagerberg (2005) is convinced that inventions often emerge
from public institutions like universities, while innovations are mostly introduced
by private firms. This view is also supported by Cantwell and Fai (1999) who
claim that the firm is the principal source of innovation and, henceforth, growth.
Again, Dosi et al. (1994) believe that firms are the main locus of technological
accumulation and Jensen and McGuckin (1997) conclude from a survey of empirical
studies that firms are the main drivers of economic growth. For Schumpeter (in his
earlier writings) small entrepreneurial firms (Schumpeter, 1912) or, at a later stage,
which use data till 2003.
11
organized research and development in large firms (Schumpeter, 1942) are best suited
to introduce innovations and hereby push the technological development. In both
cases firms - not public research - play the major role. Hence, in order to deepen
the understanding of innovation and proximity it may be justified to concentrate on
the firm as the major origin of innovations.
Knowledge as a precondition for successful innovation is a possibility for a firm
to differentiate itself from competitors and earn profits through this competitive
advantage. In this view the heterogeneity of firms is crucial for competition. There
is empirical evidence that firms indeed differ a lot, which has a major impact on
their economic performance (Nelson, 1991; Jensen and McGuckin, 1997). In the
management literature aspects of firm-specific knowledge have been highly discussed
in recent years, see e.g. surveys by Zollo and Winter (2002); Fai (2003); Wang and
Ahmed (2007). The debate is related to theories of the resource-based view of the
firm (Penrose, 1995; Barney, 2001), organizational routines (Nelson and Winter,
1982), core competence (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), absorptive capacity (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1989, 1990), and, most recently, the concept of dynamic capabilities
(Nelson, 1991; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Helfat, 1997; Teece et al., 1997).
The resource-based view of the firm can be traced back to the book by Penrose
(1995) which was originally published in 1959. Here the firm is not only seen as an
administrative unit but as a collection of productive firm-specific resources. These
valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources of the firm enable a better
standing on the market, but in order to exploit the resource advantages firms have
to possess or develop certain capabilities. Both factors - resources and capabilities -
constitute a competitive advantage (Wang and Ahmed, 2007). Later, the scientific
focus of attention moved to competencies and technological competencies especially,
which can be seen as a subset of the more general resource based approach. The
set of technological competencies can be described as the firm’s technological port-
folio. Prahalad and Hamel (1990) argue, that the firm’s economic performance is
enhanced if it concentrates on particular areas of its technological portfolio - the
so called core competencies. Nelson and Winter (1982) propose that essence of the
firm’s strength lies in routines, which is related to the concept of competencies. In
their interpretation organizational routines stand for a set of rules or heuristics
which capture the way things are typically done in the firm and which tend to per-
sist. Firms develop routines over time from their own experiences and accumulated
knowledge. The routines can be modified while firms scan their technological envi-
ronment and search for opportunities on product markets (Fai, 2003). In the same
way the potential of a firm to absorb external knowledge is stressed by Cohen and
Levinthal (1990).4
4This will be further examined in Section 2.3 in the context of technological proximity.
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During the 1990s the original propositions by the resource-based view of the firm
was criticized as being static and neglecting market dynamism (Wang and Ahmed,
2007). As a reaction the theory of dynamic capabilities was developed which takes
into account a rapidly changing environment incorporating the evolutionary nature
of resources and capabilities (Teece et al., 1997). In conclusion both concepts agree
in the importance of firm heterogeneity and that the ability to develop and sustain
competitive advantage is crucial for the explanation of firm performance and its
impact on technological change and economic growth. This is in line with the idea
of Schumpeterian competition where firms with better capabilities to innovate grow
at the expense of less efficient rivals (Schumpeter, 1912).
Empirical studies investigate whether specialization or diversification enhances
the performance of firms. For example Montgomery (1985) shows that highly di-
versified firms in their markets have lower market shares than less diversified firms.
Additionally, there is empirical evidence that in average highly diversified firms
compete in less attractive markets. On the other hand, the empirical work by
Garcia-Vega (2006) examines 544 European firms and indicates a statistically sig-
nificant positive relationship between technological diversity and innovation at the
firm level. The study by Pandya and Rao (1998) adds further detail to the debate
as they indicate a trade-off between risk and return. The authors provide evidence
that specialized firms earn higher profits than average, but these returns are accom-
panied by high variance, whereas diversified firms gain lower profits at much lower
variance. Another approach (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 2000) explores the creation
of core competencies and their effect on firm performance in the international com-
puter industry. The empirical results support the importance of core capabilities for
performance differences of companies in the high-tech sector. On the other hand,
in their sample market specialization does not appear to have a positive impact on
performance, which is explained with a continuing technological convergence in the
computer industry.5 Further, the authors discovered several difficulties while acquir-
ing a core competence through merger and acquisition or with the help of a strategic
alliance. The difficulties to absorb external knowledge are discussed at some later
point, but first we would like to introduce the concept of knowledge spillover in a
more general way.
Having recognized the importance of knowledge assets for a firm the potential to
learn from competitors, or the loss of economic valuable knowledge through external-
ities, becomes a major issue. The transfer of knowledge is discussed under the notion
of technology or knowledge spillover. Although this book concentrates on knowledge
spillovers between firms which are active in the same industry, knowledge spillovers
also play a major role for the technological development of regions and even nations.
5See also Wuyts et al. (2005) for the same standardization argument in ICT.
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For example Keller (2004) reports on page 752 that ”foreign sources of technology
account for 90 percent or more of domestic productivity growth”.
Other empirical studies approve the importance of knowledge spillovers at the
firm, regional and national level, see e.g. the surveys by Griliches (1998); Keller
(2004); Audretsch and Feldman (2004); Koo (2005); Do¨ring and Schnellenbach (2006);
Los and Verspagen (2007). For example Koo (2005) groups different empirical works
according to the categories: Technology flow, cost function, production-function, and
paper trail approach. The main finding of this strand of literature is that knowledge
spillovers are relevant for firm strategy decisions as well as for regional innovation
policy.6
We define knowledge spillovers as the voluntary or involuntary exchange of
knowledge between individuals, firms, regions or countries. In this context knowl-
edge can be incorporated in routines, ideas, methods, techniques or technologies.
Further, exchange means that the flow of knowledge occurs always in two directions
despite the fact that the result of the learning process can be quite different for the
interacting agents. Further, sources of knowledge can be private R&D of firms or
research by public institutions like universities, think tanks etc.
Knowledge spillovers are a form of a positive externality and knowledge itself is
connected to the concept of public good: First, the same piece of knowledge can be
shared by more than one firm at the same time (non-rivalry). Although there might
be negative economic consequences the innovating firm is not limited in its usage of
the technology (Koo, 2005). Second, it is hard to prevent unauthorized usage once
it is in the open (non-excludability) (Los and Verspagen, 2007).
From a public policy perspective the discussion about knowledge spillovers has
become very vivid with models of economic growth. The model by Solow (1956,
1957) develops a theoretical framework for economic growth which relies enormously
on knowledge externalities. Here knowledge is seen as a pure public good, which
has major consequences when looking at the research activities of firms and na-
tions: The uncompensated flow of knowledge diminishes all incentives for a firm
or to perform its own research. This ’market failure’ implication is, however, not
consistent with the empirical finding that private R&D has been increasing during
the past several decades (Koo, 2005). In contrast to the early growth framework the
endogenous growth model by Romer (1990) modifies the assumption in the way that
technology is understood to be non-rival but only partially excludable. Other en-
dogenous growth models like Grossman and Helpman (1991) or Aghion and Howitt
(1997) also consider technological externalities.7 In the same line this book does
6The studies which are important for geographical and technological proximity are discussed in
the following two sections and more details on regional innovation policy can be found in Section
7.3.
7See Section 3.1 for an overview.
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not handle knowledge as a pure public good and we investigate potential barriers to
knowledge externalities and their relation to proximity in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
Going back to Scitovsky (1954) and Griliches (1979, 1992) one can often find
the following differentiation of two types of spillovers in the literature (see also Koo,
2005; Los and Verspagen, 2007):
1. vertical, welfare, pecuniary, or rent spillover
2. horizontal, technological, non-pecuniary or knowledge spillover
(a) idea-creating knowledge spillovers
(b) imitation-enhancing knowledge spillovers.
The first type of rent spillover is connected to market interactions between sup-
plier and user. The benefits of a new or improved product or lower production cost
are often distributed between seller and buyer depending on the market structure.
In case of a monopoly the firm can fully appropriate the benefits of the innovation
and capture all economic rents. The stronger the competition or bargaining power
the more a supplier is forced to transfer parts of the innovation rent to the user in the
form of lower prices. Hence, the concept of rent spillovers highlights the appropri-
ability problem of the innovator and rent spillovers are equal to an increasing price
quality ratio (Los and Verspagen, 2007). Empirically it is difficult to measure these
group of spillovers as price indexes do not correctly reflect quality improvements.
An example is the computer industry with stagnating or only slightly decreasing
prices accompanied by great advancements in the computer performance.
Krugman (1991b) refers to Marshall (1920) while indicating three potential forms
of locational externalities: economies of specialization, labor market economies and
knowledge spillovers. The first two forms are often referred to as pecuniary or rent
spillovers in relation to localization externalities since they mostly work for agents
of the same industry. In contrast to this the last type is seen as a true technolog-
ical externality and is in principle useful for all members of the local community,
which is connected to the term urbanization externality (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001a;
Audretsch and Feldman, 2004).8
The second form of spillovers in our list is located at the heart of the interpreta-
tion in this book. Knowledge spillovers are related to the transmission of knowledge
that results from the characteristic as a (partial) public good. Knowledge in this
case is not embodied in goods but part of a general pool of knowledge and it may
spill over between individuals or firms even in the absence of market interactions
(Koo, 2005). Instead of a seller-buyer constellation the relationship here is based on
8This topic is further examined in Section 2.3.
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technology linkages. Only these kinds of spillovers create further innovations and
shift the production capacity of an economy (Griliches, 1992) as the knowledge stock
of both firms may increase. Knowledge spillovers in this sense are true spillovers and,
unlike rent spillovers, ”not just a statistical redistribution of productivity gains due
to competition and measurement errors” (Los and Verspagen, 2007, p. 4).
According to Los and Verspagen (2007) knowledge spillovers can be further
grouped into idea-creating and imitation-enhancing spillovers. Through the first
type of idea-creating knowledge spillovers new innovations and applications might
emerge which need not be in the same technological field. The absorbed knowledge
is transformed and applied to the current needs of the firm and this process might
generate new knowledge. Therefore, idea-creating knowledge spillovers need not lead
to an increase in competition. The situation is different in the case of imitation-
enhancing knowledge spillovers. This form of knowledge spillovers addresses the
transfer of mostly codified knowledge which may not be perfectly protectable. Com-
petition in a market can be intensified if a firm imitates the production process or
product characteristics of an advanced competitor. Patents are one way to eco-
nomically protect innovators from imitation-enhancing but not from idea-creating
knowledge spillovers. In both cases knowledge would still spill over from the inno-
vator to rivals as patents prevent only the introduction of technologically similar
products. Patent laws do do not prevent the usage of knowledge for a technologi-
cally different product.9 Empirical observations by Levin et al. (1987) indicate that
R&D managers indeed see patents not as the best alternative to protect competitive
advantages of new or improved products or processes.
In the literature it is further discussed in what ways knowledge can spill over
from an individual, firm, region or nation to another. During this debate several
sources of knowledge spillovers are indicated and ranked by their relevance in case
studies and broad empirical surveys. As a result the main channels of knowledge
spillovers can be summarized as the following:10
• Publications: Patents, scientific literature, research reports, newspaper, web-
site
• People: Face-to-face communication, mobility of R&D employees, employ-
ment of students, scientists, or consultants, spin-offs, training
• Formal Co-operations: Research joint ventures, communication with cus-
tomers, users and suppliers
9There is of course a problem to define a technologically different product, see the literature on
patent breadth, e.g. Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Encaoua et al. (2006).
10The sorting builds upon works by Levin et al. (1987); Arvanitis and Hollenstein (2001); Brenner
(2007); Los and Verspagen (2007).
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• Informal Contacts: Fairs, expositions, meetings, talks, presentations, demon-
strations, communication with competitors
• Products: Reverse-engineering, licensing, acquisition of (capital) goods
The first potential channel of knowledge spillovers are publications. Apart from
patents, which are probably one of the major ways for the diffusion of technical
knowledge, other scientific or non-scientific announcements like an article in a local
newspaper may provide the reader with crucial details about actual R&D activities.
People in possession of knowledge can be another source of technology transfer,
for example when they change their engagement or meet each other on formal or
informal occasions. The importance of face-to-face contacts is highlighted in the
literature and is connected to the exchange of ideas between people, see e.g. Au-
dretsch (1998). Formal co-operations like research projects, or informal contacts can
occur within a firm or between firms. The interaction through formal channels of
communication with suppliers and customers can provide a lot of new impulses for
the advancement of products. Also, conferences and fairs are indicated to be one of
the most active occasions for the exchange of ideas for new products and processes
(Maskell et al., 2006). Last but not least in relevance, the flow of knowledge through
products is responsible for a large amount of knowledge spillovers between nations.
Although Levin et al. (1987) in their broad survey do consider acquisition of
knowledge through licensing and independent R&D as sources of technology trans-
fer, Los and Verspagen (2007) state that these activities cannot be understood as
channels of knowledge spillovers. Further, several means of exchange of knowledge
are connected to the concepts of ’being there’ (Gertler, 1995) and ’local buzz’ (Malm-
berg and Maskell, 2006). Foreign direct investments by multinational companies
are also understood to be important channels of knowledge spillovers (Do¨ring and
Schnellenbach, 2006). Furthermore, in an empirical study of Belgian manufacturing
firms Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) find that commercially sensitive knowledge
often leaks out to competitors through shared suppliers or customers.
Empirical works try to identify which potential channels of knowledge spillovers
are more important for the exchange of ideas. Among them is the article by Levin
et al. (1987) indicating that reverse-engineering is the most important source of
technology for high-level executives in US manufacturing companies. The effect
is stronger for products, but reverse-engineering even seems to enable learning of
better production processes. Furthermore, publications, technical meetings and hir-
ing of R&D employees from innovating firms tend to be other sources for knowl-
edge spillovers, which are even more useful than patents or conversation with em-
ployees. The empirical investigation of Arvanitis and Hollenstein (2001) ranks the
sources of knowledge for Swiss firms in the following order: Communication with cus-
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tomers/users, fairs/expositions, suppliers of materials/components, professional con-
ferences/journals, recruitment of experts, competitors, suppliers of equipment, sub-
sidiaries/mother firms, universities/technical schools, acquisition of capital goods,
other government research institutions and patent disclosures, acquisition of other
firms, technology transfer agencies, private scientific laboratories/consulting firms,
government technology programs and acquisition of licenses. And recently Giuri
et al. (2007) have performed a survey based on European patents and introduced six
sources of knowledge used to develop innovation sorted by their marked importance
from questionnaires: Customers and users, patent literature, scientific literature,
competitors, technical conferences and workshops, suppliers as well as universities
and public research laboratories.
The diverse channels of knowledge spillovers add to the importance of knowl-
edge transfer. Building on the definition of knowledge spillovers in connection with
the importance of knowledge assets for firm strategy, we recognize that knowledge
spillovers can be a serious threat for a firm’s market position. The question how
to prevent knowledge spilling over to competitors in this context has to be tack-
led. If a firm wants to benefit from knowledge externalities and seeks possibilities
to learn from advanced competitors, they always have to fear the loss of their own
core competencies as learning always happens in both directions. This trade-off
is often neglected in the literature11, which understands knowledge spillovers as a
solely ’positive’ externality. The model introduced in Chapter 4 is based on this
consideration of potential benefits and risks associated with knowledge spillovers.
This topic is also taken up in the next section.
Levin et al. (1987) note that lead time and secrecy open a time window for the
successful innovator to earn economic profits to finance previous R&D investments.
Indeed Mansfield (1985) shows that there is no clear protection against knowledge
spillover. The author reports in his investigation of 100 American firms that in
average technological information concerning development decisions leaks out to
rival firms within 12 to 18 months and details about a new product or process within
one year. The flow of information occurs through the previously discussed channels
of knowledge spillovers. Furthermore, process innovations in general diffuse much
more slowly than information about new products. The author argues that this
happens because of less external communication requirements in the case of process
innovations. The time interval till competitors learn about the innovation is very
short in relation to the time it takes to develop and commercialize an innovation,
which was estimated by Mansfield (1985) to be about three years. That means that
the decision information leaks out before the innovation project is half completed. Of
11Positive exceptions are: Martin and Sunley (2003); Boschma (2005a); Iammarino and McCann
(2006).
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course the imitator needs additional time till he is able to introduce his own product
on the market, but the time window for appropriating benefits from innovation is
very limited.
Summing up, we put forward the argument that knowledge as the major input
factor for innovation is significant to understand competition between firms and
the technological progress of countries. Furthermore, because of the partial public
good characteristic of knowledge it may diffuse to others through several channels,
which may have considerable economic consequences for the creator. But, using
a similar formulation as Keller (2004), knowledge spillovers are neither inevitable
nor automatic: Own technology investments and aspects of closeness are needed to
understand and apply external knowledge. At this point the interpretation of prox-
imity comes into play and we argue that geographical and technological proximity
are fundamental to assess knowledge spillovers.
The main idea behind knowledge spillovers and proximity is the insight that
innovative learning is local. Localized learning in this sense is bounded to local
conditions and spatial closeness (Malmberg and Maskell, 2006) as well as to the
existing knowledge base and capabilities of processing knowledge (Antonelli, 1995),
which is also related to the notion of technological paradigm (Dosi, 1988a). The first
concept is debated under the notion geographical proximity and the latter under
technological proximity. Both types of proximity and their relation to innovative
learning are discussed in greater detail in the following Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
But before doing so we mention that other forms of proximity are also relevant
for learning. Apart from geographical and technological proximity Boschma (2005a)
and Knoben and Oerlemans (2006) deal with cognitive, cultural, social and insti-
tutional proximity. In line with Knoben and Oerlemans (2006) these four forms of
proximity can be integrated into one, namely organizational proximity. Organiza-
tional proximity, in the view of Rallet and Torre (2000); Torre and Rallet (2005) and
Knoben and Oerlemans (2006), is seen as the set of shared routines, values, norms,
and cultures which allow for coordination and simplify communication between ac-
tors. This set incorporates organization structure, culture, institutions and social
relations. As we do not explicitly model organizational proximity, we want to argue
how this can be justified and why - at least in a first step - we abstract from this
form of proximity.
In our view there are three reasons for not considering organizational proximity
in the model: First, parts of the interpretation behind organizational proximity are
related to and, hence, captured in the two basic forms of geographical and technolog-
ical proximity. In contrast to Knoben and Oerlemans (2006) we see a strong overlap
behind our interpretation of technological and cognitive proximity since both trigger
the resulting learning effect with given knowledge bases of the actors. Further, it is
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claimed that cultural, social and institutional proximity are strongly connected to
geographical proximity (e.g. Maskell and Malmberg, 1999; Malmberg and Maskell,
2006). Those four types of proximity, according to Boschma (2005a), are all mech-
anisms that bring actors together and are henceforth substitutes. Therefore, parts
of organizational proximity can be found in the formalization of geographical and
technological proximity and need not to be modeled on their own. Second, in the
description of geographical proximity the introduction of organizational proximity
would not lead to a substantial change but only to a re-interpretation of the model.
This happens because the decision for geographical proximity considers only two
possibilities: In the agglomeration or outside.12 The term agglomeration can be
exchanged with club, group, community, or organization to re-interpret the model
in a way that social, institutional, or cultural proximity is investigated. A proper
examination of these forms of proximity cannot be done with minor changes - rather
it needs an extensive reformulation of the model. Third, a quantification of proxim-
ity effects in economic terms can only be done in relation to consumer preferences,
which is here achieved through a mapping from product to technology space. Thus,
for an economic model it makes sense to concentrate on the technological and only
one further dimension of proximity. Doing so keeps the model as simple as possible
and still allows to capture relevant aspects.
We close this section with the insight by Boschma (2005a), who argues that
geographical proximity alone is not sufficient and it requires at last cognitive (or
technological) proximity to assess learning processes in a useful manner. Further,
we are interested in the relatedness between those two forms of proximity or as
Antonelli (2007) formulates on page 259: ”Proximity in geographic space interacts
with proximity in knowledge space.” We agree and continue with the description of
the relation between innovation and geographical proximity in the next section.
2.2 Innovation and Geographical Proximity
There is a long lasting tradition in the literature on the influence of geographical
proximity on innovation, although in early days Schumpeter was not concerned with
spatial aspects of innovations and agglomeration theory was not dealing with inno-
vations. This changed during the last decades and now many authors claim that
there is a deep connection between innovation and space (Simmie, 2005). Geograph-
ical proximity and innovation today is a very vivid field of research, which can be
seen in several surveys and special issues on this topic. Despite the fact that all lit-
erature overviews handle both (empirically and theoretically oriented approaches),
examples for more empirically oriented surveys are: Breschi and Lissoni (2001a);
12See Sections 4.1.3 and 4.3.3 for more details.
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Audretsch and Feldman (2004); Koo (2005); Do¨ring and Schnellenbach (2006); Los
and Verspagen (2007). Of the more theoretically oriented reviews the following can
be mentioned: Audretsch (1998); Moulart and Sekia (2003); Do¨ring (2004); Simmie
(2005); Malmberg and Maskell (2006); Iammarino and McCann (2006).
Instead of geographical proximity synonyms like territorial, spatial, local, or
physical proximity are used. Apart from the physical distance between two indi-
viduals, firms, or regions our definition of geographical proximity also contains,
as noted by Knoben and Oerlemans (2006), the probability or extent to which two
agents can have daily face-to-face contact without prohibitive costs. This is assumed
to have a positive influence on learning through knowledge spillovers.
We might start with writings of David Audretsch (e.g. Audretsch, 1998), in which
the author investigates the potential discrepancy between an increasing globaliza-
tion, arising from the computer and telecommunication revolution in combination
with falling transport costs, and the relevance of the geographical location of compa-
nies. In contrast to an often proposed public opinion which points to the unimpor-
tance of locational factors, several economists and economic geographers still see the
significance of firm location and industry concentration in the present as well as in
the future (e.g. Storper and Scott, 1995; Porter, 1998; Glaeser, 1998; Porter, 2000).
Hence, in order to lay the foundations of the economic model we have to answer
the question: Why is geographical proximity - even in an age of long-distance mass
communication - still relevant?
At first glance the choice of firm location would be driven by consideration of
wages as well as factor, production and transport cost arguments (Weber, 1909). But
in the long run the capabilities to increase one’s own productivity and attract new
customer groups to one’s own products are understood to be major determinants of
the economic success of a firm (Porter, 1998).13 Both aspects are related to innova-
tions: First, process innovations enable the reduction of production cost and second,
product innovations allow a better meeting of consumer needs with advanced or new
products and services. As argued in the previous section, the capability to innovate
is driven by the input factor knowledge. But the production factor knowledge is
rather different from the traditional factors of production - labor, capital and land -
because it is to a high degree uncertain and often asymmetrically distributed among
agents (Nelson, 1991).14 Additionally, knowledge can be transmitted from its source
across geographical space without losing any economic value. But this flow of knowl-
edge is to a certain degree bounded and knowledge is not a pure public good. We
argue that the first frontier of knowledge spillovers is geographical distance despite
13See also the debate of firm strategy and dynamic capabilities in the previous Section 2.1.
14Alfred Marshall also highlights the role of knowledge, but he regards it as a part of capital
(Marshall, 1920, p.138).
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the existence of fax, telephone, email and the world wide web.
The crucial point for the argument is the distinction between information and
knowledge (Audretsch, 1998; Audretsch and Feldman, 2004), which was already
mentioned by Jacobs (1969). On the one hand, information such as the price of
a Siemens stock on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange or the exchange rate of Euro to
Dollar can be easily codified and exhibits a singular meaning and interpretation.
The telecommunication revolution has indeed drastically reduced cost and increased
speed and availability of information. On the other hand, knowledge is characterized
as vague, difficult to codify and seldom recognized as such (Dosi, 1988a). This so
called tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966) is difficult to formalize or write down and
is often embodied in people. Therefore, tacit knowledge is best transmitted from
face to face (von Hippel, 1994; Gertler, 1995). Examples of tacit knowledge are
learning to swim or to ride a bicycle. Hence, geographical proximity leads to a
higher possibility for direct communication between individuals, which favors the
exchange of tacit knowledge.
Apart from the ease of transmitting knowledge it should be mentioned that some
results are not published or codified at all. For example the failure of a scientific
experiment does not have good chances to get published although it might be of
great interest for people working in the same field. This knowledge might only spill
over by face-to-face contact between directly interacting people. Further, the local
social and organizational environment is understood to favor learning and asks for a
concentration of research activities on a single adequate spot (Asheim and Gertler,
2005). In the same way Malmberg and Maskell (2006) stress the localized capabilities
and conclude that interactive learning is a localized process.
The relation of spillovers and tacitness is not accepted by all writers in the
area of research. Breschi and Lissoni (2001a) discover a conceptual problem which
makes it difficult to fully understand the role of geographical proximity in knowledge
transmission. Howells (2002) points out that in Polanyi’s view explicit (or codified)
and tacit knowledge are not divided but should be seen rather as two extremes which
open up a continuum of many types of knowledge. Further, Torre and Rallet (2005)
criticize the thesis that geographical proximity leads to the sharing of tacit knowledge
whereas codified information can be accessed even from long-distance relations, as
being too simplistic. Like Howells (2002) they are convinced that information and
knowledge are difficult to separate. Furthermore, the authors find that other forms of
proximity like organizational proximity 15 can support the long-distance coordination
and that new technologies like chats, forums, or video-conferences become close
to oral communication. Nevertheless, Torre and Rallet (2005) see the importance
of face-to-face relations for innovative projects and for solving conflicts between
15See the debate on different types of proximity at the end of the last section.
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innovators. During these activities firms need to adjust their localization and seek
temporary16 or permanent geographical proximity to the innovators.
The differentiation between knowledge and information asks for a second look at
the channels of knowledge spillovers introduced on page 16 as some of these channels
are more local than others. Information in newspapers or on websites diffuses very
fast but tacit knowledge uses more local channels like personal contacts (Do¨ring
and Schnellenbach, 2006). Tacit knowledge is also incorporated in patents or other
scientific publications and apart from the publications themselves one might need
further explanations to really understand the content, which results from the fact
that not all relevant details are (or can be) codified. This may even be true in the case
of codified knowledge as its interpretation and assimilation may still require tacit
knowledge and, thus, geographical proximity (Howells, 2002). Hence, geographical
proximity also favors the distribution of codified knowledge.
Especially, firms will avoid the publication of knowledge that is particularly rele-
vant for process or product innovations. The fact that the source of new knowledge
matters for knowledge spillovers is one out of three conditions for the diffusion of
knowledge elaborated by Canie¨ls (2000): Source of knowledge (private or public),
capacities and willingness of the recipient of new knowledge, and the relationship
between the recipient and the source of the new knowledge. In contrast to firms
public sources of knowledge (e.g. universities) are in general more willing to publish
and circulate their research results because many and qualified publications add to
the reputation of the researcher and institution. The second condition incorporates
aspects of technological, and the third of geographical proximity.
Malmberg and Maskell (2006) argue that learning is indeed localized as it profits
from regular and direct face-to-face contacts and the communal sharing of cognitive
and social repertoires. In the horizontal dimension, which concerns competing firms
operating in the same industry, two effects for localization are distinguished by the
writers: Observability and comparability. First, closely located firms undertaking
similar activities may benefit from regular monitoring or even spontaneous observa-
tions that reveal every difference in the market behavior of the rivals. Second, the
sharing of common conditions, opportunities and threats displays the strengths and
weaknesses of myself and the competitors. Therefore, geographical proximity helps
firms to identify and imitate best-practice as well as to combine external superior
solutions with ideas of their own. Similar arguments about localized learning in
clusters can be found by Canie¨ls and Romijn (2003) and Dahl and Pedersen (2004).
According to Malmberg and Power (2005) firms in an agglomeration do not only
16For more details on the interpretation of temporary proximity please refer to the end of this
section.
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benefit from knowledge spillovers but may also create additional new knowledge.17
The authors analyze the empirical literature on clusters to identify potential mecha-
nisms of knowledge creation and evaluate them upon their empirical relevance. We
summarize their results in the following listing, where we mark the mechanism of
knowledge creation by ’+’ if there is empirical evidence for the result and by ’∼’ if
the empirical support is very little or ambiguous:
• Knowledge through interaction: Inter-firm business transactions (∼) and
non-transactional forms of inter-firm collaborations (∼)
• Knowledge through competition: Local rivalry (∼)
• Knowledge through knowledge spillovers: Social relations (+) and labor
market flows (+)
The first finding of Malmberg and Power (2005) does not support the view that
formal interaction between firms in an agglomeration is important for the creation
of knowledge. Some firms report that for their most important suppliers and cos-
tumers not local but global networks dominate. The positive effect of increased
competition in clusters put forward by Porter (1998) is only investigated by few
studies and, thus, there is only little support for the thesis that clusters enhance
local rivalry. It is striking that both considered channels of knowledge spillovers in
the form of social relations between individuals and local labor mobility are sup-
ported by empirical evidence. The latter is even indicated by firms as inducing
more problems than generating advantages. The authors conclude that knowledge
creation in clusters happens mostly not by organized inter-firm transactions and
collaborations but rather by rivalry, labor dynamics and informal contacts creating
knowledge spillovers.
As overall conclusion from the mentioned examples and empirical surveys cited
at the beginning of this section the following can be proposed: Although there
is some critique on the methodology of measuring knowledge spillovers (Breschi
and Lissoni, 2001a), empirical evidence suggests that geographical proximity clearly
matters in exploiting knowledge spillovers (Audretsch and Feldman, 2004). Or as
Do¨ring and Schnellenbach (2006) formulate on p. 383: ”[T]here appears to be a
widespread consensus that spatially confined knowledge-spillovers are an important
empirical phenomenon with a significant impact on economic performance”. Among
the key contributions which constitute this finding are the works of Jaffe et al.
(1993), who find that the trails of knowledge spillovers found in patent data are
geographically localized, Audretsch and Feldman (1996b), who stress the importance
17See also the idea-creating type of knowledge spillovers in Section 2.1.
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of the geography of innovation and production, and Zucker et al. (1998), who discover
the influence of top scientists on the clustering of high technology firms.
Some of the empirical studies can even provide a clear range of knowledge
spillovers. For example Anselin et al. (1997) propose that knowledge of university
research mainly spills over 50 miles away from the innovating metropolitan statistical
area, see Do¨ring and Schnellenbach (2006) on p. 384 for several other examples. An
interesting illustration of the geographical range of knowledge spillovers is worked
out by Peri (2005) and is shown in Figure 2.2. In his empirical study, which esti-
mated knowledge flows on the basis of 1.5 million patents from Europe and North
America during 1975-1996, the author finds evidence that only 20% of knowledge is
in average acquired outside the region and 9% outside the country of origin.
Figure 2.2: Decay of knowledge spillovers by technological class. Source: Peri (2005)
The decay of knowledge flows of several technologies in geographical space is
depicted in Figure 2.2. Here we see that the range of diffusion is by far greatest in
the computer industry. Despite the fact that less than 40% of knowledge in average
leaves the region of origin and approximately 25% of this knowledge flows out of
its country and linguistic area, computer technology appears to have a more global
scope of research (Peri, 2005). The knowledge flows in the other sectors are much
more localized and it seems that knowlegde in electronics and drugs sectors spreads
farther than in the mechanical or chemical sector. As with all proposed borders
of knolwedge flows the methodology can be critized in the way that the range is
often given through statistical areas (Do¨ring, 2004) and statistical state boundaries
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are maybe a poor proxy for geographical units of the knowledge circulation (Breschi
and Lissoni, 2001a). Nevertheless, the visualization of possible borders of knowledge
spillovers, which are statistical results and may not hold in the individual case, help
to stress the fact that learning is indeed localized.
Apart from the empirical works on innovation and geographical proximity there
is also a substantial theoretical literature on agglomeration and its relation to inno-
vation. For an overview of the historical development we refer to Rocha (2004) or
Simmie (2005) and an attempt of a graphical representation of the related theories
is provided by Moulart and Sekia (2003).
The topic of innovations and geographical proximity is debated under several
notions like the following:
• Polarization Theory (Myrdal, 1957; Hirschman, 1958)
• Growth Poles (Darwent, 1969; Richardson, 1976)
• Cluster (Porter, 1990, 1998)
• Innovative Milieu (Camagni, 1995; Ratti et al., 1997)
• Industrial District (Becattini, 1990; Dei Ottati, 1994)
• Proximity Tradition (Kirat and Lung, 1999)
• Regional Systems of Innovation (Cooke et al., 1997)
• New Industrial Spaces (Scott, 1988)
• Learning Region (Morgan, 1997)
• Localized Knowledge Spillovers (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001a; Canie¨ls and Romijn,
2003)
• Localized Learning (Malmberg and Maskell, 2006).
This diversity of theoretical approaches leads some scientists to claim that - al-
though using similar concepts - spatial innovation models suffer from conceptual
ambiguity (Moulart and Sekia, 2003). The classification of agglomerations and in-
troduction of ’brands’ for new strands of the literature is not seen to be very helpful
and often generates misunderstandings (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001a,b; Martin and
Sunley, 2003; Doloreux and Parto, 2004; Alecke and Untiedt, 2005). In particular
the cluster concept of Porter (1998) is criticized by Martin and Sunley (2003) as
being deliberately vague to admit a very wide spectrum of topics. Further, Over-
man (2004) argues that the literature on agglomeration could gain from the usage
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of formal models, which help to identify crucial assumptions and enforce internal
consistency, and rigorous empirical testing of the theory predictions. He is convinced
that economic geographers may benefit from standard economic methodologies in
order to clarify the relevant mechanisms as well as to develop a better theoretical
and empirical foundation of their ideas.
As background for our model in Chapter 4 the differentiation of spatial innova-
tion models is not of major interest since all of the mentioned works underline the
positive effect of geographical proximity on the exchange of knowledge. The varieties
of the several approaches is not (and probably should not) be modeled in order to
concentrate on elementary aspects. For example the complexity of a regional inno-
vation system can hardly be captured in analytical terms, which, in spite of more
freedom in the design, also holds in the case of a simulation model. Hence, for the
purpose of this book agglomeration, cluster, and geographical proximity are used as
synonyms. However, the main insight that geographical proximity favors knowledge
spillovers is taken as a crucial assumption for the formalization of the model.
On the other hand, the acceptance of spatially bounded knowledge spillovers
implies that geographical distance might be a good protection against the loss of
knowledge. Competition considerations are also an important factor in determining
which firms decide to enter a cluster in the first place as knowledge spillovers always
flow in two directions. Thus, a firm cannot prevent knowledge from spilling over to
possible competitors in the cluster and a firm inhabiting a particularly profitable
market niche or enjoying a technological lead might have strong incentives to choose
geographical isolation on the periphery rather than joining a cluster. This constitutes
the trade-off between learning and secrecy and it becomes obvious that knowledge
spillovers might be both - a centripetal and a centrifugal force.18
This context is very clearly addressed by Iammarino and McCann (2006), who
look at knowledge spillovers from two different perspectives, namely knowledge in-
flows and knowledge outflows. They argue that it is consensus that knowledge
inflows are regarded as positive for all firms. Contrary, knowledge outflows can have
both positive and negative consequences on the firm. A positive effect could emerge
if unintentional knowledge outflows contribute and strengthen the local knowledge
base. In that case other innovative firms may be attracted, which leads to larger
knowledge inflows to the firm in the future. This positive effect is contrasted by the
unintentional knowledge outflow of its valuable intellectual capital and intangible
knowledge assets. We previously discussed (in Section 2.1) that the loss of knowl-
edge assets might have very negative consequences on the profitability of firms as
intellectual capital can be used to differentiate the firm’s own products and earn
18See Krugman (1996) and Fujita and Thisse (2002) for the interpretation of centripetal and
centrifugal forces in geographical terms.
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innovative rents as well as to provide access to technology exchanges, joint ventures,
and R&D collaborations (Grindley and Teece, 1997).
There are some case studies and empirical works supporting the view that firms
avoid agglomerations because of the threat of unintentional knowledge spillovers.
For example Suarez-Villa and Walrod (1997) find empirical evidence that not being
located in a spatial cluster may be beneficial as firms are able to safeguard their
privacy and introduce new products earlier than their competitors. The authors
study the electronics industry in the metropolitan area of the Los Angeles basin,
where many locational alternatives are available and not being located in a cluster
may allow greater strategic flexibility. They find in their sample that profitability
and productivity were significantly lower for the clustered establishments. Further,
non-clustered establishments spent more on R&D and achieved greater economies
from the introduction of just-in-time and outsourcing activities than clustered es-
tablishments. The authors conclude from their observations that not being located
in a cluster may have been an advantage as some firms manage to maintain inde-
pendence and secrecy for their R&D activities and that many small, independent,
and R&D-intensive firms may have sought locations away from the larger produc-
ers found in clusters. Other case studies report a tendency for dominant firms in
their industries to locate away from clusters. For example, Microsoft is located in
Redmond / Washington and IBM developed its own personal computers in Boca
Ratton / Florida - both quite far away from Silicon Valley. Further, George Lucas’
Industrial Light and Magic is located near San Francisco and not in Hollywood (Au-
dretsch, 1998; Nachum and Wymbs, 2002). Other empirical studies with the result
that technologically advanced firms avoid agglomerations are: Rauch (1993); Sim-
mie (1998); Cantwell and Santangelo (1999); Shaver and Flyer (2000); Chung (2001);
Kalnins and Chung (2004); Nachum and Wymbs (2005); Alecke et al. (2006).19
There are of course also other counter-arguments for choosing a location in a
cluster, such as congestion cost like increasing land price, labor shortage and cost,
environmental problems or even a technological lock-in due to over-specialization20
(Martin and Sunley, 2003). These factors and the potential drawbacks of knowledge
spillovers are often not considered in the literature despite their significance for the
analysis of innovation and geographical proximity. In this work we abstract from
all locational factors but learning through knowledge spillovers and concentrate on
its impact on the economic competition. This endeavor is interesting and can be
justified because knowledge spillovers can at the same time be convincing for one
firm and deterring for another firm to settle in an agglomeration.
A critical matter of discussion about this argument could be the fact that firms
19Some of these studies are introduced at greater length in Section 6.2.
20See Sections 6.3 and 7.3 for a longer discussion on this issue.
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in reality do not change the geographical location of their research activities, which
are often conducted in their headquarter. The following question arises and needs to
be tackled: Do firms really change their geographical proximity in order to benefit
from or avoid knowledge spillovers?
There exist some empirical studies which look at the location choice of newly
founded firms. Buenstorf and Klepper (2004) and Klepper (2004) argue that spin-
offs typically remain at the location of the former parent organization. It is shown
that only a small percentage of the newly founded firms survive but a small part
of the surviving firms is fast-growing, mainly responsible for new job creation, and
additionally reveals very high locational dynamics, within as well as outside their
region of origin (Stam, 2006). In the latter work the probability for a locational
change of a firm in the considered knowledge-intensive industries rises with prior
knowledge and experience of the founders, with autonomy of local resource providers
and customers, and with less dependency on sunk cost. On the other hand, there
is some evidence in Dumais et al. (2002) that new firms are more likely to start
away from current geographic centers of the industry and growth is faster away
from those centers, which in combination reduces the degree to which industries
are geographically concentrated. Another very striking result of this study of U.S.
manufacturing industries during 1972-1992 is the fact that concentrated industries
appear to be fairly mobile. The fact that concentration emerges not simply from
never moving industries is seen to be compatible with the view that externalities
have a major influence on the levels of geographic concentration.
Some authors indeed argue that firms, and in particular multinational firms,
have become very active in geographical terms. Firms increasingly establish new
plants or branches in other places or foreign countries and regularly shift economic
activities between their branches, which leads to a sharp rise of foreign direct in-
vestments during the last decades (e.g. Venables and Navaretti, 2004). In the same
line Cantwell and Santangelo (2002) report that multinational enterprises disperse
their innovation activities geographically across a range of locations to access foreign
centers of excellence. Hereby, the multinational firms target certain agglomerations
where they can enjoy local externalities including knowledge spillovers.
Taking into account that not only firms but also whole industries can be mobile
in space, we further extend our interpretation of geographical proximity in two
ways. First, we state that geographical proximity incorporates aspects of temporary
spatial closeness. Second, we do not only understand the notion of geographical
proximity as one particular geographical location of all R&D of a firm but more as a
general innovation strategy which represents the general openness of a firm toward
competitors or external learning. These two extensions of geographical proximity
need to be assessed in more detail.
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First, the relevance of temporary geographical proximity is highlighted in recent
contributions to the literature (Torre and Rallet, 2005; Knoben and Oerlemans,
2006; Maskell et al., 2006). This notion implies that interacting agents need not be
in permanent spatial closeness, but that meetings, short visits and temporary geo-
graphical proximity can be very intense forms of knowledge exchange. Furthermore,
it is stressed that the importance of geographical proximity for learning during a
R&D project is not constant. Face-to-face contacts are more needed in certain
phases of an innovative collaboration, such as during initial negotiations and launch
of innovative projects (Rallet and Torre, 2000), during the creation and exchange
of fundamental and tacit knowledge (Knoben and Oerlemans, 2006), or during con-
flict management between innovators (Torre and Rallet, 2005). Further, Torre and
Rallet (2005) are convinced that the increasing mobility of men, which points at the
increasing significance of temporary proximity, is often neglected or underestimated
in the literature. The authors report that in France the number of people working
outside their home in a fixed location dropped by 4% and the number of workers
travelling as part of their work increased by 40% during 1982-1994. The travelling
of sales representatives, maintenance engineers, consultants, researchers, scientists,
and even private visits also contribute to temporary geographical proximity. Hence,
the constraint of geographical proximity, which is needed for knowledge spillovers,
can be fulfilled temporarily through travelling without permanent co-localization of
the partners (Torre and Rallet, 2005, p. 53).
In line with these observations the main focus of Maskell et al. (2006) lies on
trade fairs, exhibitions, conventions, congresses, and conferences and their similar-
ities to (temporary) clusters. The authors put forward the argument that these
phases of temporary geographical proximity help business people and profession-
als to compare their products, investigate innovation efforts of competitors, iden-
tify knowledge frontiers and monitor customer reactions. The mechanisms at work
during these short-lived and intense meetings are indeed comparable to knowledge
creation processes in agglomerations and, hence, favor spatially bounded knowledge
spillovers. Maskell et al. (2006) conclude that active participation in temporary
clusters might provide solitary firms access to distant markets or knowledge pools
without establishing a geographical location. Additionally, temporary clusters ap-
pear to be complements rather than substitutes to local learning in agglomerations
as they introduce new knowledge to the local knowledge base. See also Bathelt et al.
(2004) for potential benefits of global pipelines for clusters. Both phenomena show
that geography matters - in permanent or temporary form.
According to Torre and Rallet (2005) the size of firms seems to have an im-
pact on the possibilities for temporal localization. Big firms can more easily adjust
their geographical proximity by de-localizing part of their innovative staff for long
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intervals, whereas small firm do not have the same potential and are often forced
to adopt permanent co-location in order to benefit from external knowledge flows.
This sending of teams of researchers or the build-up for foreign research centers as
part of the firm strategy brings us to the other extension of geographical proximity.
Second, the notion of geographical proximity can take another interpretation in
the way that it describes the willingness and general openness of a firm to participate
in knowledge exchange activities. Examples of such knowledge exchange efforts
of firms, which do not hinge on the geographical location of the headquarter, are
the affinity of firms to visit fairs and conferences (see above), to initiate research
joint ventures with competitors, or to arrange for external research facilities like
R&D labs in knowledge intensive clusters. Further, this willingness can change
depending on the knowledge within the firm and the potential learning effect from
such innovation activities. For example, after the introduction of a radical product or
process innovation the firm might choose secrecy and not to participate in learning
activities in order not to communicate about its technological breakthrough. In
times when competitors appear to have a knowledge lead the firm might choose to
be more active and seek every opportunity to absorb external knowledge. While
doing so the firm itself produces knowledge outflows and offers to become an active
member of the knowledge exchange group. For example knowledge incorporated in
patents can be used to establish research joint ventures (Teece, 1998). In our view
an open research strategy is therefore equal to a location in geographical proximity
whereas a closed research strategy stands for a location on the periphery. In the first
situation the firm puts more weight on external learning possibilities, in the latter
on secrecy of its own research results.
A similar interpretation of geographical proximity like our second aspect is used
in a simulation model by Muller and Pe´nin (2007). In their model each firm possesses
knowledge held secret. This knowledge can be made available to others according to
a parameter which describes the open knowledge disclosure strategy of each agent.
The strategies can also be interpreted as being either more focused on current profits
or more long-term oriented. The more knowledge is disclosed, the lower the profits,
but the higher the reputation of a firm, which may enable more R&D cooperative
relationships in the future. The trade-off in their work is indeed very similar to
the main theme of this book, but a shortcoming of this model can be identified
in in its not considering aspects of absorptive capacity (see below) or not modeling
market interactions with consumers. Nevertheless, the results are interesting as they
indicate that there might exit a rational for behaviors of open knowledge disclosures
despite the fact that such strategies reduce profits in the short run, but pay out in the
long run because the increased reputation enables firms to access external sources
of knowledge in the future. As in the case of temporary geographical proximity it
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can be very easily argued that the change of strategy can be made much more easily
and faster than the change of geographical location of the whole firm.
Summing up the ideas of the last paragraphs we answer the above question: Yes,
firms can very abruptly alter their geographical proximity to competitors. In our
interpretation this does not necessarily mean that the firm moves its headquarter to
another site. Geographical proximity can also be adjusted through the presence at
events like fairs and conferences, the openness of one’s own R&D strategy in terms
of knowledge exchange with competitors, and the founding or closing of external
R&D facilities. The decision upon these activities can be made in no time and is
immediately effective. The choice of geographical proximity depends on the amount
and structure of the firm’s knowledge base which determines the level of knowledge
in- and outflows.
The amount and structure of the knowledge base is related to technological
proximity. How this determines the results of learning is the topic of the next
section.
2.3 Innovation and Technological Proximity
The flow of knowledge is not only influenced by geographical but also by technologi-
cal proximity. In order to assess the topic of innovation and technological proximity
we start by looking at the technological environment and ask whether a specialized
or diversified surrounding increases knowledge spillovers. After that, we concentrate
on our interpretation of technological proximity which completes the foundation of
the model.
One of the main points of interest is the question which regional setting is best
suited as an incubator for technological change and further concentration of eco-
nomic activity: Specialization or diversification of the local economic operations
(Desrochers, 2001). Accordingly, the degree of technological specialization of an ag-
glomeration should be of relevance for the intensity of knowledge transfer. Several
authors have studied the impact of technological specialization on local knowledge
spillovers, see e.g. Audretsch and Feldman (2004) but also earlier works like Hoover
(1937) and Lo¨sch (1940). See the following articles for recent reviews of the debate:
Audretsch and Feldman (2004); Koo (2005); Ejermo (2005); Do¨ring and Schnellen-
bach (2006); van der Panne and van Beers (2006).
There are mainly two competing hypotheses on the nature of knowledge exter-
nalities. As put forward by Marshall (1920), Arrow (1962), and Romer (1986) -
later labeled by Glaeser et al. (1992) as the Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) model
- the specialization hypothesis argues that knowledge tends to be industry-specific.
Hence, spillovers are expected to arise between firms within the same industry and
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the similarity of knowledge and activities promotes learning between individuals
and firms. Regional competition and specialization favor local knowledge spillovers
among similar firms. These intra-industry spillovers are known as localization or
specialization externalities.21 Empirical support for these claims was given e.g. by
van der Panne (2004) or Ejermo (2005).
By contrast, the alternative hypothesis proposes that knowledge spills over be-
tween complementary rather than within industries. As argued by Jacobs (1969)
the exchange of complementary knowledge across economic agents enhances learning
and leads to a cross-fertilization, which again fosters innovations. Ideas developed by
one industry can be useful for other industries and, therefore, technological diversity
favors knowledge spillovers. According to her a variety of industries within an ag-
glomeration promotes knowledge externalities and a diversified regional production
structure is expected to increase local knowledge and to give rise to urbanization
or diversification externalities. Following this argument knowledge spillovers mostly
happen between firms of different industries. As in the case of specialization ex-
ternalities the diversity thesis is supported by empirical works, too. Examples are
Feldman and Audretsch (1999) or van Oort (2002). In a study of German data from
1993 to 2001 Suedekum and Blien (2005) see empirical evidence that Jacobs ex-
ternalities are relevant both in manufacturing and service industries whereas MAR
externalities matter only in services.
Several other authors do not approve of either specialization or diversification,
but take a middle position or see the importance of both types of knowledge spillovers
depending on the type of innovations or the stage of product development. A recent
study by Cantner and Graf (2004) provides further empirical indication concerning
specialization and cooperation. In their work cooperation is measured by the num-
ber of participating firms on assigned patents. The authors find that technological
moderately specialized regions show the highest number of research cooperations,
and the higher a region’s specialization, the more cooperations are formed between
partners outside that region. Taking cooperations as a proxy for knowledge spillover,
this results indicates that the exchange of knowledge is highest in moderately spe-
cialized clusters. A similar finding is provided by Fritsch and Slavtchev (2007), who
suggest an inverted u-shaped relationship between regional specialization in certain
industries and innovative performance. According to their German data from 1995
to 2000 a high specialization as well as great diversity of the sectoral structure in a
region might reduce innovative performance. Hence, these papers argue against an
extremely specialized or diversified technological environment.
Further, it is argued that firms with focus on incremental innovations benefit
mostly from intra-industry knowledge spillovers whereas firms with focus on radi-
21See also the differentiation between localizational and urbanization externalities on page 15.
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cal innovations benefit more from inter-industry knowledge spillovers (Do¨ring, 2004;
Do¨ring and Schnellenbach, 2006). The hypothesis that both types of knowledge
spillovers may be relevant at the same time is put forward by van der Panne and
van Beers (2006). They find that specialized regions accommodate a higher number
of innovators and, consistently, firms’ innovativeness increases with regional spe-
cialization. But after the market introduction of a product the innovators in a
diversified surrounding prove to be more economically successful. The writers con-
clude that at different stages in new product development there is room for both
types of knowledge spillovers.
The debate on the two types of knowledge spillovers shows that learning de-
pends on the external technological environment of the firm. But at the same time
the internal firm capabilities do have a major impact on learning from knowledge
spillovers. The exchange of knowledge does not happen automatically and some
firms benefit more than others from the same opportunities. It is widely accepted
that in order to recognize, understand, and economically exploit external knowledge
the firm has to develop special abilities which are denoted as absorptive capacity
(Rosenberg, 1974; Nelson, 1982; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990). One way to cre-
ate such an absorptive capacity is for a firm to perform their own in-house research
and development activities. Therefore, a firm’s own R&D does not only gener-
ate innovations but develops the firm’s potential to identify, assimilate, and exploit
knowledge from competitors, companies of other industries, or public institutions
like universities. This characteristic is marked by Cohen and Levinthal (1989) as
the dual role of R&D. Hence, this argument again refers to the interpretation of
knowledge as a not purely public good as firms have to bear knowledge processing
and imitation costs to absorb outside knowledge and implement it in the form of
product or process innovations.
The concept of absorptive capacity can be understood in the way that the knowl-
edge bases of two interacting partners should not be too different in order to under-
stand each other. In other words: The absorptive capacity sets a lower bar for the
agents’ knowledge heterogeneity. On the other hand, the learning effect is also re-
duced if a firm wants to absorb very similar knowledge. Therefore, the heterogeneity
of knowledge should be ”sufficiently small to allow for understanding but sufficiently
large to yield non-redundant, novel knowledge” (Nooteboom, 2000, p. 72). The
outcome of the knowledge exchange process could be described as a hump-shaped
relation depending on technological proximity (Nooteboom, 1992, 2000; Wuyts et al.,
2005). Although Nooteboom (2000) talks in this context of cognitive distance his
concept can be well applied to our interpretation of technological proximity as we,
in contrast to Knoben and Oerlemans (2006), explicitly include aspects of cognitive
proximity in the term technological proximity.
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Figure 2.3: Cognitive distance and learning. Source: Wuyts et al. (2005)
Figure 2.3 visualizes the relationship between cognitive respectively technological
distance and learning. The effectiveness of learning is seen as the product of novelty
value and understandability. Learning is maximized for a medium level of cognitive
distance, which is denoted as optimal cognitive distance. This means that firms
need partners with a similar and complementary but not identical knowledge base.
Learning presupposes differences of perception, interpretation and knowledge but
at the same time also the existence of certain common concepts and procedures to
maintain an effective linkage between partners (Nooteboom, 1992). A change of the
absorptive capacity of a firm entails a shift of the line indicating understandability,
e.g. a firm with a low absorptive capacity shifts the understandability line down-
wards, which yields a lower optimal cognitive distance. This is in line with empirical
research which finds that small and technologically not very advanced firms prefer to
co-operate with sources of limited capacities like customers, suppliers and colleagues
instead of universities and technological institutes, which might be better partners
for greater and technologically more advanced firms (Nooteboom, 2000). Hence, it is
important to point out that such optimal cognitive distance is not fixed but depends
on the knowledge and capabilities of the firm, which can of course change over time.
Like in the examples above finding the right collaboration partner becomes a central
issue.
The existence of an optimal level of two forms of cognitive distance (technolog-
ical and organizational cognitive distance22) is empirically tested by Wuyts et al.
22Both aspects are, in our understanding, part of technological proximity.
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(2005) for two scenarios. In the first case the focus is set upon on a pharmaceutical
firm’s overall technological cognitive distance with its biotechnology partners. The
results indicate that technological innovations are most likely to occur at intermedi-
ate levels of partner dispersion. The second case reveals some statistical influence of
technological and organizational cognitive distance on alliance formation in the ICT
industries during 1981-1986. Further, the studies indicate that for alliances in ICT
industries organizational cognitive distance is, in contrast to the first case, more im-
portant than technological cognitive distance. The authors explain this result with
the fact that in ICT industries learning is more oriented toward organization because
here the technology involved is more standardized. As an overall conclusion they see
empirical support for the optimal cognitive distance in both scenarios. Another em-
pirical approach approving optimal cognitive distance is given by Nooteboom et al.
(2007).
So far the literature introduced is dealing with one aspect of technological prox-
imity which can be described as the difference of the knowledge bases of the inter-
acting partners. Another aspect of technological proximity refers to the positioning
in a technology space. Among the first papers to use a measure of technological
proximity between patent classes is the work by Jaffe (1986). The author finds that
R&D productivity is increased by research activities of other firms in the same area,
but these technological neighbors reduce the profits of firms with low R&D invest-
ments. In a later work by Adams and Jaffe (1996) the significance of geographical
and technological proximity for the flow of knowledge is supported. The measure
of technological closeness is also used by Autant-Bernard (2001), who describes the
technological position of regions. She finds evidence that departments in France
with less affinity to their neighbors are less innovative whereas departments that
are technologically close to their whole neighborhood generate more innovative out-
put. Further, the author interprets her results to the effect that geographical and
technological proximity are rather complements, both favoring knowledge spillovers
between regions. Fung (2003) provides a more methodologically oriented discussion
of two measures of technological proximity constructed from patent statistics. Fi-
nally, Orlando (2004) and Fischer et al. (2006) again debate the role of geographical
and technological proximity for local knowledge spillovers.
In the seminal article by Jaffe (1986) it is assumed that if both firms have
patented in roughly the same classes the proximity measure becomes close to one,
and it is approximately zero if patenting activities are greatly different (Los and
Verspagen, 2007). Instead of a weight term it might be more consistent to assume
a technological distance of zero, if knowledge belongs to the same technology. But
a positioning with a technological distance close to zero appears to conflict with the
argumentation from above, where a middle technological proximity of the knowledge
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gaps between collaborators is understood to be optimal. Therefore, we need to dif-
ferentiate both effects in the interpretation of technological proximity and take both
into account for the formalization of knowledge spillover in the model. We do this
and argue that the heterogeneity of knowledge can be expressed by the technological
distance, measured by the path between two technologies in a technology space, and
the technological gap between the knowledge stock of two firms in these technolo-
gies. Both elements are relevant for the resulting learning effect through knowledge
spillover. Furthermore, in our model the technological proximity is connected to the
characteristics and features of the product which are demanded by the consumers.
Accordingly, the definition of technological proximity incorporates three prop-
erties, namely the distance in a technology and product space as well as the level
of technological overlap of the knowledge bases of two collaborating actors (see also
Knoben and Oerlemans, 2006). Therefore, the several meanings of our interpreta-
tion of technological proximity for the purpose of this work can be summarized as
follows:
• Distance between technologies in a technology space
• Technological gap between knowledge stocks
• Characteristics in a product space.
The learning effect between two collaborating agents rises if distance in the tech-
nology space becomes very small and the level of technological overlap is neither
too small nor too great. Learning is maximized if the distance in the technology
space is equal to zero and the technological gap equals the absorptive capacity of
the recipient.23
The third characteristic aiming at product differentiation is not relevant for the
learning outcome. However, the connection to the product space enables the as-
sessment of the economic value of the firm’s knowledge through the interaction on
a product market. Here the economic value of the firm’s own knowledge depends
on the knowledge of the competitors, the preferences of the consumers and the sub-
stitutability to other product variants. The closer the products are in the product
space, which is by assumption equal to the technology space, the more likely are
consumers to switch to neighboring variants.
Our view of technological proximity can also be related to the discussion whether
innovations emerge mainly from technology-push or demand-pull, see Schmookler
(1966) and the relevant points in Section 2.1. The technology-push argument in
our setting suggests that transfer of existing knowledge to new innovations happens
23This context is captured in equation (4.10) which describes learning through knowledge
spillovers.
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if the technological distance in the technology space becomes very small and the
knowledge stocks in the neighboring technologies take values close to the absorptive
capacity of the firm. In that case there exist best conditions for internal knowledge
transfer and, hence, the extension of the knowledge base of the firm, which might
result in innovations. These innovations occur mostly due to internal learning and
R&D building upon the existing technological expertise of the firm. They are, so
to say, technology-pushed. The demand-pull argument is of course related to the
interpretation of distances in the product space. Profits from innovation promise to
be higher the more demand can be attracted to the new product - in other words
the greater is the distance to the neighbors in the product space. The idea is in line
with Schumpeter (1912), who states that innovators seek for profitable opportunities
to earn innovative rents. A great market niche may stand for such an opportunity
to combine features and introduce a product which entails the characteristics of this
market segment.24 In conclusion, we argue that our interpretation of technological
proximity captures both elements for the creation of innovations: Either a firm’s
own knowledge and local search in the technology space leads to new findings, or
a relatively great market niche attracts the interest of firms, which leads to inten-
sified R&D in that area. Which elements are understood to be more significant or
whether the same weight is put on both, is a matter of firm strategy. But in general
both aspects have to be taken into account and, as both mechanisms often work
simultaneously, it is hard to differentiate between the real origin of innovation.
Technological diversification is also is closely related to market or product dif-
ferentiation (Fai, 2003). The Industrial Organization literature provides a broad
discussion of horizontal and vertical product differentiation (e.g. Tirole, 1988). On
the one hand, products might differ in their cost or quality, whereas from a model-
ing point of view both aspects can be handled as the same. The differentiation in
cost or quality is called vertical product differentiation. On the other hand, there
is competition due to the characteristics of each product under the assumption that
consumers do not prefer the same kind of products. An example of horizontal prod-
uct differentiation is the range of software offered with a computer whereas the
different operating speeds of personal computers might be an example of vertical
product differentiation (Sutton, 1986). Hence, horizontal product differentiation
comes close to our understanding of technological proximity in the product space.25
Now, we should have a clearer picture of the relevant elements of innovation and
the meaning of geographical as well as technological proximity. The interpretation of
both - geographical and technological proximity - lies at the center of this work and
24The relationship between technological distance and its connection to a product space is also
highlighted by Antonelli (2004).
25However, in the model we will also consider vertical product differentiation as the production
costs depend on the knowledge stock in a specific technology, see Section 4.1.2.
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we hope that the previous two sections have clarified our meaning. We continue with
the next chapter, which discusses the availability of appropriate economic models to
investigate those forms of proximity and the need for a new modeling approach.
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Chapter 3
Economic Models of Innovation
and Proximity
The modeling of learning through knowledge spillover depending on proximity and
economic market interactions has proven to be a difficult task. Economic equilibrium
models have the advantage of being fully analytically tractable whereas simulation
models allow for more degrees of freedom, e.g. in the description of a geographical or
technological space. This chapter introduces examples of economic models of both
types, which are related to the topic of innovation and proximity. We then debate
the methodology of agent-based simulation and argue why it could be appropriate in
this context. Further, we argue that the cited models are not well suited to provide
answers to the research questions of this work.
3.1 Analytical Models
The first model of geographical space is believed to be one of the first abstract eco-
nomical models in history. It is the work by Thu¨nen (1910) originally published in
1826. In the model he introduces the concept of land rents and their impact on the
location of mostly agricultural firms around a center. The center typically repre-
sents a city and the analysis is driven by transport costs of perishable goods. Works
like Christaller (1933) and Lo¨sch (1940) show how economies of scale in connection
with transport costs lead to a pattern described as central places. Another strand of
literature on the geographical location of plants which already considers benefits of
agglomerations was established by Weber (1909). A classical paper worth mention-
ing is the model by Hotelling (1929) which introduces market-based strategies in the
location decision of firms. Despite the fact that d’Aspremont et al. (1979) contra-
dict the results of the original model because they prove that the original Hotelling
solution is no Nash equilibrium, the methodology and formalization of horizontal
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product differentiation influenced many scholars in the field of spatial competition.1
We will come back to this seminal paper during the description of the demand side
in the model in Section 4.2.
Although many early economists considered space - at that time is was mainly
geographical space - as a crucial element of economic analysis, the literature in later
times almost ignored geography (Krugman, 1991b). In order to re-introduce geog-
raphy back into the theoretical debate Krugman (1991b) formulated an economic
model which indeed established a new strand of literature. These so called ’New
Economic Geography’ (NEG) models put transport cost and increasing returns into
their main interest and try to explain concentration of economic activity. The ba-
sic setting of geography as core and periphery is simple but useful to disentangle
agglomerating and de-agglomerating forces.2 Surveys about NEG models can be
found in Ottaviano and Puga (1998); Fujita et al. (2001); Fujita and Thisse (2002).
Interesting is the fact, that though Krugman (1991a) mentions knowledge spillovers
as a major force of agglomeration, he regarded them not to be theoretically possible
to handle: ”[k]nowledge flows . . . are invisible; they leave no paper trail by which
they may be measured and tracked, and there is nothing to prevent the theorist from
assuming anything about them that she likes” (Krugman, 1991a, p. 53). Authors
like Jaffe et al. (1993) responded that this is not true and that knowledge flows
can be measured empirically through patent citations. Martin and Sunley (1996)
are convinced that the ignorance of knowledge externalities is the most important
limitation of the NEG literature. Later followers of the NEG approach tried to in-
ternalize knowledge spillovers in this framework, see Martin and Ottaviano (1999);
Baldwin et al. (2001). Furthermore, it has been argued that the framework of NEG
assumes very specific functions, is not truly dynamic and does not catch the strate-
gic behavior of firms, see e.g. Neary (2001). Especially the ignorance of strategic
elements of the firms is criticized by Shaver and Flyer (2000). They argue that NEG
models of monopolistic competition are not well suited to study strategic interac-
tions like positioning and price competition. Further, it is debated that the NEG
models discuss the location of whole industries and ignore the location decisions of
single firms (Boschma and Lambooy, 1999; Stam, 2006). One can also add that
most of these NEG models are not fully analytically solvable and therefore lose one
of the main advantages of stylized mathematical models. Further critique of the
NEG theory can be found in Martin (1999b) and Meardon (2001).
A third type of equilibrium models puts knowledge spillovers at the center of
their attention. The so called ’New Endogenous Growth Theory’ builds upon the
neoclassical growth model of Solow (1956, 1957), in which technological progress was
1See for example Economides (1986) for a two-dimensional version of this approach.
2This structure is also adapted in our model, see Section 4.3.3.
41
understood to be exogenous. The new theory tries to describe growth through tech-
nical progress generated within the model, see Romer (1986); Lucas (1988); Romer
(1990); Grossman and Helpman (1991); Aghion and Howitt (1997). In particular
Paul Romer stressed the importance of knowledge externalities and their role for
growth. In Romer (1986) he points at the public good effect of knowledge spillovers
and in Romer (1990) the flow of knowledge is captured in intermediate technology
designs. Martin and Sunley (1998) criticized the approach for being overwhelmingly
abstract and not incorporating aspects of geography.
A fourth class of models debates the effect of knowledge spillovers in game-
theoretic models following the seminal work of Arrow (1962). DeBondt (1997) sum-
marizes these articles from the Industrial Organization literature. More recent pa-
pers highlight the role of internal and external knowledge spillovers (Gersbach and
Schmutzler, 1999), research joint ventures and knowledge spillovers (Katsoulacos
and Ulph, 1998; Kamien and Zang, 2000), an interpretation of horizontally differ-
entiated knowledge on a circular technological space (Berliant et al., 2006), and the
flow of localized knowledge through the exchange of employees between competing
firms (Gersbach and Schmutzler, 2003; Fosfuri and Rønde, 2004; Alsleben, 2005;
Combes and Duranton, 2006). In order to debate the possibilities to model aspects
of innovation and proximity we have a closer look at the model of Alsleben (2005).
The model proposed by Alsleben (2005) highlights the possible trade-off which
could emerge in the context of knowledge externalities: Should firms co-locate and
benefit from knowledge spillover or are they better off in separation? Here knowledge
spillovers occur due to a very concrete mechanism in the form of mutual labor poach-
ing. Knowledge is understood to be employed in ’key employees’ (e.g. managers,
engineers, scientists) and may flow between firms in geographically close location.
Another assumption is the fact that firms may prevent poaching by offering their
workers higher wages. Therefore a firm may influence not only their own, but also
the wages and fraction of moving labor of the competitors. The basic setup of the
model considers Cournot competition between two firms producing a homogeneous
good. In an extension the assumption of a duopoly is relaxed but results also hold
in the case of a symmetrical oligopoly. Firms decide upon four strategic variables
in four stages: Location, height of wages for their own labor, fraction of attracted
labor from the competitor, and quantities. Solving the model leads to two possible
solutions: Either both firms co-locate with full poaching or firms choose separation
with zero wages and zero fraction of attracted labor. In contrast to Combes and
Duranton (2006), who consider a similar model with Bertrand competition, in the
model by Alsleben (2005) firms never co-locate with partial poaching. The model is
extended to the effect that firms differ in their ability to absorb knowledge spillovers.
As a result the low-quality firm wants to join the high-quality firm but not vice versa.
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If both firms choose their location simultaneously, only equilibria in mixed strategies
can be calculated.
The model by Alsleben (2005) is a good example of the description of the prox-
imity and strategic behavior of firms in a stylized game-theoretic model. The result
that firms always prefer isolation unless they swap their entire personnel is interest-
ing, since it indicates possible disadvantages of knowledge spillovers. But we would
like to argue that some assumptions of this approach are very strong and that the
introduction of innovation in this model would impose difficulties. First, the model
describes the way of knowledge spillovers through the flow of labor. Although the
mechanism is convincing, the modeling approach does not consider any labor mar-
ket or specific knowledge of the workers. As formalized in the model the externality
could take the form of any other cost reducing mechanism. Further, the fact that
firms are able to prevent knowledge from spilling over in close geographical proxim-
ity is a rather strong assumption as argued in the previous chapter. Second, in the
model the benefits of labor poaching reduce production costs in a linear form. As ar-
gued in Section 2.3 there is empirical evidence that learning takes a rather non-linear
form. Third, it is not possible to retrieve a solution with heterogeneous firms. In this
context this is a major disadvantage, because one of the main research question asks
which type of firms agglomerate in a cluster. Fourth, the analysis is static, whereas
the strategic behavior over time is probably more instructive. Fifth, the competition
considers a homogeneous good although the author himself regards product differ-
entiation as an important point in the analysis. As a last point of criticism we would
like to add that no innovations are incorporated in the model. A proper description
of strategic innovation behavior needs the formalization of dynamics, heterogeneity
and uncertainty. Since the model already has problems describing the competition
between firms which differ only in the ability to benefit from knowledge spillovers,
this methodology seems to be limited for the purpose of this work. The next section
introduces a different modeling approach which is probably more suitable for the
formalization of innovation and proximity in an economic model.
3.2 Simulation Models
As a response to Solow (1957) another group of authors tried to endogenize the
process of technological change and economic growth with the help of simulation
techniques. Probably the most famous model is described in Part IV in Nelson and
Winter (1982). Building on this approach there emerged a literature on growth-
oriented simulation models like Silverberg and Verspagen (1994); Fagiolo and Dosi
(2003); Dosi et al. (2006). The same authors also provide the seminal work for
an industry model of Schumpeterian competition in Part V of Nelson and Winter
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(1982) that is fundamental for our approach.3
In this section we survey all types of industry simulation models which capture
aspects of innovation and proximity. A broader overview of simulation models focus-
ing on innovation and the technological development of an industry is presented in
Dawid (2006). Other surveys focus more on clusters and industrial districts (Fioretti,
2006), complexity theory (Frenken, 2006) or economic growth (Windrum, 2007).
Here we concentrate on models which describe the technological development
of an industry in relation to learning in some sort of geographical or technological
space. In order to group the several models we differentiate between geographical
and technological proximity. All relevant models are categorized in Table 3.1. Cellu-
lar automata, cluster and networks constitute the group of geographical proximity.
Learning, product space and technological regimes are related to the interpretation
of technological proximity.
Further, there exist simulation models that cannot be related to a geographical
or technological space. Apart from the models on economic growth (see above)
authors work on topics as replication of industry empirics (Winter et al., 2000,
2003), industry life cycles (Klepper, 1996; Windrum and Birchenhall, 1998; Saviotti
and Pyka, 2004; Windrum and Birchenhall, 2005) , and a history-friendly approach
(Malerba et al., 1999, 2001).
In the following we explain different interpretations of proximity and briefly
present the methodology and outcome of selected models.
3.2.1 Simulation Models of Geographical Proximity
The simulation models which consider geographical proximity are grouped into mod-
els of cellular automata, clusters and networks. The cellular automata framework
was introduced by von Neumann and Burks (1966) and became quite popular with
the book by Epstein and Axtell (1996). In the models of the cellular automata
framework agents interact in some sort of regular space, for example a lattice in
various forms. In the models by Verspagen (1993); Canie¨ls (2000); Keilbach (2000)
and Canie¨ls and Verspagen (2001) agents represent regions or countries whereas in
the other models agents represent firms. In the first type regions benefit from spa-
tially bounded knowledge spillovers whereas the intensity of spillovers depends on
geographical distance between regions due to the location on the lattice. We later
come back to these works because they capture aspects of learning in technological
distance, too.
The latter models focus on firm behavior in a cellular automata environment.
3A more analytical approach which is based on the ideas of Nelson and Winter (1982) is pre-
sented by Iwai (1984a,b) and a different formalization to the development of routines is given in
Kwasnicki and Kwasnicka (1992).
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Geographical Proximity
Cellular Automata
Verspagen (1993); Jonard and Yildizoglu (1998); Canie¨ls
(2000); Keilbach (2000); Canie¨ls and Verspagen (2001);
Brenner (2001); Berger (2001); Otter et al. (2001);
Zhang (2003); Brenner (2004)
Cluster
Fioretti (2001); Squazzoni and Boero (2002); Albino
et al. (2003); Boero et al. (2004); Fratesi (2004); Bor-
relli et al. (2005); Ciarli and Valente (2005); Suire et al.
(2006)
Networks
Jonard and Yildizoglu (1998); Gilbert et al. (2001);
Meagher and Rogers (2004); Cowan et al. (2004); Cowan
and Jonard (2004); Muller and Pe´nin (2007)
Technological Proximity
Learning
Verspagen (1993); Cantner and Pyka (1998a,b); Canie¨ls
(2000); Canie¨ls and Verspagen (2001); Gilbert et al.
(2001); Reichenstein (2003); Knott (2003); Meagher and
Rogers (2004); Canals et al. (2004a,b)
Product Space
Cooper (2000); Silverberg and Verspagen (2003); Ma
and Nakamori (2005); Silverberg and Verspagen (2005,
2007)
Technological Regimes
Winter (1984); Dosi et al. (1995); Meyer et al. (1996);
Wakeley (1998); Llerena and Oltra (2002); Garavaglia
et al. (2006)
Table 3.1: Simulation models of innovation and proximity.
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Jonard and Yildizoglu (1998) and Zhang (2003) introduce extensions of the tra-
ditional Nelson and Winter (1982) model with a technological space and spatially
bounded knowledge externalities. Hereby, Jonard and Yildizoglu (1998) may also
be understood as a network and is discussed at a later point. Zhang (2003) stud-
ies the formation of high-tech industrial clusters in a two-dimensional geographical
space. Otter et al. (2001) model the interaction between households and firms in
the context of regional economics.
Two works in that category are of particular interest as they use real world data
in order to evaluate the simulation model. The article by Berger (2001) develops
a agent-based simulation of innovation diffusion in the context of agriculture eco-
nomics. The model is calibrated with an empirical data set from Chile. The results
of Berger (2001) include a replication of the typical diffusion patterns and real world
prices and quantities. Further, several policy scenarios are examined with the help of
the model. The second model is proposed by Brenner (2004) and is based on earlier
work by Brenner (2001). The book by Brenner (2004) tries to find answers to the
questions why local industrial cluster exist, when and where they emerge, and how
they can be characterized. The author highlights the role of local self-augmenting
processes. Apart from an empirical investigation of clusters in Germany a dynamic
simulation model is formulated which incorporates spin-offs, accumulation of hu-
man capital, and knowledge spillovers decreasing in spatial distance. Geographical
space is represented by the administrative districts of Germany. Those districts are
sorted on a two-dimensional lattice in accordance with their calculated center of
gravity. The major results indicate that the considered self-augmenting processes
are together able to cause clusters but this process is not deterministic. Further, it
is shown that the early times of emergence have a strong impact on the development
of clusters.
The second types of simulation models in connection with geographical proximity
analyze interactions within existing clusters.4 Most of the articles are based on the
concept of industrial district, see also Section 2.2. For example Borrelli et al. (2005)
investigate the performance of the industrial district in relation to different scenarios.
Different types of firms interact on a grid similar to cellular automata models, but in
this case the grid stands for communication and information processing mechanisms
inside the industrial district. The observation of the model outcome shows that
cooperative districts do not always perform best, which is, as the authors note, a
widespread opinion in the industrial district literature. In particular a turbulent
market demand generates best results in an industrial district in which cooperation
and competition are balanced. The main disadvantage of the models in this category
is the fact that by assumption firms cannot decide whether to be part of the cluster
4See Bischi et al. (2003) for an analytical model of two clusters.
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or not. Hence, the models neglect strategic firm behavior in the context of spatial
and technological location.
The third group of models of a geographical space relies on networks. Although
the interpretation of a network is more based on organizational proximity, one can
find arguments in favor of its connection to geographical proximity. As elaborated
in Section 2.2 the interpretation of geographical proximity incorporates temporary
face-to-face contacts or even general openness toward knowledge exchange with other
firms and institutions. Both can be achieved with partners who can be sorted in a
type of network. Hence, we see networks as one way to organize knowledge exchange
in close geographical proximity.
Jonard and Yildizoglu (1998) introduce localized learning in a network into the
traditional model by Nelson and Winter (1982). The network is interpreted as a two-
dimensional closed lattice, which again borrows from the cellular automata approach,
see above. The authors study the persistence of technological diversity which in their
model is higher in a situation with an intermediate level of localization. This leads to
the conclusion that there is no obvious increasing or decreasing relationship between
localized learning and diversity.
Gilbert et al. (2001) describe the interaction of agents with a specified knowledge
base in an innovation network, thus providing another example of a simulation model
of this category. The article uses very sophisticated types of knowledge stocks and
labels them as kenes. In their view a kene is given through the triple of technological
capabilities, the agent’s ability, and expertise level in different technological fields.
The firms undergo research activities modifying and improving their kenes in order
to discover the technology space and benefit from innovations. Thus, the model
does not consider market interactions, rather there is a financial reward system for
successful innovations. Research strategies of the agents include collaborations in
networks where they can modify their kenes by exchanging knowledge with cooper-
ation partners. Aspects of learning through technological proximity and absorptive
capacity are captured in the number of overlapping capabilities. The minimum
amount of overlapping capabilities needed for learning is studied in several scenar-
ios. Furthermore, the authors apply their simulation model to different case studies
and discuss policy relevant issues like the role of policy as an integrating actor in
networks. Apart from the network structure the model is also mentioned in learning
in the group of technological proximity.
In Meagher and Rogers (2004) the authors debate the influence of structure
and function of a network on knowledge spillovers. The network is modeled as a
cellular automaton but here the categorization is based on the interpretation of
space which is in line with the purpose of the article. In this article the authors
make use of a similar interpretation of closeness between firms, which depends on
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the relative position of firms on the network. Apart from the interpretation of
geographical proximity later in the article this closeness is seen as distance in a
technology space. Because of this the model is mentioned in the section dealing with
learning in technological proximity, too. The results show that there is a complex
relationship between spillovers and aggregate innovation as well as an influence of
network density on the overall outcome for innovation.
The models of Cowan and Jonard (2004) and Cowan et al. (2004) consider a
network structure where all agents are located on a circle. Each agent may possess
connections to direct neighbors or to more distant partners. In Cowan and Jonard
(2004) the focus is set on diffusion of knowledge and informal knowledge trading
between actors on the network. The authors find that best diffusion5 occurs in a
network where most of the connections are local, supported by few global connec-
tions. The later model by Cowan et al. (2004) gives evidence that spatial clustering
favors growth of knowledge in industries where tacit knowledge is important. Fur-
ther, the simulations by Muller and Pe´nin (2007) indicate that there might exit a
rational for behaviors of open knowledge disclosures as such strategies might be risky
in the short run but may pay out in the long run.6
3.2.2 Simulation Models of Technological Proximity
Simulation models with features of technological proximity can be divided into learn-
ing, product space and technological regimes. We go through the three types of
models and then discuss why there might be need for an additional model which
combines geographical and technological proximity.
The first type of models formalize learning depending on distance between two
technologies or on the technological gap which stands for the difference of knowledge
stocks. These knowledge stocks belong either to the same technology or to different
technologies. In the latter case one can combine technological distance and tech-
nological gap in order to describe knowledge transfer between agents, see Section
2.3.
A good example of models which look at spillovers in relation to the knowledge
gap are the models by Verspagen (1993); Canie¨ls (2000); Canie¨ls and Verspagen
(2001). As mentioned above the agents stand for regions and knowledge diffuses
through knowledge spillovers which are modeled as a hump-shaped function of the
technology gap between two regions. In contrast to Verspagen (1993) the model
of Canie¨ls (2000) and Canie¨ls and Verspagen (2001) allows spillovers to occur in
both directions - from the technological leading agent to the backward agent and
5See Silverberg et al. (1988) for another simulation model on diffusion.
6See also the interpretation of network and geographical proximity in this work presented in
Section 2.2.
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vice versa. Although the first amount is larger, it is assumed that both benefit
through spillovers of complementary knowledge. In all models the level of knowledge
spillovers is highest if the technological gap equals a parameter which is interpreted
as the absorptive capacity.7
Other approaches adapt the formal description of knowledge spillovers by Verspa-
gen (1993) and build an industry dynamic model with heterogeneous knowledge
spillover. Here interactions of agents on product market are modeled while focus-
ing either on the absorptive capacity of firms in Cantner and Pyka (1998a) or the
selection process with different technologies in Cantner and Pyka (1998b). Espe-
cially in the first article the authors extend the idea of absorptive capacity and
find that building up absorptive capacity is a superior strategy in technologically
heterogeneous environments.
Reichenstein (2003) extends the Nelson and Winter (1982) framework and mod-
ifies the imitation outcome. The author alters the imitation process to the effect
that productivity increases through imitation depending on the technology gap to
the best-practice of the industry. The resulting productivity is a concave function
of the imitation efforts and approaches the maximum productivity of the previous
period. Hence, the higher the technology gap, the higher is the amount of learning.
This conflicts with the previous models following Verspagen (1993) which assume a
hump-shaped relation.
A simulation model about heterogeneity and innovation in the context of firm
strategy is introduced by Knott (2003). The heterogeneity of firms comes in the form
of knowledge stocks, physical and technological location. The knowledge stocks can
change over time, but their locations are fixed. The use of a geographical space is
due to the modeling of diffusion and the technological space is needed for learning
between firms sharing a common knowledge base. The shorter the geographical and
technological distance the more effectively knowledge is transferred. The locations,
each in one dimension, of the firms are chosen randomly from an uniform distribution
and stay constant over the simulated time horizon. The amount of learning in this
model increases with the difference of the knowledge stocks. The evaluation of
the model leads to the insights that heterogeneity fuels growth, and that learning
through spillovers does not annihilate heterogeneity if firms invest efforts to preserve
their resource advantages. In conclusion, the interpretation of a geographical and
technological space by Knott (2003) is very appealing and already captures the
main arguments of this book, but the modeling of learning does not appear to be
satisfactory because one could subsume both forms of distances into one. In the
current form of the model nothing will change if both distances would represent
a two-dimensional technological space. Thus, the structural differences have to be
7Our formal definition of knowledge spillovers borrows from that idea, see Section 4.1.3.
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elements of a model in order to study the impact of geographical and technological
proximity on innovation.
The research papers by Canals et al. (2004b,a) propose the use of simulation
techniques for evaluating management strategies. Here the authors emphasize the
build-up of knowledge through the processes of codification and abstraction and
represent it in the so called I-Space. Each agent possesses knowledge assets which
can be located in the I-Space, and their location changes over time as a function
of a diffusion process. The agents may exchange their knowledge assets in whole
or in parts with other agents and knowledge assets can become obsolete over time.
The agents benefit from goods made with help of their knowledge assets and local
interaction happens in a cellular automata framework.8 The agents remain at their
randomly chosen location for the duration of their life within the simulation. The
probability that agents learn from each other decreases in physical distance and
further depends on the structure of the knowledge assets. Results of the papers
include the finding that a knowledge blocking strategy is very costly and that an
increasing degree of development of information and communication technologies
increases the rents that firms receive from their knowledge assets. Furthermore,
in Canals et al. (2004a) the model is applied to the conditions of Silicon Valley
or Boston’s Route 128. The outcome of this comparison in combination with an
assumed development of information and communication technologies shows that
such a dynamic will result in a reduction in the number of firms present in knowledge-
based geographical clusters, will reduce the advantages of Silicon Valley’s cultural
model over those of Boston’s Route 128, and less knowledge will be created by cluster
firms relative to that produced by firms outside such clusters.
The interpretation of technological location in this book is equal to the location in
a product space which is related to the preferences of consumers.9 Hence, the use of a
product space in simulation models represents the second category of technological
proximity. The article by Cooper (2000) has a closer look on the process of how
firms tackle design problems. In Ma and Nakamori (2005) each product is composed
of several design and performance parameters. Like other models of complexity it
adapts features of Kauffman (1993). Please refer to Frenken (2006) for a survey and
introduction to this type of models, which at the same time includes the following
approach.
The simulation model by Silverberg and Verspagen (2005) introduces a com-
plex technology space based on percolation theory, which is represented by a two-
8The sorting of the last two types of models in the category learning in technological proximity
(and not cellular automata in geographical proximity) is due to its deep reliance on a technology
space, although both models incorporate aspects of geographical proximity.
9Our model is based on Dawid and Reimann (2005) who use Chamberlainian love-of-variety
preferences instead of an explicit product space.
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dimensional lattice. The bounded horizontal dimension stands for technology niches,
whereas the unbounded vertical dimension stands for technological performance.
The lattice sites can take different states and move from discovered to viable when
there exists a contiguous path of discovered or viable sites connecting it to the base-
line. The lattice is discovered through local search, which sometimes results in a
high number of related innovations. The model outcome is further examined upon
its empirical evidence and is able to reproduce important stylized facts about the
clustering of innovations in time and space, see Silverberg and Verspagen (2003). Sil-
verberg and Verspagen (2007) introduces endogenous R&D search into this model.
Firms are able to change their location in the technology space and economic com-
petition between firms is introduced. But instead of interactions on markets firms
earn profits from innovation payoffs and the payoffs are proportional to the number
of levels that the frontier has moved upward by a successful innovation.
The seminal model to technological regimes, which represents the third category
of technological proximity, is provided by Winter (1984). Here the author proposes
to model and to discuss two stylized technological regimes.10 Following Nelson and
Winter (1982) a technological regime is the technological environment of an industry
under which firms operate. Hence, aspects of technological proximity appear in the
form of the kind of technology space and learning opportunities of the industry.
In a model by Dosi et al. (1995) the evolution of an industry is observed under
different scenarios described by several features of technological regimes. Apart from
the learning conditions, which are defined as stylized archetypes called Schumpeter
Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II (and an intermediate regime), the model considers
birth and death of firms as well as life cycle patterns on the demand side. The
model is used to explain characteristics of industrial structures by alternative regime
parameters. The authors conclude that it is possible to reproduce a rich set of
stylized facts. One drawback of the paper could be seen in the fact that the focus is
more on showing correlations between aggregated properties and system parameters
than on formulating behavior assumptions, which could be seen as major causes of
the emerging regularities.
Another work by Llerena and Oltra (2002) concentrates on the aspect of learn-
ing and the diversity of innovation strategies in an industrial dynamics setup. One
learning strategy is understood as internal learning-by-searching of cumulative firms.
Contrary to this non-cumulative firms adopt an external learning strategy that aims
at absorbing external sources of knowledge. Apart from configurations which con-
sider a pure cumulative respectively non-cumulative case, a third configuration de-
scribes the outcome when firms with different learning strategies interact. As a
result the diversity in the last scenario shows the best technological performance.
10See Section 7.2 for more details and a comparison of the results with the outcome in this book.
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Here a pattern emerges where few surviving cumulative firms with high market
shares generate high spillovers to a fringe of small non-cumulative firms.
Additionally, Garavaglia et al. (2006) formulate a history-friendly model of the
pharmaceutical industry in which a differentiation between the two technological
regimes was also taken into account. And finally, the models by Meyer et al. (1996)
and Wakeley (1998) debate the influence of market structure on the innovative com-
petition between firms, which is again related to technological regimes.
After this review of existing economic models we discuss whether any of the
mentioned approaches is suitable to answer our research questions. The next section
points out that in our view this is not the case.
3.3 Why another Model of Innovation and Prox-
imity?
The model studied in the following chapters tries to combine elements of the pre-
viously addressed works and is formulated as an agent-based simulation model. In
this section we would like to put forward the argument why we choose this method-
ology and what are crucial elements for modeling innovation and proximity. We
are convinced that the method of agent-based simulation offers great possibilities to
study the process of technological change with strategic behavior in a geographical
and technological space. As these features are not found to our satisfaction in any
existing economic model, we propose the definition of a new model. Notwithstand-
ing, our approach rests of course on experiences and insights of former models of all
types discussed.
We start by asking why an analytical equilibrium framework might not be suited
to capture relevant features of innovation and proximity. We already addressed
this issue when we discussed the example of a game-theoretic model by Alsleben
(2005) in Section 3.1. We criticize that the assumptions concerning structure and
transfer of knowledge are very restrictive, firms are not heterogeneous, the analysis
is static, and that no innovations are incorporated in the model. These shortcom-
ings of the model are typical problems when including innovation and technological
change in a standard equilibrium framework. The points are also in line with Dawid
(2006), where the author highlights major properties of innovation. According to
him a model of innovation and technological change should consider four features:
Dynamics, nature of knowledge, uncertainty, and heterogeneity.
First, after the influential work by Schumpeter (1912) it became clear that in-
novations are very much related to a dynamic framework. Innovations and tech-
nological change do not only distort the actual situation on a market, at the same
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time they have a major impact on the further evolution of the industry structure.
The incumbents are threatened by new innovators and have to innovate themselves
in order to stay competitive. On the other hand, established large firms benefit
from new products and better processes and try to extend their market position, see
Schumpeter (1942). Second, knowledge is a precondition for successful innovations
and, as Dosi (1988a,b) shows, it can only be gained through a cumulative activity.
Firms can learn though internal research or external knowledge spillovers but in
every case the outcome depends on the knowledge already accumulated in the firm.
The tacitness of knowledge is also crucial for the transfer of knowledge between
agents. At this point proximity comes into play, but this is discussed in detail in
Chapter 2. The third argument highlights the immanent uncertainty of innovations.
An economic agent cannot predict the technological development and will never
be sure if and when the firm’s own investments in R&D lead to a breakthrough.
Furthermore, agents do not know about the concrete type of a breakthrough - e.g.
incremental or radical. In order to handle this uncertainty agents adapt a behavior
based on routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982).11 And fourth, the analysis of learning
and innovation cannot leave out heterogeneity between agents. Firms can only learn
from each other if knowledge is sufficiently different. Heterogeneity is crucial not
only for the process but for the result of innovations: ”The whole point of innovating
for firms is to distinguish themselves from the competitors in the market according to
production technique or product range, thereby generating heterogeneities.” (Dawid,
2006, p. 1240). Thus, innovation demands heterogeneous firms, technologies and
products and without heterogeneity it is not possible to understand competition and
economic performance (Jensen and McGuckin, 1997). Apart from the four major
concerns we would like to add an endogenously changing industry structure as a
further important feature of an innovative industry (e.g. in the form of industry life
cycles, see Klepper, 1996).
Summing up, to understand the process of innovation and technological change
we need a dynamic framework in which heterogeneous agents interact in a com-
plex environment. The complex environment should contain relevant market and
non-market interactions like learning through knowledge spillover depending on ge-
ographical and technological proximity. Apparently, the outcome of non-market
interactions must have a link to the economic markets in order to close the model.
Therefore, the proposed elements make it hard to investigate issues of innovation
and technological change with the standard methods of equilibrium analysis. One
way to meet this challenge comes with the methodology of agent-based simulations.
According to Tesfatsion (2006) an agent-based simulation model allows ”a com-
putational study of economic processes modeled as dynamic systems of interacting
11See Rosenberg (1994) for a critique of the evolutionary approach and routines especially.
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agents” (Tesfatsion, 2006, p. 835). Apart from the interactions between autonomous
decision-making agents this framework allows an investigation of emerging proper-
ties of the system.12 The emergent properties arise due to the goal-oriented or un-
intended behavior of the individuals in the model. The model includes a definition
of data and behavioral methods for agents as well as an initial state of the economic
system. Like a computational laboratory the analysis is based on observations of the
system over time without any interventions from the modeler. Several repetitions
of one or more scenarios allow a statistical analysis of the model outcome. The
structure and findings of the model have to be written down in such detail that a
third person can implement the model and reproduce the proposed results. Critical
issues in this field are verification and validation of simulations, which are discussed
in greater length in Chapter 5.
Four main objectives of the researcher in agent-based computational economics
are distinguished by Tesfatsion (2006): Empirical understanding, normative under-
standing, qualitative insight and theory generation, and methodological advance-
ment. Similarly, Bruun (2004) proposes three different justifications for agent-based
simulation models in economics: First, the reproduction of theoretical results of an-
alytically tractable models. Second, to reproduce previously not formalized theory
or to investigate issues that cannot be solved analytically. Third, to reproduce styl-
ized facts and understand the mechanisms behind empirical findings. For further
surveys of the methodology of agent-based computational economics please refer to
Axelrod (2006) or Pyka and Fagiolo (2007) and to the previous section for examples
of agent-based simulation models.13
In the context of this book agents are heterogeneous firms and consumers with
heterogeneous preferences in an evolving industry. Emergent properties here are the
formation of clusters in a geographical space and the overall technological develop-
ment of an industry which is driven by agents’ search and learning activities. We
define the behavior of firms with the help of routines embedded in their institutional
framework and market interactions are represented as a single period equilibrium
system in the tradition of evolutionary modeling (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The
main objective of this approach concentrates on theory generation complemented by
a normative analysis of selected issues.14 As already addressed, the theory behind
innovation and proximity demands modeling features that are difficult to assess in
analytical models. Therefore, we implement our interpretation of innovation and
12This characteristic is captured best in the title of the book by Schelling (1978): Micromotives
and Macrobehavior.
13See also the extensive on-line resources at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.
htm.
14The evaluation of regional innovation policies in Section 7.3 is an example of a normative
discussion.
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proximity in an agent-based simulation model to achieve a quantitative analysis
which cannot be provided by an analytically solvable model. Furthermore, our find-
ings are compared to empirical work in order to compare our results with reality.
Part III of this book shows examples of several scenarios which differ in their initial
conditions, economic environment, types and number of agents, and the possibilities
of the agents.
After collecting arguments for the methodology the remainder of this section
debates the question why previous agent-based simulation models do not capture all
relevant aspects of innovation and proximity. We see four major features the model
has to consider in order to investigate the topic of the book: Endogenous choice
of location, both geographical and technological distance in one model, structural
differences between these forms of proximity, and economic interactions on markets.
The first point captures the fact that in many models location is chosen randomly
and firms cannot alter their position strategically. Firms should have the possibility
to influence their position in space which must have an influence on the outcome
on the product market. For example the models of clusters do in general not model
firms leaving the cluster and elsewhere location is often kept fixed (see e.g. Verspa-
gen, 1993; Knott, 2003; Canals et al., 2004a,b). Second, as argued in Chapter 2 at
least two forms of proximity are necessary to get the main idea behind knowledge
spillovers: Geographical and technological proximity. Hence, both forms are to be
integrated at the same time but earlier models do not consider this (e.g. Cantner and
Pyka, 1998a,b; Silverberg and Verspagen, 2005). Third, the interpretation of geo-
graphical and technological distance and its influence on innovation bears structural
differences. Especially, the nonlinear relationship between learning in technological
distance needs to be included. Considering one type of proximity, which can be
interpreted either as geographical or as technological proximity, is not satisfactory
(e.g. Knott, 2003; Meagher and Rogers, 2004). And finally, the economic success of
firm strategies and technological breakthroughs can only be quantified by competi-
tion in a market. The economic value of a firm’s knowledge assets always depends
on the assets of the competitors and the preferences of the consumers. Enjoying
a small fraction of knowledge in an isolated technological area may lead to higher
profits than having a large amount of knowledge in a popular technology where
many competitors possess distinct knowledge, too. The same holds for innovations
which do not meet the needs of consumers. From the point of view of a firm there
is a difference between knowledge and economic valuable knowledge. Therefore, the
economic value of knowledge can only be specified by market interactions. Previous
models of innovation and proximity sometimes lack this economic foundation (e.g.
Gilbert et al., 2001; Knott, 2003).
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If a model aims to address the issue of innovation and proximity, these features
have to be considered at the same time. At least to our knowledge this has not
been done so far, which justifies the formulation of a new agent-based simulation
model. As the need for a new model of innovation and proximity becomes evident,
we introduce our attempt to fill the research gap in the forthcoming chapter.
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Part II
The Model
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Chapter 4
An Agent-Based Simulation Model
of Innovation and Proximity
This chapter introduces the agent-based simulation model which is analyzed and
extended in the following part of this work. The simplest version of the model
represents the evolution of a dynamic and innovative industry inhabited by hetero-
geneous firms and consumers. The main focus is set on the technological develop-
ment in terms of process and product innovations, aspects of learning depending on
proximity and the strategic behavior of firms that are direct competitors on related
product markets. The model allows the description of an endogenously evolving
technology space, which is driven by the innovation behavior of firms. The tech-
nological space is connected to the product space which determines the demand of
the consumers depending on the number and scope of product variants. Further,
the dynamics of firm location in geographical and technological space as well as
the market structure result endogenously from the interactions between firms and
consumers.
The major trade-off for the strategic behavior of the firms lies in the evaluation
of possible positive learning effects versus the possible loss of economic valuable
knowledge in close geographical proximity. Another important aspect of strategy
could be seen in the way firms develop their technological portfolio over time whereas
the technological portfolio stands for the amount and area of knowledge in the
technology space. The model enables a complex and dynamic determination of
economic profits through the interaction on differentiated product markets which
depends on the preferences of the consumers as well as the knowledge and behavior
of the firm and its competitors.
As pointed out before, a precondition for the evaluation of innovation is a dy-
namic setting. The method of agent-based simulations can provide a very simple
dynamic representation as repetition of agent interaction is the basis of this con-
cept. In order to debate learning, firm strategy and innovation the assumption of
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heterogeneity is crucial as well: Learning through knowledge spillover can only occur
between agents who do not have the same knowledge. One can only evaluate firm
strategies if the behavior of firms differs within or between scenarios, for example
the choice for a geographical and technological location of the company. And fi-
nally as investments in R&D are connected to uncertainty in the outcome (see e.g.
Dosi, 1988a), firms have to differ in their innovation results even if research strategy
and the amount of investments are constant. Therefore this model is largely based
on heterogeneity, which can be adequately modeled with the help of agent-based
simulation.1
To be very clear, this model does not examine other agglomeration or de-agglomeration
forces than learning through knowledge spillover between competitors on horizon-
tally related product markets. For example Marshall (1920) mentions (apart from
knowledge spillovers) labor market pooling or the benefits of specialized input fac-
tors (see also Porter, 1998). Negative effects of accumulation of economic activity
like increasing land rents, congestion or pollution are not included in the model ei-
ther.2 All forthcoming propositions, firm strategy and policy recommendations do
only rely on the isolated effect of knowledge externalities described in the model
and should never be understood as general advise. The chosen assumptions and pa-
rameter settings limit the scope of the recommendations, too. The assumed formal
description is introduced in this chapter and the discussion of the parameter settings
follows in Chapter 5.
The model is based on previous work by Dawid and Reimann (2005, 2007).
Building on their framework of an innovative industry Wersching (2007a) introduces
aspects of technological and geographical proximity in this setting. In contrast to
the version of this book the model of Wersching (2007a) relies on an interpretation
of a representative consumer and another major difference is the usage of congestion
cost for highly populated firm agglomerations. The paper by Dawid and Wersching
(2006) uses the same model in order to have a closer look on firm strategies. In
Wersching (2006) the demand side and firm strategies are changed but it is still a
preliminary version of the setup introduced here. All major topics of the previous
articles are again taken up in this book in a consistent and unified framework with
a more elaborated version of the simulation model in the applications Part III. In
general the model was built and modified such that our research questions can be
addressed with a formalization which is as simple as possible. Still, the model setup
is quite complex, but later on in the applications part it will become evident why
this complexity is needed for debating the main issues of this book.
Before going into details of the model the time-line of each simulated period
1See also the argumentation in Section 3.3.
2For possible extensions of the standard model please refer to Chapter 8.
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is shown. These events are repeated over T periods and provide the basis of the
programming code in MATLAB:
1. The environment of the industry changes:
• Bankrupt firms are exchanged.
• Knowledge of the firms increases through investments in R&D and through
knowledge spillovers.
• Product innovations occur leading to the generation of new sub-markets.
2. Consumers choose a sub-market.
3. Firms make decisions:
• Firms evaluate all existing sub-markets.
• Firms decide on market exit and market entry.
• Output quantity decisions are made.
4. Market clearing prices are calculated and profits are realized.
5. Firms choose the focus and height of investments:
• Investments in the geographical location.
• Investments in product and process innovations.
6. Savings of the firms are calculated.
The details of the model and the realization in the agent-based simulation model
are introduced in the following sections, which present the technological environ-
ment, the behavior of firms and consumers as well as the calculation of the single-
period equilibrium system as it was called by Nelson and Winter (1982).
4.1 The Technological Environment
The technological environment determines the knowledge formation, the represen-
tation of learning through knowledge spillovers and the demand conditions of our
artificial industry. We start with the introduction of the technology space.
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4.1.1 The Technology Space
The technology space is interpreted as a circle in the tradition of the circular city
models in the Industrial Organization literature (see e.g. Schmalensee, 1978; Sa-
lop, 1979) which build on the seminal work of horizontal product differentiation
by Hotelling (1929). Other models like Jonard and Yildizoglu (1998) and Keilbach
(2000) formulate the technology space as a torus, but for the purpose of this work a
circle seems to be a useful solution, because it enables the calculation of technologi-
cal specialization as will be seen in Section 6.1. The idea is that products belonging
to a technology j, which marks a certain point on that circle, are horizontally differ-
entiated.3 To keep things simple it is assumed that product differentiation is entirely
due to technological differences between products and hence product positioning is
equivalent to technological positioning.
Figure 4.1: The technology space as a circle.
The technological distance dtechj,j+1,t between two technologies j and j + 1 is in-
terpreted as the shortest path on the circle in period t. The technological distance
can be interpreted as a market niche, because the bigger the technological distance
between two markets the more customers are attracted to the neighboring product
variants, see Section 4.2 for more details. The technological interpretation builds on
the level of similarity of related technologies: The closer two technologies are the eas-
ier is the transfer of knowledge. The overall number of existing technologies should
be mt. In figure 4.1 the technological space and the corresponding technological
distances are shown.
A successful product innovation adds a new technology on the circular technology
space. Here the interpretation of product innovations is based on the term of a niche
innovation introduced by Abernathy and Clark (1985). The new technology creates
3Sutton (1998) discusses a similar interpretation of product differentiation under the heading
of the independent sub-markets model.
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a new market opportunity but this new technology does not make obsolete the
knowledge of neighboring firms.
Two forms of product innovations are implemented in the model:
1. Incremental Product Innovation: This type of product innovation stands
for a new variant of the industry product which combines elements of neigh-
boring technologies. The firm wants to get close to a promising technology j
but while all products are substitutes, it chooses j as a neighbor but as far
as possible. The firm will choose a technological location next to j where the
technological distance to the next technology is greatest. Thus the incremental
product innovation is a better solution for customers who are technologically
distant from existing technologies, because the new market mt + 1 emerges
right in the middle between two existing ones and the technological distances
change to:
dtechj,mt+1,t = d
tech
mt+1,j+1,t =
dtechj,j+1,t−1
2
.
In Figure 4.2 an incremental innovation is illustrated.
Figure 4.2: Incremental product innovation.
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2. Radical Product Innovation: In contrast to the previous kind a radical
product innovation adds significant new features to the product of the industry
which go beyond a pure combination of existing product characteristics. The
interpretation of a radical product innovation is not in the sense of Dosi (1982)
or Freeman and Perez (1988) because here no change of paradigm is connected
to the new technology. The interpretation of these authors would lead to major
change like e.g. a new dimension in the technology space. Here the term radical
is only used to differentiate it from the other type of product innovation. In
order to represent this in the model the circumference of the technology space
increases as new consumers are attracted to the industry. As in the case
of an incremental product innovation the firm will always choose a location
where the distance to their neighbors is greatest but in the neighborhood of
a specified technology j. The circle is extended depending on the location of
the new radical product innovation mt + 1:
dtechj,mt+1,t = d
tech
mt+1,j+1,t = d
tech
j,j+1,t−τ .
Figure 4.3: Radical product innovation.
For τ periods both connections exist, but later the connection between j and
j+1 is only possible via the new technology mt+1. The old connection d
tech
j,j+1,t
is cleared after τ periods. The innovating firm with a new product stays for
τ periods as a monopolist on this new market. After this period other firms
may produce and sell this product variant, too. In Figure 4.3 the impact of a
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radical product innovation is shown.
At this point it may be important to mention that the resulting effect for a
company, e.g. profits on the new market, may be bigger in case of an incremental
product innovation in a large market niche that in case of a radical product inno-
vation in an area with very small technological distances. But for the industry the
total demand in the first scenario stays constant whereas in the case of the second
scenario new consumers are attracted to this industry and this effect justifies the
interpretation of a radical product innovation.
An example of the technology space comes from the automobile industry: Start-
ing with three main technologies (freight vehicles, passenger cars and buses), the
introduction of vans and SUVs (sport-utility vehicles) could be interpreted as prod-
uct innovations. In Figure 4.4 the example is represented. Vans are indicated as an
incremental innovation which combines features of the neighboring industries (buses
and passenger cars). SUVs could stand for a mixture between passenger cars and
freight vehicles. The presentation of SUVs with the help of marketing instruments
attracted new consumers to the automobile industry or convinced consumers to
spend more money on their cars. For this, SUVs should be considered (at least in
economic perspective) as a radical product innovation. The widening of the technol-
ogy space leads in total to higher profits for the innovator, at least in the short run
before competition was intensified as more and more automobile producers started
to fabricate SUVs. A more detailed technological space could be imagined by sorting
brands or design models of the automotive industry on the circle.
Figure 4.4: The technology space and an example from the automobile industry.
In an search model by Berliant et al. (2006) a very similar technology space and
interpretation of learning was used. But the authors rely on a very broad interpre-
tation of the points on the circular knowledge space as they stand for any fields of
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relevance, such as art, biology, history, physics, and economics. In the context of
this industry model one can imagine different fields of production technologies for
similar products as a second example of the technology space.
4.1.2 The Role of Knowledge
The knowledge of firms is one of the most important elements of the model. Each
firm holds two forms of knowledge in each technology which stand for the level
of process respectively product innovation. On the one hand, the company may
introduce a new method, which leads to lower production cost, or it presents a
better version of an existing product. On the other hand, the firm wants to launch
a brand-new product in order to meet the needs of new consumer groups or to
establish a new product variant in a promising market niche. The first part of the
technology profile is captured by a knowledge stock for process innovations RDproci,j,t
and the second part by a knowledge stock for product innovations RDprodi,j,t , both
depending on the company i, the technology j and the time period t.
Both stock variables can be increased either by the company’s own investments
in R&D (Iproci,j,t or I
prod
i,j,t ) or by knowledge spillover (SP
proc
i,j,t or SP
prod
i,j,t ), where invest-
ments in R&D and spillover are understood as perfect substitutes. The build-up
of a knowledge stock for innovations has the property that it is a cumulative and
time consuming process where experiments and knowledge are accumulated step by
step over time. Further, it is assumed that the return to investment, measured by
increases in the knowledge stock, decreases as the company approaches the frontier
of RDmaxj . Knowledge starts at zero or at an initialized number in the interval [0,
RDmax]. Afterward the knowledge stock is updated as follows:
RDproci,j,t = RD
max
j −
(
RDmaxj −RDproci,j,t−1
) 1 + αiβi(Iproci,j,t−1 + SP proci,j,t )
1 + αi(I
proc
i,j,t−1 + SP
proc
i,j,t )
(4.1)
Here αi > 0 and βi > 0 are firm-specific parameters which describe the ability
of the firm to develop new products and the efficiency of the use of R&D funds.
In particular, firm i can in each period reduce the gap to the frontier RDmaxj at
most by the factor βi. Equation (4.1) also represents the cumulative property of
knowledge. In the standard scenario the upper border of the technology stock is set
to RDmaxj = 1.
Figure 4.5 shows an example of the functional form of equation 4.1 with different
firm parameters α1 < α2 and β. With given RD
proc
t−1 the maximum level of process
innovation, which can be reached for (Iproc + SP proc) → ∞, is given by: RDmax −
β · (RDmax − RDproct−1 ). Thus the parameter β influences the maximum value. The
parameter α governs the gradient of the curve. A firm with better capabilities to
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Figure 4.5: The function for the knowledge of process innovations.
perform R&D (higher α and β) can increase its level of process innovations much
higher and faster with the same amount of investments and knowledge spillovers
than a firm with lower parameter values.
The level of knowledge for process innovations for each technology corresponds
with the production cost ci,j,t for variant j of firm i in t. A rising knowledge stock
for process innovations RDproci,j,t leads directly to lower production cost. The variable
production costs ci,j,t depending on the corresponding knowledge stock RD
proc
i,j,t are
formulated in the following way:
ci,j,t = c
ini
[
cmin + (1− cmin)(1−RDproci,j,t )
]
(4.2)
The parameters cini and cmin are constant over time and do not depend on firm
i. Heterogeneities in production cost result only from the differences in the firms’
knowledge stock RDproci,j,t . The variable costs start at c
ini with no specific knowledge
in this technology (RDproci,j,t = 0) and the cost can be diminished up to c
ini · cmin for
the highest knowledge values (RDproci,j,t = 1). Altogether firms have the following cost
structure with given output quantities xi,j,t:
Ci,t(xi,j,t) = Fi · |Mi,t|+
∑
j∈Mi,t
(ci,j,t · x2i,j,t) (4.3)
Each of the n firms in the industry can in every period produce for each of the
public sub-markets. Mi,t is the set of markets the firm i produces for in period t
and xi,j,t is the output quantity of firm i on sub-market j. The fixed costs Fi are
a constant firm-specific parameter. For every sub-market the firm produces for, fix
cost Fi rise.
The equation for updating the knowledge stock for product innovations can be
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formulated analogously to (4.1) with the fixed upper border of 1:
RDprodi,j,t = 1−
(
1−RDprodi,j,t−1
) 1 + αiβi(Iprodi,j,t−1 + SP prodi,j,t )
1 + αi(I
prod
i,j,t−1 + SP
prod
i,j,t )
(4.4)
In contrast to process innovation a knowledge stock for product innovation
greater than zero does not automatically lead to successful product innovation. In
fact the immanent uncertainty with product innovations is captured by a stochas-
tic process which determines whether a product innovation is successful or not. A
product innovation can be either incremental or radical. Two numbers were cho-
sen: u from the uniformly distributed interval [c, d] with 0 < c < d, and v from
the uniformly distributed interval [d, e] with d < e ≤ 1. If RDprodi,j,t > u the firm i
was able to introduce a product innovation on the market. If RDprodi,j,t > v the new
product was a technological breakthrough, which could be interpreted as a radical
innovation. Otherwise the product innovation is incremental.
Therefore, the probabilities for a successful incremental product innovation Pinc(RD
prod
i,j,t )
and for a radical product innovation Prad(RD
prod
i,j,t ) depending on the current knowl-
edge stock for product innovations RDprodi,j,t can be written as:
Pinc(RD
prod
i,j,t ) =

0, for RDprodi,j,t < c;
RDprodi,j,t −c
d−c , for c ≤ RDprodi,j,t < d;
1− Prad(RDprodi,j,t ) =
e−RDprodi,j,t
e−d , for d ≤ RDprodi,j,t < e.
(4.5)
Prad(RD
prod
i,j,t ) =

0, for RDprodi,j,t < d;
RDprodi,j,t −d
e−d , for d ≤ RDprodi,j,t < e;
1, for e ≤ RDprodi,j,t ≤ 1.
(4.6)
The initial R&D stock for a new product variant is chosen randomly from the
interval RD0j = [RD
0, RDmaxj /2]. After the successful introduction of a new product
variant the knowledge stock in this particular field is erased (RDprodi,j,t = 0).
4.1.3 Proximity and Learning through Knowledge Spillovers
So far the technological aspects of proximity have been shown in the model. Firms do
have different knowledge stocks which can be located in the technological space. The
similarity of knowledge in one particular technology and the path on the circular
technology space between two technologies are part of the interpretation of the
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technological proximity, see Section 2.3.
The geographical aspects of proximity and their impact on learning is captured
by the geographical distance dgeoi,t of firm i. The geographical distance is modeled
similar to core-periphery models in the New Economic Geographic literature (see
e.g. Krugman, 1991b). There are only two possible locations for firms: At the core
(or agglomeration) or outside on the periphery. A location at the core leads to a
better exchange of tacit knowledge. If a company is a technological leader, it might
also prefer a location on the periphery in order not to let too much knowledge spill
over upon competitors, because it is assumed that firms cannot prevent knowledge
from spilling over.
dgeoi,t =
{
0, at the core;
1, on the periphery.
(4.7)
Heterogeneity of knowledge is a precondition for learning. The differences in
knowledge are interpreted in two ways: First, there are technological distances be-
tween different strands of technologies. Second, there is a difference between two
knowledge stocks which represents the knowledge gap. The knowledge gap tik,jl,t
between firms i an k related to different technologies j and l in period t is:
tik,jl,t = max
{
ln
(
RDprock,l,t
RDproci,j,t
)
, 0
}
(4.8)
In this formula the technological gap is only greater than zero, if the other
company k has a greater value of the knowledge stock variable. Furthermore, the
function is concave.
As discussed in Section 2.3 the absorptive capacity of a firm is crucial for learning
through knowledge externalities. The concept of absorptive capacity is incorporated
in the variable γi,t of firm i in t, which is assumed to be the mean value over all
mt technologies. Therefore a firm with a high amount of technological knowledge is
able to absorb a higher fraction of external and internal knowledge:
γi,t =
∑mt
j RD
proc
i,j,t
mt
(4.9)
Now we do have all ingredients for the calculation of knowledge spillovers which
represent learning in the model. Firms i and k can learn from competitors only
if both of them are placed at the core, that is (1 − dgeoi,t ) · (1 − dgeok,t ) = 1. But
learning can also happen within the firm, where knowledge is transmitted from
one field to another. Learning regards all technologies mt. Based on the formula
for knowledge spillover from Verspagen (1993) and Cantner and Pyka (1998a,b)
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and the argumentation in Section 2.3 with two kinds of distances dgeoi,t and d
tech
j,l,t ,
the technological gap tik,jlt and the absorptive capacity γi,t, the resulting knowledge
spillover for process innovations SP proci,j,t for the technology j and firm i can be written
as:
SP proci,j,t =
mt∑
l=1
∑
k 6=i
[
(1− dgeoi,t )(1− dgeok,t ) ·
1
1 + dtechj,l,t
· tik,jl,t · e−
tik,jl,t
γi,t
]
+
mt∑
l=1
[
1
1 + dtechj,l,t
· tii,jl,t · e−
tii,jl,t
γi,t
] (4.10)
Analogously the knowledge spillovers for product innovations SP prodi,j,t are formu-
lated.
Similar to Gersbach and Schmutzler (1999) a differentiation between external
and internal knowledge spillovers is used. The first term stands for the external
knowledge spillover. It is only greater than zero if both firms are at the core. The
second term stands for internal knowledge spillovers which emerge independent of
the geographical location of the firm. The formula is built such that it is maximized
if the technological gap equals the absorptive capacity. Any deviations from this
point lead to lower knowledge transfer. This represents that learning has less effect
if the knowledge is too similar or too different. A higher technological distance dtechj,l,t
between the two technologies j and l in questions reduces the possible learning effect.
Figure 4.6: An example of the calculation of knowledge spillovers SP proc(t) = t ·e− tγ
with given absorptive capacity γ1 < γ2 depending on the technological gap t.
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The functional form is shown in Figure 4.6. One can see that the maximum
learning effect is reached in t = γ1 (respectively t = γ2). A technological gap greater
than that reduces the learning effect as the basis for learning gets weaker. Firms with
on average more knowledge in several technologies have a greater absorptive capacity
and therefore can benefit much more from learning. Therefore, the formalization of
knowledge spillovers in this model takes at the same time into account the non-linear
relation between technological gaps, aspects of absorptive capacity, the technological
distance in a technology space and geographical proximity. It is in line with the
theoretical arguments and empirical findings discussed in Chapter 2. Learning in
this model is described in such a manner that the technological profiles of two
firms are compared and the specific gains are calculated. Even without any own
investments of their own in R&D firms could increase their specific knowledge by
learning.
4.2 The Demand for Products
The consumers in the model are heterogeneous in their technological preferences.
It is assumed that the consumers are continuously and uniformly distributed over
the technology space.4 The consumers have to make two decisions: First, at the
beginning of each simulation round they select the sub-market or the kind of product
variant of interest and second they choose the quantity (or set the prices according
to the offered quantities by the firms) of the previously selected product variant in
the market clearing phase.
The selection of the sub-market builds upon the models of spatial competition
(e.g. Hotelling, 1929; d’Aspremont et al., 1979; Salop, 1979) in which two factors
seem of major interest: The technological distance from the location of the consumer
to the location and the price of the product variant. The farther a product variant is
to the location of a consumer, the lower has to be the price in order for the product
variant to be selected by this consumer.
At the time of decision making the consumers do know the current status of the
technology space, this means that they know all technological distances dtechh,j,t from
the consumer h to the sub-market j in the current period t. For the prices pj,t the
situation is different, the consumers do only know the prices of the last period and
4Apart from a uniform distribution one can imagine several possible extensions of the model
while using different distributions.
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they expect them to stay constant:5
pˆj,t = pj,t−1. (4.11)
A consumer would prefer a product with the characteristics which are given by his
own technological location. In general the industry offers only products which do not
exactly match his needs, and so each consumer has to decide upon similar alternative
product variants and their prices. The consumer would to a certain degree substitute
a product with less favorable properties, if the price of the technologically farther
product is lower. Therefore the farer away or the less interesting a product is from the
perspective of an individual consumer and the higher the price, the less attractive
is a product variant. The decision of the sub-market can be formulated by the
following evaluation function vconsh,j,t of the consumers h for market j in t:
vconsh,j,t = s¯− dtechh,j,t − pˆj,t = s¯− dtechh,j,t − pj,t−1 (4.12)
The evaluation function of the consumer is equal to the utility function in the
traditional model of horizontal product differentiation by Hotelling (1929). It is
assumed that s¯ is high enough that every consumer picks one sub-market. The first
term dtechh,j,t expresses how well the characteristics of the product fit the prospects
of the consumers and the expected price pˆj,t completes the evaluation of the sub-
market. Figure 4.7 shows the situation of a consumer who has to decide between the
two neighboring product variants j and j + 1 with different prices pj,t−1 > pj+1,t−1.
The possible location of a consumer is marked by d and it is counted from the
sub-market j. The technological distance between these two alternative markets
is given by dtechj,j+1,t. It is assumed that the price of j + 1 is lower than the one of
j. Because of this, more consumers are attracted to market j + 1 than to market
j. Depending on the preferences of the consumers two evaluation functions can be
drawn whereas the consumer in d will choose the lower curve at its technological
location. The technological location d¯ of the consumer, which is indifferent between
j and j + 1, can be calculated as:
pj,t−1 + d = pj+1,t−1 + (dtechj,j+1,t − d)
⇒ d¯ = pj+1,t−1 − pj,t−1 + d
tech
j,j+1,t
2
(4.13)
5In the case of a dominated sub-market (see below) the price in the last period was equal to
pj,t−1 = 0. Here the consumers assume that the price is equal to the average price in the last
period: pˆj,t = (
∑
j pj,t−1)/mt−1.
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Figure 4.7: Market choice of consumers.
From this formula one can see that the lower pj,t−1, the higher pj+1,t−1 or the
higher dtechj,j+1,t the greater becomes d¯, which means that the more consumers are
attracted to product variant j. The emergence of prices and technological distances
is given by the strategic behavior of firms concerning their market entry and exit as
well their investments in process and product innovations. It is also worth noticing
that even if a firm is monopolist on a market j, his quantity decision (and therefore
price decision) is not independent of the neighboring markets, because high prices
would convince many consumers to change their demand from the monopolistic to
a neighboring market. Beside competition in the sub-market the substitutability of
product variants enforces competition between sub-markets.
While the technology space is understood as a circle, every sub-market of the
industry may attract consumers from two sides. Additionally it has to be consid-
ered that not only the direct technological neighbors offer the best conditions (the
highest evaluation value) for a consumer. A sub-market may be dominated by an-
other market if the price of another market plus the technological distance between
those markets is smaller than the price of the dominated market. In Figure 4.7
the sub-market j + 1 would be dominated by j if pj+1,t−1 > pj,t−1 + dtechj,j+1,t. For
this the relevant markets for each sub-market have to be detected, whereas the rel-
evant markets are the nearest not dominated markets as the technological distance
increases.
Figure 4.8 shows an example of a technology space with different prices. One can
see that sub-market j+1 is dominated by j+2. Because of that no consumers would
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Figure 4.8: Relevant markets.
choose products of sub-market j+1 and therefore j+1 cannot be a relevant market
for j. The straight line of j + 3 is above the straight line of j + 2 and therefore the
next relevant market j+ in clockwise direction for market j is j + 2. The relevant
market j− against clockwise direction for market j is j − 1, because this is the first
not dominated sub-market.
Each consumer has an individual budget that he is willing to spend on products
from this industry. With the relevant sub-markets j− and j+ and a given budget
Bm one can compute the budget Bj,t for a sub-market j at time t as the sum of all
attracted consumers times a parameter Bm indicating individual demand:
Bj,t =
pj−,t−1 − pj,t−1 + dtechj−,j,t2︸ ︷︷ ︸
a¯j,t
+
pj+,t−1 − pj,t−1 + dtechj,j+,t
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
b¯j,t
 ·Bm (4.14)
With the calculation of the budgets Bj,t by the consumers, the selection of the
sub-markets is finished. As shown in the overview the firms then continue while
setting their output quantities which will then be considered in the market clearing
phase. Let us denote Xj,t as the sum of all output quantities of all firms on sub-
market j in period t. Given the total output Xj,t and the budget Bj,t, one can
calculate the emerging price pj,t for these product variant in the market clearing
phase by:
pj,t =
Bj,t
(Xj,t)²j,t
(4.15)
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In previous models (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982; Jacoby, 2005) it was shown
that this type of inverse demand function is useful for simulation models. Here the
price pj,t on a market j depends on the budget Bj,t divided by the total output
on the sub-market Xj,t =
∑
j xi,j,t to the power of the price elasticity of demand
²j,t, which is for simplicity assumed to be equal to one: ²j,t = 1.
6 The inverse
demand function can be received from the maximization of an utility function, which
increases in quantities (e.g. U(xh,j,t) = xh,j,t), with respect to the budget constraint
(pj,t ·xh,j,t ≤ Bm). For example in Nelson and Winter (1982) the formula pt = 67/Xt
was used, which is a direct application of this function with a constant budget
Bj,t = 67. The chosen inverse demand function is suitable for simulation models
because, even if the agents do not have appropriate expectations or the technological
space changes very abrupt, for every given output a price can be computed without
having the problems of intersection points with the axis.
In order to perform a welfare analysis we develop a consumer surplus function.
The consumer surplus for every sub-market j depends on the range of attracted
consumers indicated by a¯j,t and b¯j,t from equation (4.14), the actual price pj,t and a
consumer specific maximum price pmaxj,t (a). This latter value indicates the maximum
price a consumer located in a would pay on sub-market j. If the price pj,t, on this
sub-market exceeds this level, the consumer in a would buy a product variant from
the next neighboring relevant markets. Which sub-market the consumer will choose
depends on the prices, the technological distances between the markets and of course
on the technological location of the consumer. The consumer surplus for each market
CSj,t is therefore the space between the actual price pj,t the consumers pay for market
j and the maximum price pmaxj,t (a), which sets the limit for a consumer choosing this
market, of the demand function. The resulting consumer surplus of the industry
CSt is understood as the sum of all sub-market specific values: CSt =
∑
j CSj,t.
See Appendix (A.1) for further details and the calculation of consumer surplus.
Total welfareWt can be defined as the sum of consumer surplus CSt and producer
surplus PSt, which is the sum of profits and fixed cost over all firms in the industry
(see e.g. Tirole, 1988; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2005).
Therefore with given consumer surplus CSt, the set of served marketsMi,t, profits
Πi,j,t and fixed cost Fi by firm i, we define the welfare in period t as:
Wt = CSt + PSt = CSt +
∑
i
∑
j∈Mi,t
(Πi,j,t + Fi) (4.16)
6A more complex formulation of the inverse demand function with ²j,t 6= 1 would not allow an
analytical calculation of the output quantities, see Section 4.3.2 for more details.
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Although the concept of welfare is still being debated7 and the formalization in
this work might provoke some criticism due its ad-hoc assumptions, welfare provides
a useful aggregated indicator of the benefits for producers as well as for consumers
in the model.
4.3 Decisions of the Firms
Firms act according to routines in the tradition of evolutionary modeling (see Nelson
and Winter, 1982). The routines are heterogeneous because each firm may put
different weights on certain factors and because firms only have limited information.
Firms do have an idea of the technology space with the technological distances
between sub-markets and are well informed about their own cost structures and the
budget for each product variant. Firms can calculate their benefits from knowledge
spillovers and they can imagine how much their benefits from learning might change
with a different geographical location. But firms do not know the costs and strategies
of the competitors and they are not able to anticipate the consumer decisions about
the substitutability of product variants in the industry.
With respect to proximity firms set a geographical location by moving between
agglomeration and periphery. Here firms have to decide whether it is best to protect
their knowledge or to take part in the learning process in the agglomeration. Tech-
nological proximity is affected by investments in product and process innovations
whereas the height and the technological area of the resulting knowledge in compar-
ison with their competitors’ knowledge determines the economic performance of the
firms. A formal description of the firm decisions allows a study of firm strategies in
different environments and their economic gains. The following section starts with
the choice of sub-markets by the firms.
4.3.1 Market Entry and Exit
The total number of firms in the industry n is assumed to stay constant. But the
number of firms who are active on a certain sub-market is determined endogenously.
The change in the market portfolio a firm holds is modeled as a sequence of rule-
based market exit and entry decisions. The exit and entry rules rely on an evaluation
of all existing markets carried out at the beginning of each period. It is assumed
that at the end of a period all firms have an idea of the public technology space.
In order to keep the model as simple as possible the evaluation for market entry
depends only on the profitability and on the technological distance to the firm’s own
main technological focus. As a proxy for profitability the size of the market niche
7A broad overview of and an application to optimal taxation can be found in Auerbach (1985).
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is taken: The greater the technological distances to the neighboring markets, the
more attractive is a sub-market, as it can potentially attract many consumers. The
firm’s own technological focus l is the technology with the greatest knowledge stock:
l from maxj {RDproci,j,t }. For this the evaluation vi,j,t of a sub-market j is given by:
vi,j,t =
(
dtechj,j+1,t + d
tech
j−1,j,t
maxj{dtechj,j+1,t + dtechj−1,j,t}
) δi,Π
(δi,Π+δi,T )
·
(
1
1 + dtechj,l,t
) δi,T
δiT+δi,Π
(4.17)
Both terms in brackets are chosen such that the result lies in the interval [0,1],
which sets the boundary of the evaluation function to vi,j,t ∈ [0, 1]. The sum of the
exponents is chosen to be equal to 1. The exponents are important parameters of the
firm’s diversification strategy since they represent the weights assigned to possible
profits (δi,Π) and technological specialization (δi,T ). The evaluation function is also
in line with Bain (1956), who argues that entrants’ expectations are determined by
the height of pre-entry profits relative to entry barriers. In this case the size of
the market niche is a proxy for profits and the possibilities to develop knowledge for
process innovations determine the degree of the entry barrier. Another interpretation
of the evaluation function can be done in connection to the management literature
mentioned in Section 2.1. Hence, the firm’s own technological focus is similar to the
concept of a firm-specific core competence (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) and only the
opportunity for great profits can convince firms to extend their knowledge portfolio
in new areas. The article by Breschi et al. (2003) discusses whether firms follow a
more profit-oriented or knowledge-related strategy in their innovation activities. The
authors find empirical evidence that firms extend their innovative activities across
knowledge-related technological fields as a consequence of learning processes. Apart
from that, the two strategies of their approach are in line with our assumptions.
After a successful product innovation the innovating firm becomes monopolist
on this market for τ periods and therefore no other firms can enter. After that
period the market becomes available and every other firm may enter. To make
the entry decision the firm ranks all available markets it does not currently serve
according to their evaluations and determines the best existing non-served market
as the entry candidate. The entry candidate is added to the portfolio if vi,l,t > κi,en
and if the candidate does not belong to the set of previously served markets Mi,t−1.
The parameter κi,en > 0 is an inertia parameter and represents the aggressiveness
of the firm’s entry policy. The firm can only enter in one sub-market every period.
max
l /∈Mi,t−1
{vi,l,t} > κi,en (4.18)
The exit decision of the firm is determined solely on the sum of profits of the
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last τex periods. The firm will choose the market with lowest value for
∑τex
τ=1Πi,j,t−τ
and will exit this sub-market if the sum of the profits is below the credit line S0
respectively the current saving plus the credit line S0 + Si,t times the firm-specific
parameter κi,ex:
min
l∈Mi,t−1
τex∑
τ=1
Πi,j,t−τ < −κi,ex ·min{S0, S0 + Si,t} (4.19)
The knowledge of this specific technology remains in the firm. The firm exits up
to one sub-market a period and chooses the market with the greatest losses.
4.3.2 Quantity Decisions
The quantity decisions are modeled similar to Dawid and Reimann (2005, 2007).
Firms try to maximize their profit in each sub-market, but they are restricted by
imperfect information. Firms believe that all producers in the sub-market change
their output quantity by the same factor. They know the actual budget on each sub-
market and therefore the demand function for each sub-market. But firms do not
have perfect information about the effects of prices on the consumer market selection
process in the next period. The aggregate output quantities and the number of firms
in all sub-markets at t−1 can be observed by all producers including those that were
not active in this market. Each firm has in all periods perfect information about
its own fixed cost Fi and marginal cost ci,j,t of production of all product variants.
Firms however do not know other firms’ cost structures. With this information they
can calculate their optimal production quantity in each sub-market.
Given the set of sub-marketsMi,t, firm i tries to maximize their profits by choos-
ing the optimal output quantity xi,j,t in each sub-market with the given profit func-
tion Πi,j,t:
max
xi,j,t,j∈Mi,t
Πi,j,t =
[
pj,t · xi,j,t − ci,j,t · x2i,j,t − Fi
]
, (4.20)
subject to the constraint that current production has to be paid for by the current
stock of savings Si,t:
Si,t ≥ Fi · |Mi,t|+
∑
j∈Mi,t
(ci,j,t · x2i,j,t). (4.21)
The corresponding fist-order conditions with the Lagrange multiplier µi,t ≥ 0 of
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the firm’s budget constraint are:
pj,t + xi,j,t · ∂pj,t
∂xi,j,t
− 2 · ci,j,t · xi,j,t(1 + µi,t) = 0 ∀j ∈Mi,t (4.22)
Due to the limited information about the competitor’s production cost and out-
put quantities, firms cannot simply determine the Nash equilibrium of this quantity
setting game. Rather they use some heuristic approximations to determine their
output quantity. For setting the quantity output several steps have to be taken.
First, the firms believe that all producers in the sub-market j change their output
quantity by the same factor λ. For this the total estimated output Xˆj,t on sub-market
j is given by:
Xˆj,t = λ ·
∑
i
xi,j,t−1 = λ ·Xj,t−1. (4.23)
Second, the firms expect that all firms change their output in the same way they
would do: λ = λi,j,t. Building on the inverse demand function (4.15) they expect
the following prices:
pˆj,t =
Bj,t
λ ·Xj,t−1 (4.24)
Last, firms have an idea of the functional form of the inverse demand function.
Thus firms can approximate the partial derivative of the inverse demand with respect
to xi,j,t as:
8
∂pˆj,t
∂xi,j,t
= − Bj,t
(λ ·Xj,t−1)2 (4.25)
With this information the firms can calculate their optimal production quantity
in each sub-market. For firms that have been in sub-market j in period t−1 inserting
these expression into (4.22) gives the output quantity xi,j,t = λ · xi,j,t−1 with:
λ =
1
Xj,t−1
·
√
Bj,t(Xj,t−1 − xi,j,t−1)
2 · ci,j,t · xi,j,t−1 · (1 + µi,t) (4.26)
It becomes obvious from this expression that the actual rates of changes are
heterogeneous. Thus quantities depend on the consumer budgets, the market share
of the firm in the last period, the production constraint, and on the knowledge for
process innovations, which is incorporated in the marginal cost ci,j,t.
8They assume that pj,t =
Bj,t
F (xi,j,t)
whereas F (xi,j,t) is a linear function in xi,j,t, e.g. F (xi,j,t) =
λ ·Xj,t−1 − xi,j,t−1 + xi,j,t. The derivative with respect to xi,j,t would be ∂pj,t∂xi,j,t = −
Bj,t
F (xi,j,t)2
· 1.
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A firm which did not produce variant j in period t − 1 but added this sub-
market in t first tries to estimate the change of output quantity of the incumbents
and determines its optimal quantity based on this. The expected rate of change of
output of the incumbents in the market is determined analogous to equation (4.26)
where xi,j,t−1 is replaced by the average output of a producer of variant j in period
t− 1. Nj,t−1 should be the set of producers in the sub-market j in the period t− 1.
The average output on this market can therefore be written as:
xi,j,t−1 =
∑
k∈Nj,t−1 xk,j,t−1
|Nj,t−1| = xi,j,t−1 (4.27)
The expectations of firm i about total output in t in such a case is Xˆj,t =
λ·Xj,t−1+xi,j,t. Inserting into (4.22) implies a production quantity of xi,j,t = λ·xi,j,t−1
with:
λ =
1
(Xj,t−1 + xi,j,t−1)
·
√
Bj,t · xi,j,t−1
2 · ci,j,t · xi,j,t−1 · (1 + µi,t) (4.28)
Finally there is a minimum quantity xmin > 0 which has to be produced by
any firm which decided to keep this sub-market in its portfolio. If the result of the
quantity calculations is below this level the firm still produces xmin. Also in the
initial period and every time when a sub-market is founded by a product innovation
the quantity xmin is produced by the founder. This is also the case if a firm enters
an empty market. In the special case of monopoly equation (4.22) would lead to
xi,j,t = 0 and therefore the minimum quantity is chosen.
Monopolist
(e.g. after successful
product innovation)
xmin
Incumbent
xi,j,t = λ · xi,j,t−1 with
λ = 1
Xj,t−1
·
√
Bj,t(Xj,t−1−xi,t,t−1)
2·ci,j,t·xi,j,t−1·(1+µi,t)
Entrant in a Market
with Incumbents
xi,j,t = λ · xi,j,t−1 with
λ = 1
(Xj,t−1+xi,j,t−1)
·
√
Bj,t·xi,j,t−1
2·ci,j,t·xi,j,t−1·(1+µi,t)
Table 4.1: Firms’ decisions concerning output quantities.
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All quantities for the sub-markets are calculated based on these formulas until
the constraint that current production has to be paid for by the current stock of
savings, is fulfilled. For a better overview Table 4.1 sums up the firms’ output
decisions.
4.3.3 Investments in Geographical Location
Starting from a random location the firms may decide to change their geographical
location from core (dgeoi,t = 0) to periphery (d
geo
i,t = 1) or vice versa. As argued in
Section 2.2 the change of geographical proximity can occur very sudden, which in
the model means that the decision can be made every period. The shifting of the
location leads to sunk cost cgeofix due to expenses for transferring the R&D facilities.
These costs are constant in order to keep the model simple.
The investments occur when a location is changed:
Igeoi,t =
{
cgeo, if dgeoi,j,t 6= dgeoi,j,t+1;
0, otherwise.
(4.29)
For the evaluation of the two location alternatives two factors seem to be im-
portant. First, the main advantage of a headquarter at the core lies in the learning
effect through spatially transferred knowledge. But knowledge spillovers are a threat
for the firm’s own core competence in knowledge. For this a second point aims at
the own technological leadership. Because knowledge for product innovations is
only a first step to form a competitive advantage, the knowledge stock for process
innovation RDproci,j,t (and the corresponding spillover SP
proc
i,j,t ) is the main indicator
for a knowledge competence. Thus for the evaluation of the location only this type
of knowledge is considered. The evaluation function for the geographical locations
should be written as:
vgeoi,t =
[
E
(
RDproci,j,t
RDprocj,t
)] δi,RD
δi,RD+δi,SP ·
[
E
(
SP proci,j,t (d
geo
i,j,t = 1)
SP proci,j,t (d
geo
i,j,t = 0)
)] δi,SP
δi,RD+δi,SP
(4.30)
The evaluation for the geographical location vgeoi,t of firm i lies in the interval
[0, 1], where a result of vgeoi,t = 0 stands for a strong incentive to set the headquarter
of the company at the core (dgeoi,t = 0). The symbol E should stand for the arithmetic
mean over all values greater than zero.
As mentioned above the first term takes account of the possible loss of a techno-
logical core competence. Hereby the firm i’s knowledge is divided by the maximum
knowledge of another firm in this market where RDprocj,t = maxi {RDproci,j,t }. If the
potential loss is great, the firm would have the incentive to choose a location far
away from the competitors. The second term considers the effect of the knowledge
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spillover. The numerator is the sum of the internal knowledge spillover which would
occur in every location. The denominator is the sum of the internal and external
spillover. If a firm profits a lot from external spillovers, the firm would have an
incentive to locate inside the cluster.
Like in the evaluation function of market entry (see equation (4.17)) the firm-
specific parameters δi,RD and δi,SP represent firm strategy. The parameters weight
the different terms such that heterogeneous firm strategies can be reproduced. As
in the evaluation of markets there exists an inertia parameter κi,S. Firms will for
example change their geographical location from periphery to core if vgeoi,t ≤ κi,S and
if their savings are higher than the shifting cost Si,t > I
geo
i,t . If firm i has a location
on the periphery (dgeoi,j,t = 1), the firm will choose their geographical distance for the
next period as follows:
dgeoi,t+1 =
{
0, if vgeoi,t ≤ κi,S ∧ Si,t > Igeoi,t ;
1, otherwise.
(4.31)
If firm i is at the core (dgeoi,t = 0), it will choose its geographical distance for the
next period as follows:
dgeoi,t+1 =
{
1, if vgeoi,t > κi,S ∧ Si,t > Igeoi,t ;
0, otherwise.
(4.32)
In both cases the shift of location has to be funded by the firm’s savings Si,t. If
the firm cannot afford this, the firm’s location does not change.
4.3.4 Investments in Research and Development
At the end of a period each firm decides on its investments in product and process
innovations. Both investments Iproci,j,t and I
prod
i,j,t increase the corresponding knowledge
stocks RDproci,j,t respectively RD
prod
i,j,t and depend on the current profits of the firm
Πi,t. The R&D investment quota for product innovation is denoted by q
prod
i and the
quota for process innovation is qproci . The investments for product innovations are
given by:
Iprodi,j,t = q
prod
i · Πi,t, (4.33)
and for process innovations by∑
j
Iproci,j,t = q
proc
i · Πi,t. (4.34)
Since process investments lead to a reduction of per unit cost of production, the
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firm allocates these funds to the different sub-markets proportional to an adjusted
expression of its current output in each market:
Iproci,j,t = q
proc
i · Πi,t ·
xi,j,t∑
k∈Mi,t xi,k,t
(4.35)
A product innovation is seen as an alternative to market entry: In order to extract
rents on a profitable market a new market is founded next to the existing one. For
this the evaluation function for product innovations vprodi,j,t is equal to the evaluation
of markets, see equation (4.17). The only difference is that now all markets are
considered, whereas the decision for market entry took only those markets into
account which were not served by firm i and entry was not prevented by patent
protection. Firm i will invest all its expenditures for product innovations in the
market l with the highest evaluation: Iprodi,l,t = q
prod
i · Πi,t, but only if vprodi,j,t > 0.
The interpretation behind these fixed rules for research and development invest-
ments sees the behavior of firms to be short-term oriented. Firms are understood
to change expenses for research projects very abruptly in accordance with their eco-
nomic success in each period. Firms in reality might also follow long-term goals in
their R&D strategy and firms’ R&D investments might depend not on profits but
on revenues. On the other hand, the assumed rules for the investments for process
innovations depend on product quantities and for product innovations on potential
market niches and the firm’s own technological focus. As these values are likely not
to change every period, there is some continuity in the R&D strategy of the firm.
This continuity emerges mostly because of the assumed evaluation functions and
not by the expenses for R&D. Therefore, the intensity of R&D might change very
suddenly, but the focus of the innovation efforts is rather constant over time. As we
will see in Section 5.1.1, the parameters for the share of R&D investments on profits
can be calibrated with the help of firm level data.
4.4 Market Clearing
With all quantity outputs xi,j,t prices can be calculated for all sub-markets. With
the cost functions every firm is able to derive their overall profit Πi,t =
∑
j∈Mi,t Πi,j,t
from the profits Πi,j,t on every sub-market which are given by:
Πi,j,t =
(
xi,j,t · pj,t − ci,j,t · x2i,j,t − Fi
)
(4.36)
All firms start with initial savings of S0. Every period they earn total profit
Πi,t but also have to make their investments on process innovations I
proc
i,j,t , product
innovation Iprodi,j,t and eventually on the change of location I
geo
i,t . The savings for the
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next period should be expressed by the following formula while ρ stands for the
interest rate:
Si,t+1 = (1 + ρ)Si,t +Πi,t − Igeoi,t − Iprodi,j,t −
∑
j∈Mi,t
Iproci,j,t (4.37)
Firms are able to rent money up to their starting level of savings S0. If the savings
of a firm are less than −S0, the firm is bankrupt. All knowledge of bankrupt firms is
lost. Bankrupt firms are replaced in the industry with new firms with new savings S0
and the same knowledge as the technological leader, but only in one randomly picked
market. The geographical location is hereby chosen randomly. The substitution of
bankrupt firms is understood as an entry of a new firm in this industry and a firm
would only enter if it had - at least in one technology - the same knowledge as a
technological leader. The new firm gets new specific parameters which represent the
new strategy. Therefore the total number of firms is constant in the industry but as
shown above, the market structure of the sub-markets is determined endogenously.
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Chapter 5
Model Verification and Validation
According to Kennedy et al. (2006) model verification is understood as ’solving the
model right’. This means that the computational representation is modeled correctly
and matches the abstract model. Model validation is seen as ’solving the right model,
meaning that the correct abstract model was chosen and that the model accurately
represents the real-world phenomena’ (Kennedy et al., 2006, p. 95). Obviously the
result of model validation is not the perfect model, since the perfect model would be
the real system itself (Kleijnen, 1995). Model verification and validation are crucial
elements for the model development and interpretation process, since they support
the plausibility and credibility of the simulation model. For more details to the
debate about model verification and validation refer to: Kleijnen (1995); Troitzsch
(2004); Sargent (2005); Fagiolo et al. (2006); Kennedy et al. (2006); Windrum et al.
(2007).1
Apart from the formal representation introduced in the last chapter and program
debugging, which considered methods like face validation, internal validity, tracing
and animation, an accurate choice of the model parameters seems to be the most
important objective of the model verification process. Therefore the next step is the
introduction of the parameters of the model. Model validation is then performed
such that the model outcome is compared to a great number of empirical studies to
study how well the results fit real-world data.
5.1 Parametrization of the Model
The discussion of the parameter space completes the description of the model. There-
fore this section begins by showing how the values for input parameters are chosen
for the simulation exercises. Since only a small number of parameters can be esti-
mated with empirical data, the second part of the section debates the relevance of
1See also the debate on model replication in e.g. Wilensky and Rand (2007).
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the remaining parameters with the help of a sensitivity analysis.
5.1.1 Setting the Parameters
The simulation model employed in this work is rather complex and has a large set of
parameters. In particular the parameters of the simulation model for the standard
scenario can be found in Appendix A.2 in Tables A.1 and A.2. The model starts
every time with a technology space withm0 technologies, located on a circle with the
normally distributed technological distances with mean dtech0 and variance σ
2
tech (but
at least equal to 0.01) between those technologies. In total the industry consists of
n = m0/2 firms which interact on the product markets. The geographical location
of the firms is chosen randomly. Each firm starts with a randomly generated knowl-
edge in one of the technologies and is also an active member of the corresponding
sub-market. The starting level is normally distributed around mean RD0 with the
variance σ20 (but at least equal to 0.01). Thus on every sub-market there are ex-
actly two firms active in the first period. Firms are able to borrow money up to
their starting level of savings S0. If the savings of a firm are less than −S0, the
firm is bankrupt and the knowledge of bankrupt firms is lost. Bankrupt firms are
replaced in the industry with firms, that have new savings, the same knowledge as
the technological leader in one randomly picked market and a random geographical
location, see Section 4.4. The new firm gets new specific parameters which represent
the new strategy. Therefore, the total number of firms is constant in the industry,
but the market structure of the sub-markets is determined endogenously through
market entry and exit.
Including the initial conditions four types of parameters can be distinguished.
First, the parameters determining the basic characteristics of the industry (number
of firms, individual demand, minimum production output, interest rate, time as mo-
nopolist). The second group contains technological parameters (costs, thresholds for
product innovations, starting values for technological distances, number of technolo-
gies and knowledge for process innovation). Third, strategy parameters determining
the behavior and capabilities of the firms in the industry (learning curve effects,
weights and thresholds in the functions evaluating markets, investments in product
and process innovation, fixed cost, initial values for savings). And the last group
of parameters describes the length and the repetition of the simulations. Table 5.1
allocates the parameters to the defined groups.
In order to derive qualitatively robust results which do not hinge on particu-
lar parameter settings, we base our observations on batches of 100 simulation runs
carried out for different parameter constellations. The industry structure and tech-
nology parameters are fixed across these runs but parameters of the second type are
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Group Parameters
Industry characteristics n,Bm, xmin, ρ, τ
Technological Environment
cmin, cini, c, d, e, dtech0 , σ
2
tech,
m0, RD
0, σ20
Firm strategy
αi, βi, κi,en, κi,ex, τex, κi,S, δi,Π, δi,SP ,
δi,RD, δi,T , q
prod
i , q
proc
i , Fi, S
0
Simulation T, Runs
Table 5.1: Grouping of parameters.
mostly2 chosen stochastically from certain predefined ranges for each firm in each
run. The initial conditions concerning the starting values of knowledge for each firm
and the definition of the technology space are set up randomly, too. Additionally
the time horizon T was kept fixed, but every presented result is tested for its sta-
bility considering a longer time horizon. The mentioned approach allows us to test
whether the impact that a restriction of the range of selected strategy parameters
has on various variables of interest is statistically significant across stochastically
chosen profiles of the other parameters. In the following we directly calibrate some
parameters in order to reduce the degrees of freedom of the model (see Fagiolo et al.,
2006; Windrum et al., 2007).
The parameters are chosen such that the model was able to find reasonable and
robust results. For example the number of radical product innovations is controlled
to be much lower than the number of incremental product innovations. The capa-
bilities of the firms to learn and generate knowledge for process innovations were set
in such a way that it is possible to reach the lowest possible production cost within
half of the simulated time horizon. The aggregated budget of all consumers in the
industry is determined not only by individual demand but also by the technological
distances in the technology space, see equation (4.14). Hence, the initial aggregated
budget of the industry has to be high enough in order to allow for positive profits of
the firms. The overall budget of the industry is an increasing and convex function
in the number of radical product innovations which in parallel increase the total
circumference of the technological circle. This pattern emerges endogenously from
2There are two exceptions: The starting level of savings S0 and the number of periods τex
considered for market exit, which are equal for every firm and simulation run.
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the assumptions of the model without any additional parameters. The technologi-
cal distances again are significant for the level of knowledge spillovers, see equation
(4.10). In this context it is important that the possible knowledge spillover can reach
approximately the same magnitude as the investments in product or process inno-
vations. The parameters which describe firm strategies are in general no problem
for getting plausible results because most of the structure is given by the evalua-
tion functions in equations (4.17) and (4.30). The parameters which determine the
weights put on different factors are chosen from the interval [0,1]. It does not matter
how the boundaries of the interval are chosen as long they are equal for all firms. If
numbers from different intervals are allocated to the strategies of the firms, it can be
said that firms follow different strategies. The same arguments hold for the parame-
ters which determine the thresholds for firm strategy. A last point aims at the time
restriction given due to the use of an ordinary PC and the programming language
MATLAB, which limits the number of possible interacting agents, the number of
repetitions and the length of the simulation runs.
In one case it was possible to calibrate the parameters to empirical data: The
expenses of firms for product and process innovations (qprodi , q
proc
i ) were chosen to be
in total approximately 5% of the revenues of firms. The division of the investments
in innovations was set to be on average 30% for process and 70% for product inno-
vations. These parameter values are in line with recent empirical studies of German
firm data (Legler et al., 2004; Rammer et al., 2004) and with data from US in the
1970s and 80s (see Chapters 5-9 in Griliches, 1998). In the model the investments
are calculated proportionally to firm profits, see equations (4.33) and (4.34). The
parameters were set to be on average equal to qprodi + q
proc
i = 0.4, which leads to
investments of approximately 5% of firm revenues. From this one can calculate
qprodi = 70% · 0.4 = 0.28 and qprodi = 30% · 0.4 = 0.12, which are the mean values of
the given intervals with uniform distribution.
In order to evaluate the model outcome based on the input parameters several
simulation runs are considered. The interpretation of the results is based on graph-
ical analysis (for example a boxplot or a histogram at a certain time, the graph of
the mean for a variable over all simulation runs over time) and on statistical test-
ing. Each model outcome is tested upon their time stability indicating whether the
outcome persists at a longer time horizon or not.
5.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The arguments discussed so far add constraints to the parameter space of the model.
But there still remain parameters which could be crucial for the results of the model
and which are chosen from a quite big range. Many of these parameters will be the
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topic of simulation exercises in the following chapters (e.g. firm strategies in Chapter
6 and industry characteristics in Chapter 7.2), but in order to get a broader picture
critical parameters are identified and their impact on certain main characteristics of
the industry are analyzed in a sensitivity analysis.
The methodology for evaluating the impact of several input parameters on the
model output is based on a screening design which provides a list of factors ranked
in order of decreasing importance. Several screening designs are discussed in the
literature, but here the analysis is based on the methodology of Morris (1991).3
The design by Morris and other forms of sensitivity analysis useful for agent-based
simulation models can be found in Campolongo et al. (2000) and Saltelli et al. (2004).
Morris’s experiment design varies one factor at a time which is chosen from a
discrete number of levels for each input factor. Four different levels are chosen for
each input parameter and their values are given in Table 5.2. Morris (1991) argues
that the estimation of the relevance of each input parameter should be based on two
measures for each parameter: The first measure µ describes the overall effect of this
parameter on model output and the other measure σ estimates second- and higher-
order effects in which the factor is involved. The Morris design starts by randomly
creating a matrix which gives the experiment plan in the form of values for all
input factors. For every simulation run one single parameter is modified. Based
on the comparison of the model outcome before and after the parameter change an
elementary effect of this particular input factor is calculated. Although the method
relies on a local sensitivity measure (the elementary effect), it can be understood
as a global method, because the measures µ as the mean and σ as the standard
deviation of the elementary effects are calculated upon several different areas in
the input space (see also Chapter 4 in Saltelli et al., 2004). A revised version of
the Morris method suggests the usage of the absolute values for the calculation of
the mean (p. 93, Saltelli et al., 2004). The approach in this work considers this
extension and labels the mean of absolute values of the elementary effects as µ∗.
The experiment plan can be built with the help of a random number generator and
the computation with matrices which can easily be implemented in MATLAB. The
results of the method are best shown in a figure of the (µ∗,σ)-space, which will be
done after the introduction of the considered input and output variables for the
sensitivity analysis.
One aim of the approach in this work is the description of the technological devel-
opment of an industry. Thus factors with a potential high impact on the outcome of
innovations are important. In the model the evolution of the knowledge for process
innovations is determined by the parameters αi and βi as well by the initial value
3An earlier version of the model was analyzed with the methodology of Cotter (Cotter, 1979;
Campolongo et al., 2000) with similar results regarding relevant input parameters.
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for process innovation RD0. Apart from the knowledge for process innovation the
variable costs are determined with the parameters cmin and cini. The parameters
αi and βi are important for product innovations, too. Additionally the parameter d
sets the lower bar for a successful introduction of a radical new product variant. As
mentioned above the consumer budget is driven by the initial technological distance
dtech0 and the individual budget Bm. Main exogenously given parameters influencing
the behavior of firms can be seen in the number of competitors n, fixed cost Fi
and initial savings S0. As a simulation-specific parameter the number of simulated
periods T is incorporated in the analysis. Table 5.2 shows the input parameters and
their values taken for the Morris exercise. All firm-specific parameters (αi, βi and
Fi) indicate the lower boundary of the interval, of which the numbers for the firm
capabilities are chosen stochastically.
Number Parameter 0 1/3 2/3 1
1 αi 3 3.3333 3.6667 4
2 βi 0.75 0.7833 0.8167 0.85
3 Fi 0.2 0.2667 0.3333 0.4
4 RD0 0.15 0.1833 0.2167 0.25
5 d 0.935 0.94 0.945 0.95
6 dtech0 1 1.6667 2.3333 3
7 Bm 1 2.3333 3.6667 5
8 n 5 8 11 14
9 S0 5 8.3333 11.6667 15
10 T 100 133 166 200
11 cmin 0.1 0.2333 0.3667 0.5
12 cini 0.3 0.4333 0.5667 0.7
Table 5.2: Input parameters for the Morris sensitivity analysis with the choice of
p = 4.
After the identification of possible driving parameters one should discuss what
simulation results are important to consider for the sensitivity analysis. Indicators
for the technological development of the industry are the number of product inno-
vations and the evolution of the average level of process innovations. In order to see
the effect of the parameters on geographical and technological proximity the number
of firms at the core in percent and the specialization of the industry4 of the industry
are taken into account. In addition, the effect of a parameter change on welfare is
analyzed by examining the average firm profits and consumer surplus which should
help to indicate the benefits of consumers.
As an example of the outcome of the sensitivity analysis the result for consumer
surplus is shown in Figure 5.1. The diagram of the consumer surplus is chosen be-
4The definition of specialization will be given in Section 6.1. At this point specialization of the
industry is used as an analysis of the technological proximity.
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Figure 5.1: The effect of several input parameters on the consumer surplus in the
model. (Morris sensitivity analysis of absolute values with sample size r = 15.)
cause the interpretation of the output is not that obvious in this situation. Each
point represents the sensitivity measures for a single input variable. The numbers
correspond with the parameters from Table 5.2. Roughly three groups of parame-
ters can be identified in the picture. The first group (2,3,4,5,12) consists of input
parameters which are located close to the origin. According to the Morris analysis
a change in these parameters (βi,Fi,RD
0,d,cini) has only a marginal effect on the
consumer surplus at the end of the simulation horizon. According to Morris (1991)
these parameters are not important for the outcome because they have low values for
µ∗ and σ. The second group (6,8,9) is separated from the other points and indicates
a medium influence on the consumer surplus. This holds for the parameters dtech0 ,
n and S0. The last group (1,7,10,11) exhibits high importance for the outcome of
consumer surplus. These parameters stand for a part of the capability to accumulate
knowledge (αi), the budget of each consumer (Bm), the time horizon (T ) and the
potential to lower production cost (cmin). The Morris analysis suggests that these
parameters have non-linear effects or are involved in interactions with other factors
because they have high values for µ∗ and σ. A high value for µ∗ and a value close
to zero for σ would point toward linear effects. No input parameters in the figure
seem to have a purely linear influence.
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From the above example the qualitative aspect of the method becomes clear.
This could be seen as a possible weakness of the approach. It is very hard to fix
the limit of the relevant parameters. For example are the parameters in the middle
group (6,8,9) still relevant or not? Here only the outer parameters are considered.
It should be added that the figures for the other output variables indicate a much
more distinct situation where it is much easier to distinguish between negligible and
relevant input parameters. All results of the sensitivity analysis are summarized in
Table 5.3.
Product
Innovations
Process
Innovations Profits
Consumer
Surplus
Firms
at the Core
Speciali-
zation
αi x x
βi x
Fi x
RD0
d
dtech0 x x
Bm x x x x
n x x
S0
T x x
cmin x x x
cini
Table 5.3: Crucial input parameters which drive the corresponding output values
are indicated with an ’x’. (Morris sensitivity analysis of absolute values with sample
size r = 15.)
The sensitivity analysis gives evidence that different input parameters do ef-
fect different outcome variables. Some parameters even have a high influence for a
range of output factors. Among the latter group are the conditions which describe
the demand setting in the industry (the initial technological distance dtech0 and the
individual budget Bm). Looking at the effect of production cost the initial mean
knowledge for process innovations (RD0) is negligible whereas the potential to de-
crease production cost (cmin) influences several output values. The number of firms
in the industry n modifies the average profits and the percentage of firms in the ag-
glomeration. The time horizon T alters profits and consumer surplus but seems not
to alter the outcome for geographical and technological proximity. The firm-specific
parameters αi, βi and Fi do only have a minor impact on the output although as-
pects of technological location seem to be modified by them. Other parameters like
the threshold for radical product innovations d, the initial level of savings S0 or the
initial level of production cost cini appear to be irrelevant.
The sensitivity analysis provides a good picture of which input parameters prob-
ably drive which model output. Most of the parameters which had a relevant impact
on main industry characteristics are kept fixed during the simulation exercises in or-
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der to compare model outcome. Overall, the results of the sensitivity analysis are
plausible and support the implementation (and verification) of the computational
model. An important result is the highly influential role of demand conditions on
the technological development of the industry which is in line with the formal as-
sumptions of the industry specification. We will come back to this in Section 7.3,
where policy might influence the consumers’ demand. Having discussed the aspects
of the implementation of the theoretical model, the next section concentrates on the
empirical relevance of the model.
5.2 Comparison with Empirics
This section introduces a comparison of the virtual industry, which is represented
in the simulation model, with the real world, or, in other words, a comparison to
something what many economists think that the real world could be. It may be
important to mention that the aim of the theoretical model discussed in this book is
not the reproduction of so-called stylized facts (for such a methodology see e.g. Dosi
et al., 2006). As discussed in the latter section, the parameters are not calibrated to
reproduce statistics but to provide a meaningful picture of an innovative industry.
The idea behind this section is the confrontation of the simulation outcome of
the abstract model with observed empirical regularities. The main task is to identify
similar patterns of industry development and details in which the theoretical model
departs from the observed correlations. Most of the analysis here is qualitative
and concentrates on the aspects of the model. Many of the stylized facts found
in the literature cannot be discussed simply because they are not modeled (e.g.
entry to the industry). The debate is arranged around the topics of firm size and
growth, persistence, and an interpretation of competition which is connected to the
name Schumpeter. More specific topics about firm strategy and economic policy in
connection to related empirical studies are presented in the applications Part III of
this book.
The basis for the validation of the model are various empirical studies conducted
in connection with the Industrial Organization approach. This approach tried to
identify certain measures of market structure, conduct and performance. Main re-
sults of this strand of literature are very well summarized in Schmalensee (1989)
and Caves (1998). More recent surveys add to the traditional topics a discussion of
the influence of innovation on the development and the evolution of industries (see
Cohen, 1995; Geroski, 1995; Jensen and McGuckin, 1997; Bartelsman and Doms,
2000; Marsili, 2001). See also the work by Klette and Kortum (2004) for a recent
overview of stylized facts.
Table 5.4 provides a summary of the stylized facts considered and the ability
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Stylized Facts Evidence in the Model
No normal firm size distribution Yes
No normal firm growth distribution Yes
R&D productivity decreases with firm size Yes
Persistent profitability differences Not stable, but increasing
Persistent market concentration Not stable, but increasing
Persistent firm productivity differences Not stable, but increasing
Innovative firms replace less innovative firms Yes
Positive correlation between entry and exit rates Yes
Product market life cycle patterns Yes, but not very clear
Clustering of innovations in time and space Yes
Table 5.4: Stylized facts and the reproduction in the simulation model.
of the simulation model to reproduce these regularities. The comparison with the
empirics underlines the fact that the model generates reasonable firm size and growth
distributions and is in line with the view that R&D productivity is declining with
firm size. The model proves to be evolutionary because it captures the idea that
innovative successful firms expand at the expense of less successful firms, which in
the longer run leads to increasing differences in profitability, market concentration
and firm productivity. The indicated results depart from empirical findings, which
mostly suggest stable differences of the firm and market characteristics, but are in
line with the view that the characteristics do not converge over time. The evolution
of an industry shows similarities with the empirical results as the model proposes a
strong correlation of entries and exits in the markets, the development of product
life cycles, and the observation of clustering of innovations in the technology space
and over time.
At this point it should be mentioned that multiple assumptions of the model are
also based on empirical regularities: For example the interpretation of knowledge
and knowledge build-up in firms (Dosi, 1988a; Dosi et al., 2006), the interpretation
of learning (Nooteboom et al., 2007; Wuyts et al., 2005), and the assumption that
knowledge spillovers are local in terms of technological and geographical proximity
(Jaffe et al., 1993; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996b; Dosi et al., 2006). Apparently,
empirical regularities used for model assumptions cannot be used for model vali-
dation. Stylized facts - or theory that survived the empirical test - are therefore
important as input factors while building the model as well as guidelines for the
interpretation of model outcome. The next three sections will focus on the latter
aspect.
Furthermore, the simulation model in this book is also confronted with theoretical
models in order to underline the plausibility of the results. The model-to-model
comparison during the process of model validation is called ’docking’ (Kennedy
et al., 2006). In Section 3.1 the model is compared to a game-theoretic model of
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Alsleben (2005) and in Section 7.2 to a simulation model of Winter (1984).
5.2.1 Firm Size and Growth
As a first stylized fact the distribution of firm size, firm growth and the correlation of
firm size and research and development activities should be highlighted. Many em-
pirical studies indicate that firms differ in their size measured in terms of turnover,
number of employees or market shares. Typically the empirically observed distri-
bution is positively skewed showing many small and few large firms (Schmalensee,
1989; Sutton, 1997; Marsili, 2001). Within-industry firm differences are believed to
be higher than between industries (Jensen and McGuckin, 1997). Dosi et al. (2006)
propose the usage of rank size plot in order to evaluate the simulated outcome and
show that the observations do not follow a log-normal distribution. We restrict our
analysis to histograms which probably give a better impression of the distribution.
Figure 5.2 a) shows a histogram of the firm size for 100 simulation runs at the
end of the simulated time horizon. In the picture the turnover of a firm is taken as
a proxy for firm size. The distribution clearly indicates that most of the firms only
reach a small size. Some of the firms manage to go beyond a threshold and reach a
medium size whereas only very few firms are extraordinarily successful. Because the
distribution has at least two peaks, it can hardly be approximated by a log-normal
(similar to Dosi et al., 2006). These observations can be supported by the fact that in
most simulation runs 2 out of 10 firms have a size much greater than the arithmetic
mean, 2 to 3 firms are settled around the mean and 5 to 6 firms indicate a very low
value even below the starting level. Therefore, we conclude that the outcome of the
simulation studies concerning the distribution of firm size is in line with empirical
findings.
Regarding firm growth rate distributions Dosi et al. (2006) argue that they are
not Gaussian and can be well proxied by fat-tailed, tent-shaped densities in a Laplace
distribution. The distribution of average firm growth rates (measured in percentage
change of firm size) over the simulated periods are shown in Figure 5.2 b). The
histogram shows a high peak around 5% growth per period. From the picture it is
not obvious whether the observations can be well approximated by a Laplace density.
Another reason against this kind of distribution could be seen in the asymmetry
indicating a positively skewed distribution as shown in the figure.
Other authors find evidence that growth of firms diminishes with size (at decreas-
ing rate) and decreases with age when firm size is held constant and that the average
and variance of firm growth rates decline with the age of firms. Young firms have on
average higher and more differentiated rates of growth (Geroski, 1995; Caves, 1998;
Marsili, 2001). In the context of firm growth rates the simulation model departs
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Figure 5.2: Histogram of firm size and firm growth in 100 simulation runs.
from the empirical studies. Here the growth rates of the 2 to 3 biggest firms out of
10 are stable whereas the smaller firms have only minor changes or even negative
growth rates. The mean and the standard deviation of growth rates is not decreas-
ing but increasing or remaining on a constant level, which does not result in higher
and more differentiated growth rates of young firms. Therefore the observed growth
patterns do not fit the industry evolution sketched in the cited surveys. The debate
on Schumpeterian competition later in this chapter will add more details to this
discussion.
Some empirical surveys study the relationship between firm size and R&D. They
propose that R&D increases proportionately with size (thus indicating no advan-
tages of firm size), that the number of innovations tends to increase less than pro-
portionately with firm size, and that R&D productivity appears to decline with size
(Cohen, 1995). Others formulate the proposition that small firms on average have
higher rates of innovation than large firms (Caves, 1998; Acs and Audretsch, 1987,
1988), which is similar to a declining R&D productivity with size. The results of the
simulation studies seem to be in line with these findings. For example with respect
to product innovations the simulated outcome shows that the expenses for product
innovations increase proportionally, the number of new products developed by a
firm increase less than proportionally and the R&D efficiency measured in number
of product innovations divided by investments decreases with the size of a firm. One
reason for the first correlation is the fact that firms’ profits increase in the simulated
output with the size of the firms and, thus, the bigger firms invest by assumption
more in product innovations.
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5.2.2 Persistence of Firm and Industry Characteristics
The second topic, that many empirical researchers are interested in, runs under the
heading of persistence. Many characteristics of industries and firms are believed
to be quite stable over time. Profitability differences among firms (Schmalensee,
1989; Geroski, 1995; Marsili, 2001) as well as inter-industry differences in profit rates
(Geroski, 1995; Marsili, 2001) tend to persist for long periods. Market concentration
is relatively stable in an industry but there is a high degree of market turbulence
(entry and exits, change of market shares) (Marsili, 2001). The same accounts for the
size distribution of firms (Caves, 1998). Regarding firm performance given by inter-
firm productivity differentials authors find that they are significant and quite lasting
(Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Dosi et al., 2006). Jensen and McGuckin (1997) argue
that plants (or firms) have stable permanent differences in costs that are reflected
in their product prices, even within narrowly defined product groupings. A recent
empirical study of panel data of German manufacturing and service firms during
the period 1994 - 2002 indicates that innovation input and output is persistent to a
very large extent at the firm level (Peters, 2005).
In this context the simulation results are examined in terms of persistence of
market concentration, profit rates, productivity differences as well as investments in
and number of product innovations. Starting with the evolution of average market
concentration at the sub-market level the simulations depart from the empirical
patterns. A very robust result of the simulation exercises shows that average market
concentration is not stable but increasing over time, although one must add that at
the end of the simulated time horizon it stabilizes at a high level. This finding fits the
picture of the distribution of firm size since it becomes clear that at most 2 to 3 out
of 10 firms seem to dominate the industry as the simulation continues. The outcome
of an increasing market concentration fits the empirical result of Caves (1998) and
Sutton (1998), who found that concentration tends to increase in vertically and
horizontally differentiated industries.
Looking at the firm level data the results of the simulations get closer to the
empirical regularities. The differences in profits of the firms emerge very soon and
they do not converge. As in the case of firm size the variance of the distribution of
firm profitability increases over time showing an increasing difference. In order to
get an idea of the development of firm productivity differences Figure 5.3 shows the
evolution of average knowledge for process innovations (RDproci,j,t ) which determines
the cost and productivity of firms in the model. Three graphs are shown: The
average productivity of the firm which happens to be in period t at the first (Rank
1, dotted line), medium (Rank 5, dashed line) or the lowest rank (Rank 10, solid
line). Again all graphs show averages over 100 simulation runs.
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Figure 5.3: Evolution of firm productivity differences.
The figure shows that the least productive firm can only increase its average
productivity at the beginning but afterward the level decreases or stabilizes at a
very low level. The best firm manages to increase its average knowledge for process
innovation very fast and then the value is still increasing but at a lower rate. The
difference between the best and the worst firm is thus increasing over time. The
third graph shows the development for a firm with medium levels of productivity.
During the first half of the simulation the line for this firm is located in the middle
between the best and the worst firm. But at a certain time the medium firm cannot
keep its standard and its productivity approaches the line of the firm with the
lowest productivity. One reason for this is the fact that the more successful firms
keep on introducing new product innovations which increase the number of relevant
technologies, such that even with constant knowledge the average values of the
medium firm decline. In conclusion one can say that the differences in productivity
at the firm level are persistent over time and that the difference in productivity
between the few very successful and the other firms even increases as the simulation
continues.
Further analysis of the simulated outcome shows that the differences in innova-
tion input (measured in investments in process and product innovations) are also
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persistent over time. After an initial phase the expenses for innovations remain on
a constant level for the majority of the firms. Only the best or second-best firm
can further increase the amount of investments in innovation. Since process innova-
tion results were already mentioned, the innovation output in the form of successful
product innovation indicates a strong separation between leading and lagging firms.
Approximately only half of the firms introduce new products after a given time pe-
riod. Thereafter, the number of new product innovations increases strongly with the
ranked firm.
Altogether the study of the simulation outcome leads to the conclusion that
differences between firms are not only persistent but increasing. This holds for
firms’ market shares, profitability, innovation input and innovation output.
5.2.3 Schumpeterian Competition
The view of Schumpeter on competition incorporated a dynamic and active pic-
ture in the way that more productive firms grow and lead industry growth at the
expense of less efficient rivals (Schumpeter, 1912; Nelson and Winter, 1982). The
technical change pushes the laggards and non-adopters farther back whereas the
technologically leading firms survive and grow in the competitive selection process
based on innovations. Economic growth is achieved via a competitive selection pro-
cess in which the most efficient firms survive (Jensen and McGuckin, 1997; Caves,
1998). This interpretation of competition seems to find some empirical support.
Two-thirds of the aggregate productivity growth is attributable to gains in market
shares by most efficient producers and declines in market share by the least efficient
Jensen and McGuckin (1997). Following the arguments of the last two sections one
can say that the simulated outcome is in line with these findings. The industry
shows a strong separation between successful firms, which have high market shares,
earn higher profits and conduct more innovations, and firms with shrinking market
shares, profits and average knowledge. The separation between firms is not only
persistent but increasing over time. Figure 5.3 underlines this result: The distance
between the technological frontier given by the most successful firm and a firm with
medium rank or lowest rank is increasing. Firms that were successful in the past
are much more likely to be successful in the future, which was described as ’success
breeds success’ by Malerba and Orsenigo (2000). Of course this result is also driven
by the structure of the model, which is evolutionary by assumption.
Concerning entry and exit of firms two different strands of the literature can
be identified: Argumentation based on the concept of entry barriers going back
to Bain (1956) and industry life cycles (see e.g. Klepper, 1996). In the model the
total number of firms in the industry n is assumed to stay constant and entry in
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the industry is only possible if a firm is corrupt and is replaced by another firm. A
strategic behavior of firms in- and outside the industry about industry entry and exit
is not incorporated. But entry and exit in the different sub-markets of the industry
is modeled and the market structure on these sub-markets emerges endogenously.
Hence, this section concentrates on the entry and exit and the resulting market
structure in markets, but not in industries.
Traditionally entry barriers (scale economies, capital requirements, advertising
intensity or innovations) are estimated to be high (Geroski, 1995). They are believed
to be positively correlated with firm profitability and reduce the number of entrants
(Bain, 1956; Schmalensee, 1989; Caves, 1998). But the picture is not that clear
since other authors find that the level of profitability in an industry seems to have a
rather limited effect on the rate of entry. Additionally entry rates are still relatively
high in concentrated markets and rather random across industries (Marsili, 2001).
Entry barriers seem to have less influence on entry by initially large newcomers, by
firms established in other industries, or by multinational firms (Caves, 1998). Hence
Marsili (2001) concludes that entry barriers seem to be quite ineffective as deterrents
to entry. In this model incumbents do not have the possibility to strategically use
their knowledge and market power to prevent firms from penetrating their markets.5
But in general the entrants have less knowledge of process innovations, which results
in higher production cost6. After the initial periods following a successful product
innovation entry is quite easy but entrants have to catch up on the technological
leader in order to gain similar profits. The simulations demonstrate that there are
entries over the whole time horizon and the number of entrants is particularly higher
in the early periods after founding. The potential knowledge lead of the incumbents
does therefore not deter entry in the model. One aspect most researchers agree upon
is the fact that entry and exit rates in industries are highly positively correlated
and that entrants suffer from high rates of infant mortality (Geroski, 1995; Caves,
1998; Marsili, 2001). Indeed the entry and exit rates in the sub-markets of the
simulation runs are strongly correlated indicating a correlation coefficient of 0.75
and higher. This number is indeed similar to real-world data like the result of
Baldwin and Gorecki (1991), who find a correlation between exit and entry in the
interval between 0.5 and 0.7 for Canada during the 1970s, or the study of Dutch
retailing Carree and Thurik (1996), who show a correlation of 0.78 per year during
1981-1988. Furthermore, one can observe in the simulated data that most entrants
leave the market since they are not able to make positive profits.
Another interesting empirical result is given by Geroski (1995), who explains that
high rates of entry are often associated with high rates of innovation and increases
5See the literature about price wars and R&D races, e.g.Reinganum (1983); Dixit (1988).
6See equation (4.2).
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in efficiency not only by the entrants but also more innovations by the incumbents
as a reaction to the entry and that de novo entry is more common but less successful
than entry by diversification. Chapter 6 will have a closer look at firm strategies and
diversification. Caves (1998) sees the reason behind changes in the market structure
in the basic features of an industry’s technology and demand conditions. Similar to
this is the point made by Cohen (1995) when he mentions that once one controls
for firm size, the effect of market concentration on innovation activity is relatively
slight and appears to reflect the effect of other industry characteristics. The debate
of industry characteristics and the notion of technological regimes will be the topic
of Section 7.2.
The industry or product life cycle approach describes the evolution of a product
after its innovation in four subsequent stages: Introduction, expansion, consolida-
tion, and contraction. At the beginning of the industry, the number of entrants rises
over time or it may attain a peak at the start of the industry and then declines
over time. Despite the market growth entry slows down and exits overtake entry
rates, which results in a shakeout of active producers in the industry. Initially the
market shares of the largest firms decline but later on they stabilize over time. The
rate of product innovations and the number of competing product versions decline
whereas the firms employ more effort on reducing production cost. See e.g. Geroski
(1995); Klepper (1996); Caves (1998); van Dijk (2002) for a more detailed description
of product life cycles. These regularities have been widely confirmed by empirical
studies for such different industries as automobiles, car tires, televisions, penicillin,
and typewriters (Klepper and Simons, 2005). Explanations of the industry life cycle
patterns were based on the emergence of a dominant design (Utterback and Aber-
nathy, 1975; Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) or the characteristics of innovative
firms (Klepper, 1996).
The number of firms in each sub-market can be evaluated in the simulation
model. Figure 5.4 shows the number of active firms in the market which was estab-
lished by the first product innovation. The graph shows the average number of firms
with positive output on this market over 100 simulations. After the founding of the
market many firms enter the new market but the number of firms is decreasing in
time and seems to stabilize as the simulations continue. The same holds for profits:
At the beginning the profits are high and later decline to constant level. A similar
evolution regarding the number of firms can be observed for every new sub-market
which is founded through a successful product innovation. By assumption the firms
invest first in product innovations in order to introduce a new product variant and
then in process innovations to reduce production cost. Altogether the simulations
more or less reproduce the pattern of product life cycles on the level of sub-markets
but the result for the positive correlation between entries and exits is more evident.
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Figure 5.4: The average number of active firms in the market founded by the first
successful product innovation.
A last empirical stylized fact considers the location and timing of innovations.
It was argued that innovations cluster in time and space (Schumpeter, 1939; Silver-
berg and Verspagen, 2003). This behavior of the model could be observed as there
are times of no new product variants followed by times of many successful prod-
uct innovations in close technological distance. A possible explanation could lie in
the learning externalities between firms which allows several firms to simultaneously
achieve high knowledge in a particular technological area. Once this knowledge
exceeds a certain threshold, every firm has a rising probability to successfully im-
plement a new product innovation. The same effect arises if a firm is able to benefit
from internal knowledge spillovers, which lead to a clustering of product innovations
of that firm.
After this general comparison of the simulated data with observed empirical
regularities as part of the model validation we continue in the next chapters with a
deeper analysis of the main mechanisms of the model. Whenever there are relevant
empirical studies, we mention them at the respective text passage. We start with a
look at firm strategy.
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Part III
Applications
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Chapter 6
Firm Strategy
If we accept the assumptions and relevance of the model proposed in the previous
chapters, we can apply the theoretical model to different questions and problems.
We start by an investigation of firm strategy in the context of proximity and innova-
tion. We try to show which strategies in this particular setting seem to be profitable
and what trade-offs and challenges managers should be aware of. We do this by
examining firm-specific parameters in a regression analysis and by discussing differ-
ent scenarios which help to identify the influence of geographical and technological
proximity on competition between firms.
6.1 Firm Strategy and Proximity
A precondition to investigate the issue of firm strategy is heterogeneity of behavior
and capabilities. Additionally, empirical evidence shows that firm differences are
given in reality and that they have a major impact on economic variables (Nelson,
1991). As argued in Section 3.3 one strength of the agent-based approach is the
modeling of heterogeneous agents, e.g. firms, which interact in a complex environ-
ment. Here, the firms compete mostly through innovations which are the result of
accumulated knowledge, capabilities to perform R&D, and of course their opera-
tional routines. The analysis of firm strategy is done on a firm and aggregated level
to asses the consequences for the firm and the industry. The environment for firm
interaction is captured in the term of proximity.
In this work firm strategy can be evaluated in terms of geographical and techno-
logical proximity. The main trade-off for each firm when choosing the geographical
location either at the core or on the periphery is given by the possible positive
learning effects versus the possible loss of economically valuable knowledge in the
agglomeration. Since the firms are direct competitors on the horizontally differen-
tiated markets, the link from knowledge to economically valuable knowledge can
be established. The knowledge assets of the firm and its competitors imply which
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firms succeed and which do not. The amount and structure of knowledge is related
to technological proximity. Additionally the model considers other elements of firm
strategy such as the attitude toward market entry, market exit and investments in
R&D. This kind of firm behavior is captured in the model and can be analyzed.
The measurement of geographical proximity is rather simple in the model. Geo-
graphical proximity is given by the choice of the location (either core (dgeoi,t = 0) or
periphery (dgeoi,t = 1)) and the number of firms in the agglomeration gives the aggre-
gated outcome for geographical proximity. The case with technological proximity is
more complex since the area and amount of knowledge of a firm or an industry have
to be captured somehow. One possible way to do this is connected with the notion of
specialization. There are two dimensions of specialization in this context, namely
the distribution of the locations of the technologies employed in the firm and the
variance in the amount of knowledge firms have with respect to different technolo-
gies. Hence, the following two properties make a firm or an industry ’specialized’:
First, the technologies associated with the active sub-markets are clustered (in one
or several clusters) rather than being evenly distributed in the technology space.
Second, there is a significant variance in the stock of technology-specific knowledge
across active sub-markets with accentuated peaks at certain technologies. Figure
6.1 shows the different types of specialization which describe the technological loca-
tion and height in the model. An industry, a firm or the firms in a location can be
diversified (a), specialized in location (b), specialized in height (c) or specialized in
location and height (d).
In order to capture these different aspects of specialization, as introduced in
Dawid and Wersching (2006), two different versions of a specialization index are
constructed where both are transformations of the Hirschmann-Herfindahl-Index
which has been used in past empirical (Henderson et al., 1995) or simulation (Jonard
and Yildizoglu, 1998) work dealing with specialization. To be able to compare
degrees of specialization across different settings with different numbers of existing
variants the Hirschmann-Herfindahl-Index is normalized in such a manner that it
always has the range [0, 1]. In particular we use the index
SPECIALIZATIONt =
[ ∑N
j=1 a
2
j,t
(
∑N
j=1 aj,t)
2
− 1/N
]
· 1
1− 1/N , (6.1)
where N is the number of technologies actively used and the interpretation of
aj,t depends on which type of specialization is considered. In order to capture the
degree of clustering of technologies employed in the population we set aj,t = d
tech
j,j+1,t,
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Figure 6.1: Types of technological spezialization: a) no specialization, b) specialized
in location, c) specialized in height and d) specialized in location and height.
which gives the distance between technology j and the clockwise seen next active
technology in the circular technology space. In order to capture specialization in
knowledge stock we set aj,t = maxi=1,...,F RDi,j,t, where RDi,j,t denotes the stock of
knowledge specific for technology j firm i has at time t. An aggregated index, which
represents the total specialization, is the arithmetical mean of these two indices. But
it could be argued that the index for specialization in technological location is more
relevant because the demand for products and the degree of knowledge spillovers is
more influenced by the technological distance than by the height of the knowledge
stocks.
With the indices for specialization it is possible to describe and investigate sev-
eral aspects of technological proximity. For example the proportions of specialized
and diversified firms could be studied. Breschi et al. (2003) introduce an empirical
study on firms from the United States, Italy, France, UK, Germany, and Japan and
specialization is measured based on patent data from the European Patent Office
from 1982 to 1993. If a firm took patents from more than one technological field,
it was labeled as diversified innovator. If a firm took at least one patent but only
in one technological field, it was called a specialized innovator. In their sample the
authors estimated that 69.8 % of the innovative firms were specialized and 30.2 %
diversified. The interpretation of technology fields in Breschi et al. (2003) is very
broad and could be compared to the interpretation of an industry in this work. Thus
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the firms in the model belong to one technology field by assumption. But if we ac-
cept the view that the firms are technologically specialized within the industry, and
this should be the case with an index from equation (6.1) greater than 0.5, then a
computation of the proportions is possible. At the end of the simulation runs in the
standard scenario approximately half of the firms have an aggregated index equal
or greater than 0.5. Interestingly, if we consider only the index for specialization in
technological distances, approximately 62 % of the firms are more specialized. This
value comes quite close to the empirical evidence of the patent sample. With the
potential to measure the technological and geographical proximity, we can now start
to study the impact of firm strategy on the economic performance of firms and the
outcome of geographical and technological location.
As a first analysis we perform a multiple linear regression analysis of the randomly
chosen strategy parameters on the outcome for aggregated profits over all periods in
the standard scenario of the industry. The regression analysis considers parameters
from the two equations for evaluating market choice (see equation (4.17)) and loca-
tion (see equation (4.30)), different inertia parameters and the height of investments
in research activities of the firm. For the regression 200 runs are considered, which
results in 2000 data points with 10 firms in each iteration. The statistical results
are given in Table 6.1. Although the considered parameters are only able to explain
about 24% of the original variability, some striking results can be identified.∑
tΠi,t Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t|
δi,Π 56.06*** 16.87 3.32 0.001
δi,SP -13.68 17.14 -0.80 0.425
δi,RD -0.91 16.69 -0.05 0.956
δi,T -93.31*** 16.80 -5.55 0.000
κi,en -378.85*** 16.16 -23.45 0.000
κi,ex 1096.00*** 166.91 6.57 0.000
κi,S 13.35 17.04 0.78 0.434
qprodi 176.54 214.54 0.82 0.411
qproci 649.72*** 210.51 3.09 0.002
Const. 172.26** 69.01 2.50 0.013
Table 6.1: Multiple linear regression results of strategy parameters on firm profits
(Observations= 2000, R2 = 0.2440).
The parameters δi,Π and δi,T are significant and have a positive respectively neg-
ative coefficient. Both parameters are used in equation (4.17) to choose market
entry candidates or to choose an attractive area for product innovation. The in-
ertia parameters for market entry and exit (κi,en and κi,ex) turn out to be highly
significant. Apart from the constant term, the amount of profit which is invested in
process innovations (qproci ) is significant and positively correlated with the profits of
this firm.
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A first important result shows that the parameters which change the technolog-
ical location of the firm (δi,Π and δi,T ) seem to be significant whereas all parameters
which determine geographical location (δi,SP , δi,RD and κi,S) do not have a significant
influence on the level of aggregated profits of a firm. The signs of the coefficients
concerning technological proximity indicate that the higher a firm weights potential
profits in a market compared to technological focus the more profitable is the firm.
This can be concluded because there is a positive influence of δi,Π and a negative
influence of δi,T on profits. It should be added that the value of the coefficient is
rather small compared e.g. to the coefficient of the significant inertia parameters
for market entry and exit, which are also chosen from the interval [0,1]. Section 6.3
will examine whether this result is general or emerges only in specific scenarios. The
non-significant result for geographical proximity is at this point rather surprising
and requires further analysis, which is done in Section 6.2.
Another interesting finding can be seen in the fact that the more likely a firm en-
ters into a new market and the longer a firm stays in a market (even with losses), the
more profitable is this firm. The first effect comes from the significant and negative
coefficient of κi,en, and the second effect from the significant and positive coefficient
of κi,ex. Following this outcome firms benefit from serving as many markets as pos-
sible although there are assumed fixed costs. Firms that stick to their markets and
are able to bear more negative profits prove to be more economically successful in
the regression.
Concerning the expenditures for R&D a differentiation between process and prod-
uct innovations is necessary. The more a firm invests in cost-reducing process inno-
vations, the higher are the economic profits. Although both coefficients are positive,
only the height of investments in product innovations appears to have a significant
influence. One reason for this result could be that process innovations for sure re-
duce cost while product innovations always include an element of uncertainty so that
their benefits do not arise automatically.
Apart from the analysis with fixed and constant intervals for the firm-specific
parameters, the further sections examine the outcome for different scenarios. The
next section starts with a closer look at the geographical location decisions of the
firms.
6.2 The Incentive to Agglomerate
Whereas the previous section does not give a clear relation between geographical
location decisions on the profitability of firms, this section will deepen the analysis
on geographical proximity. In the model firms face the trade-off between gaining or
losing knowledge through local learning. On the one hand, firms can learn in close
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geographical proximity to competitors and thus improve their knowledge for process
and product innovations. On the other hand, firms are assumed not to be able to
prevent knowledge from spilling over. A competitive advantage can be lost through
imitation by competitors. These effects are the only relevant strategic elements of
the geographical location decision in the standard case.
Another possible effect may arise through costs of scarce resources (e.g. labor
or land), if many firms agglomerate in a particular location.1 For the discussion of
geographical proximity we therefore extend the standard model such that production
cost may rise with the number of firms in the agglomeration. We call this scenario
’Additional Cost in Core’. Hence, equation (4.2) in this setting is replaced with the
following:
ci,j,t = c
ini
[
cmin + (1− cmin)(1−RDproci,j,t )
]
+ (1− dgeoi,t ) · (|Nt| − 1) ·R. (6.2)
The last term (1 − dgeoi,t ) · (|Nt| − 1) · R in equation (6.2) is added to the pre-
vious formula. Here the costs at the core are only considered if a firm is in the
agglomeration (dgeoi,t = 0). The costs of the scarce resource depend on the number
of firms at the core, which is given by |Nt|, and the factor R, which stands for the
increase of costs through every additional firm in the agglomeration and is set to
R = 0.15. Note that if a firm is alone at the core (|Nt| = 1), there are no additional
congestion costs. In this scenario the de-agglomeration force of congestion cost has
to be included in the evaluation function for the geographical location of the firms.
Therefore, equation (4.30) is altered as follows:
vgeoi,t =
[
E
(
RDproci,j,t
RDprocj,t
)] δi,RD
δi,RD+δi,SP+δi,R
·
[
E
(
SP proci,j,t (d
geo
i,j,t = 1)
SP proci,j,t (d
geo
i,j,t = 0)
)] δi,SP
δi,RD+δi,SP+δi,R
·
[
1−E
(
ci,j,t(d
geo
i,t = 1)
ci,j,t(d
geo
i,t = 0)
)] δi,R
δi,RD+δi,SP+δi,R
(6.3)
Now equation (6.3) considers three possible effects. A weight parameter δi,R ∈
[0, 1] for the relation between production cost outside and inside the cluster is in-
corporated in the formula. This parameter represents the firm strategy concerning
congestion costs. A high value compared to δi,RD and δi,SP indicates that a firm will
react very sensitively to the rise of production cost when many firms agglomerate
at the core.
1For example Glaeser (1998) debates congestion forces at a city level.
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The outcome regarding geographical proximity over time in the standard sce-
nario (solid line) and the extension discussed above (dashed line) is shown in Figure
6.2.2 The curves show a similar pattern with a peak after the initialization of the
simulation. Afterward the number of firms at the core slightly decreases to a level
of 5 out of 10 firms in the agglomeration for the standard case. The graph which in-
cludes an additional de-agglomeration force in the form of congestion cost decreases
after the initial maximum with fewer oscillations to a lower level. All curves show
the result of 100 simulation runs. The difference between the two scenarios is highly
significant, see Appendix A.3.
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Figure 6.2: Average number of firms at the core with and without congestion cost.
The initial location was chosen randomly and thus on average five firms start at
the core. The firms start with knowledge in only one technology. By assumption two
firms have a knowledge stock greater than zero in each technology and hence no firm
has a huge technological lead. As the knowledge for process innovations at start is
quite low, in the extension the additional costs at the core compared to other costs
are also relatively low. Because of this, firms have a strong incentive to join the core
at the beginning of the simulations. This incentive is reduced, in particular, after
the first introduction of new products around period 20. With successful product
innovations the innovating firms become technological leaders and try to keep their
2Like in Wersching (2007a) the standard and the additional cost at the core scenario are com-
pared with each other. The results are quite similar although some of the model elements differ,
see Chapter 4 for more details.
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status by leaving the core. This explains the characteristic peak in all simulated
scenarios and it becomes obvious that it emerges due to initial conditions. Further
discussion will concentrate on the more general pattern in later periods.
In Figure 6.2 two different cases are presented: No and high additional costs for
scarce resources at the core. It can be seen that even with no extra cost not all firms
join core. The possible threat of knowledge losses through knowledge spillover is
hereby the reason for voluntary isolation. In case of high costs for the scarce resource
these costs are approximately equal to the average initial cost when half of the firms
locate at the core. This means that a location at the core rises the variable costs for
every product quantity in that height. Because of process innovations the relative
value even increases. As illustrated in the picture even with these high additional
costs most firms - at least in the first half - choose a location at a small geographical
distance to their competitors. Despite the differences in the two scenarios the overall
resulting effect shows that a low geographical distance to competitors is important
during a phase of very heterogeneous knowledge, e.g. during the developing period
of an industry, as well when the industry becomes more mature.
The graphs appear to differ in their gradient where in the standard scenario the
number of firms at the core is higher than in the scenario with congestion costs.
In order to see if the difference persists or is only an artifact of the considered
time horizon we extend the simulated number of periods to 500. Figure 6.3 shows
the outcome for the two scenarios in the long run. The picture shows the result
of 50 iterations of the standard scenarios and 10 iterations of the scenario with
additional costs at the core. As it was not clear whether the curve in the standard
scenario is oscillating or decreasing, we perform a long-run simulation over 50 runs.3
All additional simulation exercises indicate that even in the standard scenario the
incentive for geographical proximity is reduced over time, which was not obvious
from the previous picture 6.2.
In Figure 6.3 the development of the number of firms in the agglomeration over a
long time horizon is presented. Both curves are fitted with a linear trend in order to
get an idea of the general development. In a linear regression analysis the coefficient
of a time variable proves to be very significant and has a negative influence on the
number of firms at the core.4 The linear trend curves support the first impression
that the incentive for core in both scenarios is reduced over time and the decline is
greater with additional congestion cost.
In the evaluation function for the geographical location in equations (4.30) and
3The number of iterations was limited by time restrictions, e.g. the simulation of 50 runs over
500 periods had a computational time of about 10 days.
4In the standard scenario the statistics are: R2 = 0.195 and the t-value for the coefficient of
the time variable is −10, 999. The extended version of the model performs a little better with the
corresponding values R2 = 0.407 and a t-value of −18, 498.
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Figure 6.3: Average number of firms at the core with and without congestion cost
in the long run.
(6.3) two respectively three factors are considered: The firm’s own advances in
knowledge for process innovations, possible learning gains through knowledge spillovers
at the core and in the extension the costs for scarce resources at the core. Over time
the evaluations of the single factors change and at least the first two work against
each other. At the beginning knowledge between firms is quite heterogeneous, which
results in single firms having high knowledge in a few technologies. Because of this
in earlier periods the evaluation for knowledge strongly points toward a location on
the periphery. As the industry evolves, the values decline but at a low rate. The
situation with knowledge spillovers is exactly opposite. The heterogeneous knowl-
edge at start creates a lot of learning possibilities for the firms in the agglomeration.
Over time the fraction between internal and the total sum of internal and external
spillovers increases and this makes a location at the core less attractive. The addi-
tional cost for all firms at the core in the extension of the standard model works also
against core and the influence of the evaluation of congestion costs increases with
the number of firms in the agglomeration.
A first explanation for the decline of firms at the core could lie in the upper
limit for process innovations. But the technology space is still increasing with new
product innovations, so that new learning possibilities at the core arise. In our view
this mechanism does not drive the result. We are convinced that the attractiveness
of a geographical location at the core decreases mostly because of reduced evaluation
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values for knowledge spillovers. This effect is stronger than the opposing effect given
due to reduced knowledge leads. Firms are initially attracted by high knowledge
spillovers from other firms to join core, but as learning takes place firms in the
cluster become more similar in their technological profile and the learning effect is
reduced. Here the reason for a reduced incentive to agglomerate in a mature industry
is seen mostly in lower learning possibilities through knowledge spillover: Firms at
the core have too similar and the potential entrants have too different knowledge to
benefit from agglomerating. In our understanding the assumption of a hump-shaped
learning function for knowledge spillovers given by equation (4.10) drives this result.
Internal knowledge spillovers within each firm become more important than external
knowledge spillovers as the industry evolves. Hence, firms at the core leave and firms
on the periphery do not enter the agglomeration.
The described outcome is similar to the empirical findings of Audretsch and
Feldman (1996a), who show that agglomeration tendencies are stronger in the early
stages of the industry life cycle. In their empirical investigation the authors used a
data base that includes innovative activities for states and industries of the United
States. The authors see empirical evidence for the propensity for innovative activity
being shaped by the stage of the industry life cycle. Clustering of innovative ac-
tivity is found especially in early stages of the industry life cycle and a dispersion
of innovative activity takes place during the mature and declining stages of the life
cycle. But in contrast to their conclusion this model does not suggest a decreasing
role of tacit knowledge. Here the reduced possibilities for learning through knowl-
edge spillover within and between cluster firms and potential entrants work against
agglomeration in a mature industry.5
In order to shed more light on the changing role of knowledge spillovers we draw
the total sum of internal and external knowledge spillovers over a long simulated
period in Figure 6.4. All curves stand for mean values over 50 runs. There is an im-
portant difference in the evaluation of knowledge spillovers for the location decision
and the curves in this picture because here realized external spillovers are presented
and the evaluation is based on potential external spillovers. But the arguments for
the choice of the location are supported because both potential and realized external
knowledge spillovers lose relevance in comparison to internal knowledge spillovers.
The development of the graphs and statistical tests suggests that at the beginning
firms learn mostly through external knowledge spillovers from competitors and as
the industry evolves internal learning within the firms gets more important, see also
Appendix A.3. Thus, the main source for new knowledge, apart from the firms’ own
5Another empirical work by Dumais et al. (2002) debates the evolution of geographic concen-
tration in the USA. The authors show that new firms and expansions of existing companies have a
de-agglomerating effect whereas plant closures reinforce concentration levels. However, our model
is not able to investigate those issues.
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Figure 6.4: Internal and external knowledge spillovers in the long run in the standard
scenario.
investments in R&D, changes over the industry life cycle from external to internal
learning. This mostly emerges due to the rising relevance of internal knowledge
transfers. The changing role of knowledge spillovers has to be seen in the context
with the falling number of firms at the core. As fewer firms are attracted to the
agglomeration or the knowledge of firms in the cluster gets more equal, the benefits
of knowledge spillovers decline. It is a self-reinforcing process because lower learning
possibilities make a location in close geographical proximity less attractive, which
again reduces the incentive for core. Over time mostly the successful firms rely more
on their own knowledge competencies given through internal knowledge spillover.
The question emerges why the decline in the number of firms is not that strong. We
will see in Section 6.3 that cluster firms are bound to the agglomeration because of
their dependence on external knowledge spillovers even if the learning possibilities
are very limited.
Another point worth looking at in the context of geographical proximity is the
scale of possible knowledge spillovers and its impact on the incentive to agglomerate,
as authors like Maskell and Malmberg (1999) emphasize the role of localized learn-
ing. The outcome of the model when varying the degree of knowledge spillovers is
presented in Figure 6.5. Here three different scenarios are analyzed: The standard
scenario and a case where all knowledge spillovers are doubled (’High Knowledge
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Spillovers’) or cut in half (’Low Knowledge Spillover’).
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Figure 6.5: The impact of scale of knowledge spillovers on the number of firms at
the core.
The curves stand for mean values of 100 simulation runs and have a similar pat-
tern showing a high peak at the beginning of the simulation runs and a stabilization
phase afterward. Over time differences between the scenarios become clear, where
the graphs for low knowledge spillovers indicate most firms at the core and the
graph for high knowledge spillovers the least number of firms settle in the agglomer-
ation. The standard case is for most of the time sorted between the other scenarios.
At period 200 statistical tests show a difference between the outcome of low and
high knowledge spillover at a confidence level of 95% and between the standard and
high spillover scenarios at 90%. The difference between standard and low spillover
scenario at period 200 is not significant, see Appendix A.3.
The result of Figure 6.5 is rather interesting since it suggests a negative correla-
tion of knowledge spillovers on the numbers of firms that wish to exchange knowledge
in close geographical proximity. Higher local knowledge spillovers therefore even re-
duce the incentive for core holding all other factors constant. The more firms can
learn from each other the less they are willing to participate in the learning process
in order to secure their competitive advantages. In this model the quantification of
positive and negative aspects of knowledge externalities predicts that the negative
consequences will prevail.
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Having discussed the evolution of the number of firms in the agglomeration we
now turn to the question which type of firms seek geographical proximity. In order
to analyze the profitability of firms Figure 6.6 shows the average aggregated profits
over the firms which are located in each period either at the core or periphery. All
values are calculated from the standard scenario and it is important to note that (as
shown in graph 6.2) approximately half of the firms choose core and the other half
periphery.
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Figure 6.6: Average aggregated profits over all firms at the core and on the periphery
in the standard case.
In contrast to the previous results of this section the outcome here is very clear.
After an initial phase the average aggregated profits of the firms on the periphery
exceed the average aggregated profits of the firms in the agglomeration although
the number of firms in the two locations is almost equal. The average aggregated
profits of periphery firms increase over the whole simulated time horizon whereas the
average aggregated profits of core firms stay constant or even decline in the second
half of the simulations. A statistical test supports the impression of the figure with
a confidence level greater than 99%, see Appendix A.3. The outcome that periphery
firms earn on the average higher profits, has proven to be very robust upon demand,
firm strategy and parameter settings in the model. As we will see in Section 7.1,
firms on the periphery are on the average not only more profitable but also more
technologically advanced.
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The answer to the question which firms seek the geographical proximity to com-
petitors, is therefore: Mostly firms with low profits participate in the local learning
process. On the average firms with high profits choose the periphery and succeed in
raising their profits while the others want to learn but are only able to learn from
other low profitable firms. The conclusion of Figure 6.6 can only be: There is a
strong adverse selection effect in clusters.6 Only low profitable firms are attracted
by the agglomeration in a horizontally differentiated industry given the assumption
that all firms are competitors on the goods markets. In the setting of this chapter
this kind of behavior could be explained in the way that technologically leading firms
do not benefit from learning as they fear the loss of knowledge through involuntary
knowledge spillovers and therefore choose isolation on the periphery.
In the literature Teece (1998) points out that most firms try to keep their knowl-
edge assets secret in order not to share profits with other parties. According to
Simmie (2005) this results in the fact that only firms with limited knowledge bases
are likely to participate in local knowledge pools. The empirical investigation by
Suarez-Villa and Walrod (1997) finds that clustered firms are less productive and
less profitable. In the paper by Iammarino and McCann (2006) the authors pre-
sume that the argument of Akerlof (1970) can be applied to clusters, which results
in a concentration of mediocrity. This argument may help to explain the empirical
finding that many of the largest firms do not locate their R&D activities in close
geographical proximity to their competitive rivals (Simmie, 1998; Cantwell and San-
tangelo, 1999; Alecke et al., 2006).
More precisely, an empirical work by Shaver and Flyer (2000) about geographical
location decisions and survival of foreign greenfield investments in U.S. manufac-
turing industries discovers the adverse selection effect, that mostly technologically
lagging firms choose to locate in an agglomeration. The authors find that if firms are
heterogeneous, they will differ in the benefits in the cluster. They argue that techno-
logically advanced firms will gain little or will even lose their competitive advantages
through knowledge spillovers in an agglomeration. Therefore, these firms have low
incentives to geographically cluster despite the existence of positive agglomeration
externalities. Conversely, technologically lagging firms have little to lose and a lot to
gain. Both situations result in an agglomeration of the technologically weakest firms
with much lower profits. Our results of the model strongly support this analysis.
Other empirical studies in this context by Chung and Kalnins (2001) and Kalnins
and Chung (2004) concentrate on the lodging industry in Texas. Here a positive
externality comes in the form of demand gains of geographically closely located
hotels. Again competition costs result from proximity since customers can very easy
change their hotel. The authors discover agglomeration gains in rural areas but
6See Akerlof (1970) for the seminal model and description of adverse selection.
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mostly only small hotels, which typically do not heighten demand, gain more. They
also suggest that some establishments can be harmed, which leads to lower revenue
performance than if there was no agglomeration. In Kalnins and Chung (2004)
the location choice of entrants and possible spillover effect in the Texas lodging
industry are analyzed. The authors find evidence that entrants will locate near
others with resources that can spill over. But entrants will avoid agglomerations
where competitors will exploit spillovers without contributing. Both arguments are
in line with the findings of the model although the mechanism of spillovers is rather
different.
Recent empirical research in the form of working papers continues the discussion
of the location decision and the type of firms. In Aharonson et al. (2004) data of the
Canadian Biotechnology Industry between 1992 and 2000 is examined. The findings
suggest that entrepreneurial start-ups locate close to firms in the same technolog-
ical specialization in order to benefit from knowledge spillovers. This occurs even
if the incumbent firms may be better positioned to exploit knowledge gained from
the entrepreneurs through spillovers. Pe’er and Vertinsky (2005) use data for de
novo entrants into the Canadian manufacturing sectors during 1984-1998. Findings
reveal a non-linear relationship between resources and capabilities and the value of
localization economies for entrants, where weak firms with few resources may not
be able to benefit from local networks or collaborations. In contrast to Shaver and
Flyer (2000) the authors identify a favorable selection process in the lower range of
resources and capabilities, where stronger entrants are more attracted to locations
with agglomeration economies. But the adverse selection effect is given at higher
levels of initial resources and capabilities of the firms. Thus, the stronger the en-
trants, the more they are detracted by local competition and incumbents’ deterrence
strategies. Another result of this work indicates that, although entrepreneurs are
likely to stay in their area of origin, economic and strategic variables do matter for
the location decision. A recent empirical study by Jirjahn and Kraft (2006) observes
that knowledge spillovers from rivals are more valuable to laggard establishments.
Additionally to the adverse selection there emerges a lock-in effect which binds
firms to the core once they choose agglomeration. But this is the topic of the
following section about technological location.
6.3 Specialization and Coordination
The interpretation of technological proximity is connected to aspects of specialization
as discussed in the previous sections. This section will add further details to the
discussion about specialization and the interplay with geographical proximity. We
start by introducing the development of specialization of the firms at the core and
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on the periphery over time in the standard scenario in Figure 6.7.
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Figure 6.7: Specialization of core and periphery in the standard scenario over time.
Starting from a similar level for specialization many firms choose a location at
the core because of the mentioned reasons, see Figure 6.2. As the single firms are
by initial conditions highly specialized, more firms at the core lead to a diversified
agglomeration and specialized periphery. This changes first slightly and afterward
abruptly with the advent of the first product innovations shortly before period 20.
The level of specialization of the different geographical locations changes afterward.
Over time the agglomeration becomes more specialized and the periphery converges
to a very low level of specialization.
In order to illustrate the aspects of technological proximity Figure 6.8 presents
an example of the technology space of firms located either at the core or on the
periphery. Each peak stands for the maximum value for the knowledge stock for
process innovations chosen from all firms in that particular location. Although
several firms are located in the agglomeration, they do not have knowledge in all
types of technologies which exist at that point of time. Apart from the initial
markets with the numbers 1 to 5, firms at the core do not have knowledge in the
newly established markets 6-10. The high discrepancy in the height of the peaks
and the difference in the location of the technologies with knowledge greater than
zero make the agglomeration more specialized. Altogether the maximum height
of the peaks appears to be lower than in the right picture, which indicates that
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the firm’s best-practice of core is again lower than the best-practice outside the
agglomeration. This is true even in the major technologies of cluster firms. The
fact that cluster firms do not have knowledge in any of the new markets indicates
that the successfully innovating firms did not settle in the agglomeration. Otherwise
some of the cluster firms would have obtained at least a low level of knowledge in
the new technologies through external knowledge spillover. The innovators protect
their valuable knowledge through the choice of secrecy in the isolation.
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Figure 6.8: An example of the technology space at the core and on the periphery at
period t = 48.
The situation on the periphery is rather different. Here in every technology at
least one firm has a high amount of knowledge, which leads to positive peaks for
every number in the picture. Interestingly, in this particular situation the knowledge
in the more recent product variants (denoted by the numbers 6 to 10) almost reaches
the level of the initial product variants 1 to 5. The height of maximum knowledge
is different in certain technological areas but the differences are smaller compared
to the situation in the technology space of the agglomeration. Additionally, the
differences in technological distances between technologies are more similar. Both
properties make the technology space of the firms on the periphery less specialized.
As shown in the graphs of Figure 6.7 these differences on the average persist over
time and do not converge.
One obvious explanation for the patterns shown in Figures 6.7 and 6.8 can be
seen in the adverse selection of the agglomeration. Since mostly low profitable firms
settle at the core, as seen in the previous section, the technology space consists
of few isolated peaks. The more successful firms on the periphery invest more in
R&D and are able to extend their knowledge by internal learning. Therefore, all
firms on the periphery show a very balanced technological portfolio, which results
in diversification.
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The remainder of the section borrows from Dawid and Wersching (2006). In
this paper we used a similar model to debate the influence of specialization on firm
profits. Some of the results differ because a different formalization of the demand
side was used. In Dawid and Wersching (2006) the total demand for a sub-market
is calculated with half of the technological distance to the neighboring product vari-
ant. In contrast to the model of this book it is not possible for consumers to change
the consumed product variant, see Section 4.2. The inflexibility of the consumers
stressed the role of competition in certain technological areas, and therefore spe-
cialization has a greater impact on firms’ profits. Hence, some of the results are
different, which is always mentioned in the discussion. In general we admit that
firm and consumer behavior in the latest version of the model, introduced in this
book, are more plausible and in some sense more rational. This can for example be
seen in the comparison with a random behavior of firms.
Coming back to the influence of specialization one can argue that although there
is no complete consensus, there is some evidence that some technological specializa-
tion among firms of the same industry in a cluster has positive effects on spillovers,
see Section 2.3. We adopt this view but also take into account that firms in a cluster
are not only producers and receivers of knowledge flows but also competitors on the
market. Strong technological specialization within a cluster leads to little differenti-
ation between the products of the cluster firms and hence to increased competition
among them. This is particularly true if we think of clusters which primarily serve
local markets or industry-dominating clusters like Silicon Valley. Hence, the positive
effect of intensive knowledge exchange in specialized clusters may be countered by
negative competition effects. Competition considerations are also an important fac-
tor in determining which firms decide to enter a cluster in the first place as knowledge
spillovers always flow in two directions. Thus a firm cannot prevent knowledge from
spilling over to possible competitors in the cluster. A firm inhabiting a particularly
profitable market niche or enjoying a technological lead might have strong incentives
to choose geographical isolation on the periphery rather than joining a cluster.
The consideration of market competition might imply negative effects of special-
ization on profits which run counter to the potential positive effects on knowledge
externalities typically stressed in the literature. In order to evaluate this trade-off
in the framework of our dynamic industry model we present in Figure 6.9 the mean
aggregated profits of all firms and the level of specialization of the industry after
200 periods in 100 simulation runs in the standard scenario.
As can be seen in the graph, there appears to be a negative relation between
the aggregated profits and the specialization of the industry. This is confirmed by
estimating a linear regression with average profits as dependent and specialization as
explanatory variable, which gives a negative coefficient of the specialization index.
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Figure 6.9: Average aggregated profits and specialization of the industry.
Obviously as shown in the picture the single variable does not explain much of the
variance and the statistical results are rather bad (R2 = 0.02, t−value = −1.49). In
the similar model in Dawid andWersching (2006) the statistical results show a higher
correlation between the variables. One reason for this is the different formalization
of the demand side, which in contrast to the model of this book does not allow the
consumers to change the consumed product variant. Thus, in the earlier version
of the model firms enjoying a high knowledge in isolated parts of the technology
space are not threatened by product variants with low prices. This could be the
reason why specialization has a greater impact on firms’ profits and the results of
the regression are more evident.
Several questions arise here. Is the negative correlation between profits and
specialization a phenomenon associated with particular firm strategies concerning
sub-market selection? Are there any normative implications for firm strategies? Is
this effect more pronounced for firms who stay outside the cluster (as might be
expected since these firms do not profit from the positive knowledge flow effects
from specialization)?
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To study the impact of firms’ market selection strategies more closely we compare
results from four different batches of simulation runs. In the first batch the decision
of a firm where to position in the technology space in case of entry into an existing
market or product innovation is random.7 We say that firms use a random strategy
and use this batch as a reference case. In the other three cases potential locations
in the technology space are selected according to the market evaluation function of
the firm. The three batches differ with respect to the range of potential values of
the two parameters determining a firms market-evaluation function: The weight put
on current profits on sub-markets and the weight put on the distance of the market
from the firm’s current main technological expertise which is given by the technology
where the firm has accumulated the largest stock of knowledge, see Section 4.3. If
both strategy parameters are chosen from their full ranges, we refer to this case as the
case with a balanced strategy. This is equal to the setting of the standard scenario.
Furthermore, we consider two batches of runs where the value of a certain strategy
parameter is restricted to a sub-interval of the full range. In one batch the parameter
determining the weight of current profits is restricted to a sub-interval in the lower
region of the full range. In this case we say that firms apply knowledge-oriented
strategies. In another batch the weight of current technological expertise in the
sub-market evaluation function is restricted to a sub-interval of low values. We say
that firms use profit-oriented strategies. The changes of parameters in the different
settings are given in Table A.3 in Appendix A.3. In what follows we compare these
sets of 100 data points each with respect to crucial variables like profits and degree
of specialization.
Figure 6.10 compares the industry dynamics under the four strategies with re-
spect to the local dimensions of specialization of the industry, which is argued in
Section 6.1 to be the more relevant dimension of specialization. Due to our ini-
tialization, each firm in the first period has a random knowledge stock in only one
technology and the technological distances between product variants are also chosen
randomly. Hence, initially the industry is already quite diversified and the level of
specialization in location does not alter before the advent of the first successful prod-
uct innovations. A statistical analysis of the situation at the end of the simulated
periods is given in Appendix A.3.
The general patterns of the curves are similar in all scenarios but the resulting
level of specialization differs. After the initial phase the first product innovations
distort the technology space, which results in more clustered technologies indicated
by a peak toward more specialization. Further product innovations lead in general
7To be more precise, the firm randomly picks a ’candidate’ location in the technology space.
However, before actually entering this market the firm checks whether the market evaluation ex-
ceeds a certain minimal threshold.
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Figure 6.10: The impact of four firm strategies on industry specialization in location.
to a more uniformly distribution of technologies on the technological circle, which
reduces the levels of specialization. The decline is rather different in the scenarios.
The standard and random strategy graphs seem to converge over time, but most of
the time the specialization in standard is higher. This is quite intuitive, because we
should expect that with random strategies the sub-markets emerging over time will
be distributed rather uniformly on the technology space.
If firms use a profit-oriented strategy the industry is even more diversified than
in the random scenario. After the first new product variants are introduced in the
market, firms in the profit-oriented scenario are eager to establish new products in
relatively big market niches. Hence, their behavior leads to more uniformly dis-
tributed technologies in the technology space. After period t = 60 this generates
less specialized industries in this scenario. It can be clearly seen that orientation
of the firms toward short-run profits leads to almost parallel behavior of firms as
far as market selection goes. One can show that this has a positive effect on the
intensity of external knowledge spillovers between firms in the cluster. However,
this is also limited by the downside of the strongly coordinated behavior induced by
profit orientation, because firms at the same time build up knowledge stocks for dif-
ferent technologies at a similar pace, which implies that knowledge stocks are rather
uniform in height and there is relatively little specialization of knowledge stock in
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the cluster. But the sum of those effects still indicates that in the profit-oriented
scenario the level of external knowledge spillovers exceeds the levels of the other
scenarios considered.
As in all cases the more knowledge-oriented strategic behavior of firms leads to a
first peak and a decline of specialization in location of the industry. Firms initially
have heterogeneous technological expertise and a knowledge-oriented strategy keeps
or even reinforces this heterogeneity. This implies that the scope for knowledge
spillovers should be smaller if firms follow a knowledge-oriented strategy. This view
is supported by an examination of the evolution of external knowledge spillovers.
A major difference occurs around period t = 50 where the curve stabilizes and
even increases for a while. This point in time could hint at a selection process
between successful and technologically lagging firms similar to the arguments in
Section 5.2.2. In this scenario the economically successful firms first search close
to their major technological competencies, but as the industry evolves the most
technologically advanced firms have several technological majors and start to serve
even more distant technological areas. In consequence this results in declining overall
industry specialization. But the highest levels of specialization of the industry are
still reached in the scenario where firms base their market selection decision mainly
on their existing technological strengths.
Looking at the specialization of firms in the different scenarios one can iden-
tify differences between specialization of location or height of knowledge stocks for
process innovation. In the case of specialization of technological distances between
sub-markets the profit-oriented scenario indicates the lowest, and the knowledge-
oriented the highest values for specialization in location. The standard and random
curves are located in between. The opposite is true in later periods for specialization
in height, which is shown in Figure 6.11. Here, by assumption all firms start per-
fectly specialized and reduce their level of specialization due to investments in R&D
or through knowledge spillovers. At the beginning firms that concentrate on their
own technological focus are able to keep higher specialization values compared to
the other scenarios. The situation changes completely during the next phase. In this
time interval firms compete with each other and the consequences of the different
firm strategies become obvious. As a result there emerges a pattern where profit-
oriented strategies lead to highest and knowledge-oriented to lowest specialization
in the height of knowledge for process innovations. Statistical tests of the outcome
also support this result to a confidence interval of at least 90%, see Appendix A.3.
Summing up, one can say that a scenario where firms tend to follow short-run
profits rather than expanding from their technological core competencies leads on the
average to more diversification in technological location and more specialization in
the amount of knowledge. This means that on the average firms in the profit-oriented
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Figure 6.11: Average firm specialization in height of the knowledge for process
innovations.
scenario have knowledge peaks of very different height, which are spread over the
whole technology space. Firms do not have a clear core competence, instead they
have more basic knowledge in most areas and some regions where they are close to the
best-practice level of the industry. The overall level of knowledge spillover is high but
learning is not very clearly guided toward a certain technological area. On the other
hand, firms in the knowledge-oriented industry possess knowledge peaks of similar
height but only in a particular technological area. This is of course driven by the
assumed strategic behavior of entering close markets and introducing close product
innovations. But knowledge spillovers also foster local learning. Knowledge build-up
is highest at the frontier of the area of competence as a medium technological gap
and a small technological distance to the main knowledge of the firm supports fast
learning. Both constellations result in very similar knowledge height.
The discussion shows that the type of market selection strategies firms follow has
substantial impact on the degree of specialization arising in the industry and the
firm. The impact of the different strategies on average profits is depicted in Figure
6.12. The order of the curves at the end of the simulated periods is just the opposite
of the later periods of Figure 6.11, which is of course no coincidence. We tested the
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outcome at the end of the simulated periods and the ranking was significant except
that the values for random are not significantly higher than standard but higher
than profit-oriented. For more details please refer to Appendix A.3.
Figure 6.12: Aggregated profits for different firm strategies.
Quite surprisingly, profits are on the average lowest if firms follow a profit-
oriented strategy whereas largest profits are made in an industry where firms follow
a knowledge-oriented strategy. In Dawid and Wersching (2006) most profits were
earned in the random scenario followed by the knowledge-oriented scenario. This
appears to be so because of the different demand setting. The profits under the
random and balanced strategies lie between these two extremes, where profits under
the balanced strategy are rather close to those under the profit-oriented strategy.
Considering the effect of competition on the market is crucial to understand this
ranking. The attractiveness augmented structure of demand implies that products
far removed in the technology space from the other active sub-markets attract higher
demand at equal price and therefore tend to yield higher profits. Accordingly, any
strategy leading firms to position their products close to the competitors has detri-
mental effects on revenues. For firms that are in the cluster such a strategy on the
other hand facilitates cost-reducing technological spillovers. However, our results
indicate that the negative revenue effect outweighs the positive cost effect. These
considerations imply that for all strategies which are not random the fact that all
firms use the same evaluation strategy by itself has negative effects on the average
industry performance. We have verified this observation by running simulations
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where a single firm using the profit-oriented / knowledge-oriented / balanced strat-
egy is inserted into an industry where all other firms employ the random strategy.
For all three types of strategies we found that the non-random strategy performed
statistically significantly better than the random strategy.
Beside the firm strategy itself, another reason for the occurrence of such excessive
coordination are the spillover effects. If a cluster firm accumulates a particularly high
knowledge stock for a certain technology, spillover effects imply that all other cluster
firms also attain a high knowledge stock in that technology region. Hence, the tech-
nological focus of many other cluster firms might move into the same technological
region and accordingly these firms will concentrate future production and product
innovation in that region. Put differently, the existence of technological spillovers
makes it hard for firms to keep their distinctive technological profile if they settle
in the cluster. So, even under strategies like the knowledge-oriented strategy, which
per se does not promote technological uniformity, there is a strong tendency toward
specialization in the cluster.
Finally, it should be noted that in spite of the large differences in profits between
periphery and cluster firms there is no strong flow of firms from the cluster to the
periphery. Cluster firms could not profit from moving out of the cluster because
such a move would not alter the profile of their knowledge stock and accordingly
they would still have to produce for sub-markets which are close to the technological
focus of the cluster. Even worse, they would lose the technological spillover effects
and might eventually be less cost-efficient than the remaining cluster firms. Hence,
there is a technological lock-in effect which ties the firms to the cluster even though
periphery firms are more profitable. This argumentation is in line with the result of
the previous Section 6.2 that not many firms leave the cluster and the argument that
core is more specialized than periphery proposed at the beginning of this section in
connection to Figure 6.7.
In the management literature the topic of coordination is discussed in the field of
dynamic capabilities, see Section 2.1. Typically, in this approach the firm is advised
to develop a core competence in a certain technological area when aiming at long-
term performance (Wang and Ahmed, 2007). This finding is in line with the result of
this section that a knowledge-oriented strategy helps to constitute knowledge assets,
which results in greater profits. But it is important to note that the precondition
for this result is the heterogeneous distribution of knowledge at start. On the other
hand, a more homogeneous distribution of knowledge does not lead to the same
average profit level because of the more coordinated market behavior.
In a similar simulation approach Dawid and Reimann (2005) provide an ex-
tensive analysis of profit versus market growth oriented firm behavior, where they
examine the influence of different market evaluation strategies on overall outcome
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in a dynamic industry. In their setup average profits are higher if all firms follow a
profit-oriented strategy, but later firms are allowed to change their evaluation strat-
egy according to a simple adaptation dynamic. With strategy adaptation firms tend
to follow a market growth oriented strategy, which results in lower average industry
profits. Further, it is shown that the degree of horizontal product differentiation is
significant for the incentive to change firm strategy.
The potential disadvantages of coordinated firm behavior are stressed by the
theory of strategic balance (Deephouse, 1999), too. Here the author proposes that
firms have to balance between a differentiation and conformity proposition. The
first differentiation proposition holds that firms should have different strategies than
their competitors in order to avoid competition, and the second conformity proposi-
tion points toward potential negative effects on firm profitability through legitimacy
challenges. As a conclusion of his theory, Deephouse (1999) argues that moderately
differentiated firms have highest performance, which is also supported by an empir-
ical investigation in the same article. In Oerlemans and Meeus (2005) this theory is
tested in the context of innovation strategies with data from the Netherlands. The
paper gives empirical evidence that the more firms deviate from a sectoral mean with
their innovation strategies, the lower is their average annual growth of employment
or sales. This outcome confirms the strategic balance theory. However, in the case
of relative innovation outcomes a higher level of dissimilarity seems to be beneficial.
In short, Oerlemans and Meeus (2005) conclude that being different pays out when
it comes to innovation, which is again the same argument as in our model.
Furthermore, the topic of coordination is also connected to the question what
kind of environment favors knowledge spillovers - either specialized (MAR spillovers)
or more diversified (Jacobs spillovers), see Section 2.3. So far the literature on tech-
nological spillovers and specialization has focused on the question how the intensity
of spillovers is influenced by the degree of specialization. Our findings suggest that
there might be an opposite effect such that spillovers yield technological special-
ization and that under consideration of market competition such an effect provides
negative incentives for joining a cluster. Therefore, not the technological surround-
ing determines the degree of knowledge spillovers but rather knowledge externalities
shape the environment.
6.4 Summary
This chapter is devoted to the analysis of firm strategies in the virtual industry
described by the theoretical model. Main focus is set on the investigation of firm
behavior which is captured in parameters for firm strategy. The chapter links the
assumed environment and firm conditions to the outcome on geographical and tech-
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nological proximity from the perspective of a firm.
We start Section 6.1 with our interpretation of specialization. The technological
profile of a single firm or a group of firms can by described with a specialization
index. This index considers two types of specialization, namely specialization in
location and height of the knowledge peaks in the technology space. Afterward the
influence of firm strategy parameters on firm profits is examined with the help of a
regression analysis. The outcome suggests that in the standard scenario firms which
quickly enter new markets, stay longer in active markets, or put more weight on
attractive market niches earn greater profits. Strategy parameters for geographical
location are not significant in the regression.
The following Section 6.2 concentrates on aspects of geographical proximity. It
is argued that there is a high incentive for a location in the agglomeration but this
incentive declines as the industry becomes more mature. Higher external knowledge
spillovers even enhance this effect so that higher learning possibilities even drive firms
out of the cluster. As the industry ages, internal learning becomes more important
than external learning through knowledge spillovers. The perhaps clearest and most
robust result in this book is the finding that the aggregated profits of cluster firms are
much lower than the profits of firms in isolation. This rather surprising outcome of
adverse selection emerges not despite but because of local externalities. As discussed
in this context we find empirical evidence for such a behavior in practice.
The results of firm strategy concerning technological proximity are the topic of
Section 6.3. Simulation runs of the standard scenario show that the agglomera-
tion is much more specialized than the periphery. An example of the technology
space is introduced in order to illustrate the aspects of specialization. Next, the
possibility of a negative relation between a specialized industry and average firm
profits is debated. Firm strategies determine specialization of the whole industry
as well as specialization of firms. A scenario where all firms follow a profit-oriented
(knowledge-oriented) strategy leads to firms that are characterized by a high (low)
specialization in height and low (high) specialization in technological location. Apart
from the assumed behavior the internal and external knowledge spillovers drive this
emergence. The average profits are highest in a knowledge-oriented and lowest in a
profit-oriented industry. The parallel behavior and the coordinating role of knowl-
edge spillover might be the cause for this outcome. The coordination mechanism
also ties firms to the agglomeration, which constitutes a lock-in effect.
At the end of this chapter we come back to the question about the best strat-
egy for a firm. In this particular setting firms perform best if they focus on their
own strengths and mainly expand their knowledge around their technological core
competencies. Firms should also avoid close geographical proximity to their direct
competitors because the possibilities for external learning do not outweigh the loss
129
of competitive advantages. Both pieces of advise tend to avoid excess coordina-
tion which could emerge either through a coordinated strategy itself or through
local learning. The knowledge spillovers in an agglomeration are limited due to
the adverse selection effect for a technologically advanced firm especially. As the
competitors become more equal in their knowledge assets, competition is enhanced,
which results in lower profits.
There are of course also exceptions to the general rule, e.g. in an industry where
all firms have similar strategies or knowledge in a particular field a firm could be
better off by concentrating on previously not served market segments. Maybe this
explains the different results in Section 6.1, where firms focusing more on market
potential than on their own knowledge competencies prove to be more profitable in
the standard environment. Here firm strategies are similar, such that on the average
profitable markets and technological focus have the same weight. In that surrounding
a firm could gain from profit-oriented behavior as shown in the regression of the
parameters. For example if all automobile companies are eager to serve mostly
high-cost luxury markets, an automobile producer could gain from concentrating
on low-cost segments. Similar arguments can be formulated for policy advise if
governments in all industrialized countries support a certain type of technological
agglomeration, e.g. Biotechnology. This brings us to the topic of the next chapter.
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Chapter 7
Public Policy
This chapter is devoted to the discussion of public policy. In doing so we take the
perspective of a consumer or politician and ask how to foster the technological devel-
opment of the industry, how to enforce competition, and how to increase welfare in
the virtual industry. We start by taking a closer look at the impact of geographical
proximity on the technological development of the industry. Further, we investigate
the outcome of innovative competition in different technological environments. We
then turn to the important discussion of different policies which could have a pos-
itive influence on the technological outcome and welfare of the industry. It will be
interesting to see whether the positive influence of innovation policies, recommended
by the literature, is evident in the setting of this model. The last section concludes
the main points for public policy.
7.1 Agglomeration, Technological Development and
Welfare
In the previous chapter we have shown that the outcome for average aggregated
profits differs between core and periphery. The assumption of localized learning in
geographical and technological proximity drives this result. We now turn to the
analysis of the technological development which is understood as the progression of
process and product innovations over time.
We start with an examination of knowledge for process innovations that deter-
mines the production cost of a product variant. In order to see the differences
between the two possible geographical locations, Figure 7.1 presents the outcome
for the maximum and average values of process innovations. All lines stand for 100
repetitions of the standard scenario.
The highest values of a firm in any technology is indicated by the best-practice
level and the average knowledge of process innovation stands for the height of pro-
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(b) Average level of process innovations.
Figure 7.1: The maximum and average knowledge for process innovations over time.
duction cost over all current technologies. The first aspect describes the technological
frontier, while the second index gives an idea of the distribution of knowledge over
all agents. In Figure 7.1 a) the evolution of the maximum value for the knowledge
for process innovations is depicted. The starting level is given due to the highest
draw of a firm from a normal distribution with mean RD0 = 0.2. During the first
periods several firms change their location from periphery to core, which leads to
higher values for core.1 After that the graph for periphery lies above the curve for
core as firms leave the cluster in order to protect their knowledge in the newly estab-
lished technologies. Both curves converge to the assumed maximum of 1 and they
follow the functional form based on the assumption that it is more difficult to gain
additional knowledge the higher the achieved stock of knowledge. At the end of the
simulated periods the best-practice level of firms on the periphery is still higher than
that of firms at the core. This is also true for the average level of process innovations
presented in Figure 7.1 b). Both results are supported by a statistical test with a
confidence interval greater than 99%, see Appendix A.3.
Figure 7.1 b) demonstrates the mean of knowledge in process innovations starting
on the average at RD0 = 0.2. As the average is calculated over technologies with
positive knowledge, gaining knowledge in technologies new to the firm might lead to
falling average values. Exactly this happens at the beginning of the simulation runs,
where firms expand their knowledge base in new areas with their own investments in
R&D and through external and internal learning. After this initial phase the mean
for process innovations increases more in core than in periphery. In comparison to
a) the average values for periphery exceed those for core at a later period around
1For the development of the number of firms at the core see Section 6.2 and in particular Figure
6.2.
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t = 60. Although the number of firms at the core is significantly reduced after period
t = 20 firms need a longer time to substitute learning from competitors at the core
through internal learning and their own R&D. After that the difference in the mean
level persists and even increases over time. An extension of the simulated time
horizon to 500 periods shows that the difference in average knowledge persists but
the difference in the maximum value for knowledge disappears. Hence, in the long
run firms at the core might have a similar highest knowledge for process innovations
in at least one technology, but firms on the periphery have higher mean knowledge.
After the discussion of process innovations, we introduce the outcome for success-
ful product innovations in Figure 7.2. We use two boxplots2 to analyze the outcome
of 100 simulated iterations and to differentiate whether a product innovation was
successfully conducted at the core or on the periphery. The picture indicates that
more product innovations are introduced by firms that at that moment are on the
periphery than at the core. Again the statistical tests support this impression, see
Appendix A.3.
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Figure 7.2: The number of successful product innovations and their geographical
origin in the standard scenario.
From the comparison of core and periphery we conclude that after an initial
phase firms on the periphery display a higher best-practice level, in average more
knowledge for process innovations and introduce more new product variants to the
industry. The difference is greatest when looking at the number of newly established
products. This has a major influence on the benefits of peripheral firms due to mar-
2The boxplot function used for presentation in MATLAB was programmed by Ernest E. Roth-
man.
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ket competition. These findings are in line with the results of the previous chapter,
where it was shown that firms on the periphery earn in average greater profits.
Hence, the better technological development of firms in geographical isolation leads
to a better standing in the markets, which generates profits.
So far we have discussed the impact of agglomeration on the technological devel-
opment in the standard scenario, where firms are free to change their geographical
location. In the following investigation we compare the technological development
of an industry if we keep the location of firms fixed.3
Thus the following analysis is based on four scenarios which differ on the number
of firms at the core:
• 0% core: All firms are always on the periphery. No learning can happen
between firms but firms can make use of internal knowledge spillover.
• 50% core: Half of the firms are located on the periphery, the other half at
the core. Firms are not allowed to change their geographical location.
• Variable: This scenario represents the standard scenario with the decision
rule for changing the geographical location as described in Section 4.3.3. Firms
start with a random location and are free to move as they can afford it.4
• 100% core: All firms are always at the core. Firms profit from externalities
arising from knowledge spillover, but they might also lose their technological
lead pretty fast.
In the considered settings we continue with the discussion of product innova-
tions. The main difference between the two types of product innovations is that
only radical product innovations expand the technology space whereas incremen-
tal product innovations just reduce the technological distance between two existing
product variants. To generate a radical product innovation the knowledge for prod-
uct innovations of a firm has to exceed a certain threshold. Knowledge beyond that
threshold increases the probability for a radical product innovation.5 In order to
get a closer look at the different types of product innovations Figure 7.3 presents
boxplots of the total number of radical product innovations in a) and incremental
product innovations in b) for all simulated scenarios.
The first observation of Figure 7.3 is the fact that in all scenarios firms conduct
more incremental product innovations than radical product innovations. This is
3The remaining part of this section is built upon Wersching (2007a), where these topics were
mentioned for the first time using an earlier version of the model.
4On the average about 50-60% of firms were located at the core. Therefore this scenario is
placed between 50% and 100% core.
5For more details see Section 4.1
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Figure 7.3: The number of firms at the core and the outcome for radical and incre-
mental product innovations.
of course driven by the assumption that less knowledge is needed for incremental
product innovations. The distribution of product innovations over the scenarios does
not give a unified picture whether more or fewer firms in the agglomerations lead to
more product innovations. Indeed the situation is rather different for the two types
of new product variants.
In the case of radical product innovations there seems to be a negative relation
between the number of successful radical product innovations and more firms located
in the agglomeration. Most radical new products are given in the 0% core scenario
followed by 50% core and fewest radical product innovations are observed in vari-
able or 100% core. Statistical tests support this ranking and show that there is no
significant difference between variable and 100% core, see Appendix A.3. Looking
at the settings with fixed location this means that the lower the number of com-
petitors learning from each other in close geographical proximity the more likely
are radical product innovations. In the extreme case of 0% core all firms are geo-
graphically isolated and can only increase their knowledge through R&D projects
of their own and through internal learning. Thus, imitation is difficult (in 0% core
impossible) for competitors and firms concentrate their innovation efforts on areas in
the technology space where they already posses knowledge. Since the firms’ knowl-
edge build-up is not connected via external learning, it is more likely for firms to
have higher knowledge stocks in only a few but not very common technologies. As
not many competitors have the necessary high amount of knowledge in a technol-
ogy, an early (incremental) product innovation becomes less probable. Additionally,
this argumentation is supported by the outcome that the fewer firms are at the
core during the simulated periods, the higher is the average firms’ specialization
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in height. Therefore, no possibilities to enjoy external knowledge spillovers in this
model increase the number of radical breakthroughs.
The situation for incremental product innovations is depicted in Figure 7.3 b).
In the settings where firms are not allowed to change their location there is a signifi-
cant relation between the number of firms at the core and the number of incremental
product innovations. Apart from this outcome statistical tests in Appendix A.3 show
that the setting with free choice of location generates fewer incremental product in-
novations than 100% core and 50% core, but there is no significant difference to 0%
core. The bad performance of the variable scenario is quite surprising. Probably
the adverse selection effect discussed in Section 6.3 is the reason because only tech-
nologically advanced firms leave the agglomeration and hence do not profit from
external learning. In the scenarios with fixed locations it is not possible for a clus-
ter firm to protect its knowledge assets. which increases the amount of knowledge
spillovers. There is evidence for this because after an initializing phase the sum of
external knowledge spillovers for product innovations is greater in 100% core and in
50% core than in variable. This greater amount of external learning results in more
incremental product innovations. Hence, more external knowledge spillovers in the
agglomeration generate higher average knowledge for product innovations. Since
several firms might have high knowledge in the same technologies, the probability
is high that one of those firms introduces an early incremental product innovation.
This might alter the evaluation of the others such that they change their current
interest in innovations and, thus, do not reach the threshold for radical product in-
novations. Further, the external learning changes knowledge stocks more gradually,
which also works against radical product innovations. On the other hand, the firms’
own investments in R&D lead to more abrupt increases in the knowledge for prod-
uct innovations. Hence, the probability to reach the threshold needed for radical
product innovations is higher.
We conclude that the existence of knowledge flows at the core has positive ef-
fects on the number of incremental product innovations developed in the industry
compared to a scenario where fewer firms are at the core. The situation is the oppo-
site for radical product innovations. Here, the scenario with no external knowledge
spillovers indicates the highest number of radical product innovations. There is some
empirical evidence for this outcome in a recent study by Jirjahn and Kraft (2006).
The authors in their German firm level data find that knowledge spillovers from
rivals have a positive impact on incremental innovations but no influence on radical
innovation activities.
We continue with the discussion of process innovations to see whether we can
find a similar result with the maximum and the average level of knowledge - but
now knowledge for process innovations.
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Figure 7.4: The number of firms at the core and maximum process innovations.
The level of the knowledge stock for process innovation reached at the end of
the simulations for all settings is presented in Figure 7.4. The level of knowledge for
process innovation has a direct influence on the production costs of the corresponding
product variant. Obviously, the assumed upper border of 1 for the knowledge stock
distorts the distribution of the results. Further, one can see that with an increasing
number of firms at the core the mean and median decrease and the variance increases.
Therefore, a small number of firms (in the extreme case no firms) that exchange
knowledge through external learning seem to favor the maximum value for process
innovations. This outcome is similar to that of radical product innovations and
the argumentation is the same: As firms concentrate on fewer technologies and
knowledge is mostly increased through investments in R&D and internal learning the
best-practice level of the industry increases. The evidence of this negative relation
between firms at the core and best-practice is underlined by the statistical tests in
Appendix A.3.6
The evolution of the average level of process innovations over the whole time
horizon in all four scenarios is shown in Figure 7.5. As already mentioned at the
beginning of this section, the average values first decline because firms extend their
knowledge assets to previously unfamiliar areas. In the first periods the evolution is
similar in all scenarios and emerges because of the assumed initial conditions. But
after period 20 the increase of the average knowledge is rather different.
6In Wersching (2007a) there is no significant difference between the maximum values in the
several fixed locations but variable has the highest level of process innovations. Here the result in
the setting with free choice of location is quite plausible for the overall picture.
137
Figure 7.5: The number of firms at the core and the average process innovation over
time.
Figure 7.5 gives an idea of the diffusion of knowledge for process innovations
over time. The considered scenarios differ in their share of firms that take part in
the local learning process in the agglomeration. Despite the fact that in every case
there is an increase of the average knowledge, external knowledge spillovers seem to
have a clear influence on the rate of diffusion. The curve for 100% core shows the
highest values over time followed by variable, 50% core and 0% core. Even the graph
for variable lies very close to 50% core, which is in line with the observed average
share of cluster firms about 50-60% in variable. The sorting of the graphs is stable
after period 20, but in the long run the graphs converge to values close to 0.9 and
the difference between the graphs decreases. According to tests in Appendix A.3
at time T = 200 there is no significant difference left, but for example at T = 100
the ranking of the figure appears to be significant to a confidence level greater than
95%.
The outcome for process innovation is the same as for product innovations: More
possibilities for external learning through knowledge spillovers in the agglomeration
lead to a higher mean of knowledge or more incremental product innovations but
in the same way to lower best-practice level or less radical new product variants.
It appears that there is a trade-off between an industry where the firms have more
general knowledge and knowledge spillovers lead to a fast diffusion between agents
and a situation without knowledge externalities which induces higher levels of best-
practice. So far it is not obvious which situation should be favorable from a political
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point of view. If politicians put more weight on the quantity than on quality aspects,
an industry with local learning should be preferred because in that case in total more
product innovations occur and the sum of knowledge flows rises sharply.
The question whether firms in agglomerations are more innovative is the topic
of an empirical study by Beaudry and Breschi (2003) which is related to Baptista
and Swann (1998). Whereas Baptista and Swann (1998) find a positive effect of the
clustering of firms of the same industry on the probability of a firm to innovate, the
result by Beaudry and Breschi (2003) is not that obvious. Here the authors could
identify positive and negative effects, which depend on the type of firms and employ-
ees located in a region. Further analysis shows that an agglomeration of innovative
firms in a firm’s own industry has a positive and statistically significant influence
while a strong presence of non-innovative firms has a negative and statistically signif-
icant effect on the firm’s innovative performance. Thus, the simulated outcome that
more innovations occur the more innovative firms are located in the agglomeration
can be underlined by empirical evidence. Apparently, further research has to put
more emphasis on the analysis of the firm properties and a differentiation between
incremental and radical innovations in order to test the other findings of the model.
After the debate about the innovative outcome we continue with the achieved
average level of accumulated profits in all scenarios. The average aggregated profits
in all scenarios are shown in Figure 7.6 and additionally the variable scenario is
split into the average of all firms at the core (variable-core) and all firms on the
periphery (variable-periphery) at T = 200. From the figure and the statistical
tests in Appendix A.3 the following observations can be made: First, the higher
the number of firms in the agglomeration in the settings with fixed location, the
lower are the resulting average aggregated profits. This fact is given due to the
lower values in the boxplots which are significant to a confidence interval greater
than 99%.7 Second, the average aggregated profits in the variable scenario over all
firms can be sorted between 0% core and 100% core. Third, looking at the data for
variable in detail, we find that firms at the core have the lowest and firms on the
periphery the highest level of aggregated profits. The first result is significant and
the later outcome for periphery firms is not significant in the tests but the mean
and the median for variable-periphery are higher than in 0% core. Probably, more
simulated iterations would lead to a significant result of the statistical test.
The negative correlation between firms in the agglomeration and average aggre-
gated profits can be explained with the local interaction at the core. As firms have
more possibilities to exchange knowledge, they become more similar and competi-
tion on markets is enhanced as firms do not enjoy high knowledge leads. This is
7The previous analysis of average savings in Wersching (2007a) did not show any significant
differences in the scenarios with fixed locations.
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Figure 7.6: The number of firms at the core and the average aggregated profits.
also connected to the relatively high level of average process innovation in the sce-
narios with more firms at the core, see the previous Figure 7.5. Additionally, we
discover decreasing prices with more firms settling in the agglomeration. Therefore
a firm would on the average be better off choosing periphery rather than core, if all
competitors are in the same location.
The outcome in variable can be connected to the adverse selection effect in
clusters, which is the topic of Section 6.2. Although the average aggregated profits
fit in the picture of the other boxplots, there is a relevant difference between cluster
firms and firms on the periphery. If the choice of location is possible, firms that
locate at the core are less profitable than in 100% core. The adverse selection
mechanism in combination with the lock-in effect clearly produces this outcome.
Though a firm would prefer a situation like 0% core to variable, the choice for core
or periphery in variable is not clear since the clustering of less profitable firms at the
core emerges endogenously. As Section 6.1 shows in the regression, the parameters
for geographical location are not significant for the outcome of aggregated profits.
Taken together, the scenario 100% core is preferable to 0% core from the perspective
of a firm, but we cannot draw such a clear conclusion for the variable case.
Traditionally social welfare in the literature is defined as the sum of producer
and consumer surplus (see e.g. Tirole, 1988). The formal description of welfare is
given in Section 4.2 and Appendix A.1. If we accept the welfare concept proposed in
this work, we can draw conclusions from the analysis of consumer surplus, producer
surplus and the total welfare in the scenarios. The welfare, as it is used here,
gives a very aggregated picture of several important industry characteristics. Apart
from prices on the different markets, consumer surplus depends on the technological
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distances between existing product variants and on the number of radical product
innovations since only these increase the circumference of the technology circle. The
effects of process innovations are important for production cost and thus for the
competition between firms. The markets determine the economic value of knowledge
and the resulting profits from market interaction are the most important part of
producer surplus.
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Figure 7.7: The number of firms at the core and welfare.
The outcome with respect to welfare at the end of the simulated time horizon is
shown in Figure 7.7. The corresponding statistical tests in Appendix A.3 support
the impression of the picture at least to a confidence level greater 90%: First, the
ranking in the settings with fixed location is not obvious, but 0% core has a higher
welfare than 100% core. Second, the welfare in the case with variable geographical
location appears to be lowest. The results for consumer surplus and producer surplus
show the same picture with the only exception that consumer surplus in 50% core
lies significantly above 100% core. Further, it is worth noting that in all cases the
consumer surplus, the producer surplus and welfare are increasing over time. The
sorting between highest values in 0% core and lowest values for variable is also
persistent over time.
Although the statistical tests of welfare indicate that there is still a high level of
uncertainty left, the results point toward a negative relation between firms at the
core and welfare: Welfare in 0% core is higher than in 100% core. The freedom to
choose a geographical location, even with no additional sunk costs, decreases welfare
for the whole industry. Welfare in the case with no learning through knowledge
spillovers between firms increases mostly because more radical product innovations
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positively influence consumer surplus8 and higher profits increase producer surplus,
which could be caused by more heterogeneous knowledge of firms. Only looking at
consumer surplus would not change the conclusions. These results of the theoretical
model are rather surprising as several authors promote the benefits of agglomerations
and local learning for the firm as well for the economy (e.g. Porter, 1998; Malmberg
and Maskell, 2006).
The findings of this section could also be interpreted as a possible justification
for economic policy: Economic policy should try to enforce that all firms are located
either on the periphery or all at the core because both situations, according to the
results of the model, would increase welfare. If all firms were located at the core,
this would lead to a faster technological diffusion and more product innovations in
total. The other extreme case, where no firms exchange knowledge, induces a higher
rate of radical product innovations, a higher maximum level of knowledge for process
innovations and higher welfare of the industry. In Section 7.3 we will try to evaluate
which political measure could be useful to increase welfare. But first we have a closer
look at the influence of the technological surrounding on the innovative competition
between firms in Section 7.2.
7.2 Technological Regimes
One of the main questions raised by Schumpeter is: What kind of market char-
acteristics and technological environment promotes innovations? The arguments
proposed by Schumpeter do not give a clear answer. In his earlier writings the
author admired small entrepreneurial firms which achieve profits from their mostly
radical innovations (Schumpeter, 1912). Later on he thought that large monopo-
listic firms have better capabilities to push the technological frontier in small but
numerous steps, which results in a better technological development of an industry
(Schumpeter, 1942).
The aim of this section9 is to contribute to this discussion in order to get a better
understanding of industrial dynamics connected with the technological development
of an industry. For the purpose of this section we abstract from the influence of
geographical proximity and fully concentrate on technological proximity. Thus, the
assumption about learning through knowledge spillovers is given due to the char-
acteristics of the technological regime of the industry. Firms cannot change their
geographical location. As we will see, the approach in this section is a refinement of
8This effect seems to overweight the fact that prices in 100% core are on the average below 0%
core.
9This section is based on Wersching (2006). Despite major changes on the demand side of the
model the results for all technological regimes are qualitatively the same in both versions of the
model.
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the 0% core and 100% core scenarios of Section 7.1. In contrast to previous applica-
tions of the model we not only consider minor changes but alter many parameters
at the same time. We compare the outcome of two settings with alternative main
characteristics which correspond to two archetypes of an innovative industry.
From a policy perspective it could be of great importance to know what circum-
stances lead to more innovations because innovations seem to be the main source
of economic growth. Knowing the mechanisms at work would allow policy makers
to create appropriate measures supporting firms and public institutions. Therefore
research questions which are approached in this work are: Which view of Schum-
peter is right, what surrounding leads to a better technological development of an
industry? What is the effect of competition in an innovative industry, is there a
clear relation between market structure and innovation? And last, what is the role
of knowledge spillovers, how does internal and external learning influence the tech-
nological development?
This section is closely connected to Winter (1984), where the author proposes to
model and to discuss two stylized scenarios in order to get a clearer picture of the
mechanisms described by Schumpeter: In the entrepreneurial regime firms rely more
on external learning, the results of innovation are more stochastic and there are many
entries of innovative firms in the industry. In contrast to this, the routinized regime
is characterized by firms concentrating on internal R&D (innovation and imitation)
and by the fact that the outcome of innovations depends on old techniques previously
used in the firm. As results of the simulation study Winter (1984) shows that in the
entrepreneurial regime average productivity changes more smoothly, the industry
is less concentrated and less profitable compared to the routinized regime. The
evolution of prices is similar in both scenarios. Other simulation models also deal
with the topic of technological regimes, see Section 3.2.2.
Further, this endeavor is interesting from a methodological point of view be-
cause the outcome of our model is compared to the results of a previous simulation
model, namely Winter (1984). Several scholars stress this topic in the literature un-
der the notions of docking (the alignment of computational models (Burton, 2003))
and replication (the reproduction of earlier results (Hamermesh, 2007; Windrum
et al., 2007)). This process is in particular important for agent-based simulation
models (Wilensky and Rand, 2007). As Hales et al. (2003) argue, a result from
simulations is then more reliable if it is reproduced many times by different mod-
elers and re-implemented on several platforms in different places. Here we do not
perform a replication of the original computational model but introduce a whole
new interpretation of the conceptual model of technological regimes based on addi-
tional theoretical and empirical contributions since the seminal article. Obviously,
we implemented our computational model using different hardware and software.
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Our replication is successful in the way that the output is sufficiently similar to the
original model, which was describes as relational alignment by Wilensky and Rand
(2007). Hence, this section replicates most of the qualitatively relationships in a
different conceptual and computational model which supports the earlier findings
and hereby underlines the significance of the previous work by Winter (1984).
The debate on technological regimes can be tracked back to the writings of
Schumpeter where the author described rather different constellations of competi-
tion and the role of innovations. In Schumpeter (1912) the author emphasized the
role of small entrants who challenge the incumbents with their innovations. In the
literature this scenario was named Schumpeter Mark I.10 In his later days Schum-
peter (1942) almost radically changed his view to the effect that now for him large
firms had better capabilities to accumulate knowledge and gain economic profits
from innovations. This view was labeled as Schumpeter Mark II. In order to char-
acterize fundamental differences in the structure of innovative conditions the notion
of technological regimes was introduced. Technological regimes are defined by Nel-
son and Winter (1982) as the technological environment of an industry under which
firms operate.
Malerba and Orsenigo (1996, 2000) propose that a technological regime can be
seen as a certain combination of the following properties of technologies:
• Opportunity conditions
• Cumulativeness conditions
• Appropriability conditions and
• Type of knowledge base.
Opportunity conditions reflect the abundance of knowledge external to an in-
dustry. They express how easily a firm can successfully perform an innovation with
a given amount of resources invested in research. Cumulativeness conditions define
to what extent the build-up of new knowledge depends upon the knowledge already
accumulated in the firm. The appropriability condition stands for the ease of ex-
tracting profits from innovation and the protection of intellectual property rights.
The possibilities of imitation have a great influence on the level of appropriability.
As a last characteristic the knowledge base specifies the key dimensions of knowledge
relevant for innovation activities.
The nature of learning is important for innovations and can be described by
the properties of technological regimes, too. Learning is here understood as knowl-
edge transfer which can occur from institutions external to the industry to firms,
10The labels Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II were first used by Nelson and Winter
(1982) and Kamien and Schwartz (1982).
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or between and within firms of an industry. If firms have possibilities to learn from
public institutions, e.g. universities, it could be argued that opportunity conditions
are high. The cumulativeness condition on the other hand is significant for learning
within a firm. It represents the way firms can build up knowledge and how knowl-
edge of a related technology can be transferred. These activities should represent
internal knowledge spillovers. On the other hand, the appropriability conditions
and the type of knowledge base are of major importance for external knowledge
spillovers which are knowledge flows between firms. If knowledge circulates very
easily between competitors and cannot be protected by legal authorities, the appro-
priability conditions of innovations are low. The degree of tacitness of knowledge,
which is given by the characteristics of the knowledge base, and aspects of proxim-
ity are important for the transfer of knowledge. Altogether we see that learning is
strongly connected to technological regimes.
When it comes to the debate of market structure and innovation, the ease of in-
novative entry in an industry is the first relevant aspect. Technological entry barriers
define the competitive advantages of the incumbents over potential competitors re-
lated to knowledge and innovations (see Pavitt et al., 1989; Marsili, 2001). A highly
cumulative character of knowledge, low knowledge spillover between firms and no
learning from public sources may result in high technological entry barriers and
prevent firms from entering a market. The question whether competition increases
or decreases firms’ incentive to innovate is the second aspect of market structure
and innovation. After Schumpeter (1942) it was assumed that innovation would de-
cline with competition as more competition reduces the monopoly rents that reward
successful innovators. Taking this relation as true it could be argued that there is
a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency, because more innovations would
occur in more concentrated industries. Empirical studies to this topic in general do
not support this view. For example a recent article indicates a complex non-linear
function in the form of an inverted-u shape (Aghion et al., 2005). In contrast to this
Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that both variables, market structure and innova-
tions, are endogenous to the nature of a technological regime so that the discussion
on competition and innovation had better taken into account the fundamental prop-
erties of technological regimes (Marsili and Verspagen, 2002).11
Beside the theoretical debate on technological regimes, empirical works try to
indicate regularities which characterize certain properties of technological regimes
in different industries (see e.g. Pavitt, 1984; Pavitt et al., 1989; Audretsch, 1991;
Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996; Breschi et al., 2000; Marsili, 2001; Marsili and Verspa-
gen, 2002). For example Malerba and Orsenigo (1996) study six countries (D, F,
GB, I, USA, J) and 49 technology classes. They find evidence that 19 technological
11See also Cohen (1995) in this context.
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classes (including mechanical technologies and traditional sectors) indicate patterns
of Schumpeter Mark I and 15 technological classes (including chemicals and elec-
tronics) could have been characterized as Schumpeter Mark II. The results within
each technology class have been remarkably similar across all countries.
The dynamic perspective of the simulation model enables the analysis of the tech-
nological development of a horizontally differentiated industry. Knowledge is seen
as the major factor driving the technological development and can be used by firms
for process and product innovations. Another merit of the model is that it allows an
analytical description of the learning processes through knowledge spillover between
and within firms. These features are needed to represent technological regimes in a
computational model. The differences between the Schumpeter Mark I and Schum-
peter Mark II scenarios and their representation in the model are summarized in
Table 7.1 and the corresponding parameters are given in Table A.4 in the appendix.
Schumpeter Mark I Schumpeter Mark II
External Institution Yes No
Process Innovations Low Investments High Investments
Product Innovations Easier and more radical
Higher thresholds
and mostly incremental
Initial Knowledge
for new Technologies
Non-Cumulative Cumulative
Patent Length Short Patent Protection Long Patent Protection
Knowledge Spillover
High external and
low internal Spillovers
No external, but
high internal Spillovers
Number of Firms
in the Industry
Many Few
Table 7.1: The representation of technological regimes in the model.
In the Schumpeter Mark I (or entrepreneurial) regime the sources of knowledge
are mainly external to the firm. Beside high knowledge spillovers from competitors
firms learn from an institution which is understood to be external to the industry.
The institution provides and extends knowledge in existing technologies and all firms
can benefit from its technological advances. The amount of knowledge transfer from
the institution to the firms depends on each firm’s absorptive capacity. Examples of
external institutions occur every time when researchers or firm representatives from
other industries meet firm representatives from this specific industry, e.g. in univer-
146
sities, at think tanks, exhibitions or conferences. For simplicity it is assumed that
the investments for the external institution are funded by public authorities. Imita-
tion between companies is the second source of external learning. High opportunities
for imitation and a short patent length result overall in low technological barriers
to entry. Entry in new markets is possible after only one period and the high level
of external knowledge spillover allows fast catch-up to technological leaders in the
sub-markets. The industrial environment is characterized as ’creative destruction’
because the thresholds for incremental and radical product innovations are lower
than in the other scenario. The industry is less concentrated because there are more
firms in the industry and each sub-market is initialized as a duopoly so that every
firm faces a direct competitor in their main market. Although the industry has
a fixed number of firms the market structure on every sub-market is determined
endogenously as firms can enter and exit markets.
The Schumpeter Mark II (or routinized) regime, which is sometimes described as
’creative accumulation’, is in contrast characterized by large established firms. This
fact is represented in the way that the industry consists of fewer firms which start as
monopolists on one sub-market. The main sources of knowledge are seen internal to
the firm with high investments in process innovations and high knowledge spillover
within the firm, where knowledge from one technology is used to gain new knowledge
in another technology. There exists no public external institution. The thresholds
for product innovations are higher, so that on the average more knowledge is needed
to achieve a product innovation. Altogether there are high technological barriers to
entry in the Mark II scenario resulting from the long patent length and the absence of
external learning. This fact is underlined by the cumulative structure of knowledge.
A successful product innovation is initialized in the way that the starting level for
process innovation depends on the knowledge of the innovating firm in neighboring
technologies.
While comparing these two stylized scenarios it is important to note that other
aspects are not varied in the two technological regimes. Among them are strategies,
capabilities and resources of the firms as well as the technological space at start
(which means that the technological specialization of firms and industry is equal,
too) and the preferences of the consumers. Firm strategies stay constant but the
technological space changes endogenously as the industry evolves.
For the formal representation of the technological regimes several changes in
the description of the model have to be made. The knowledge build-up process in
the external institution works similar to the knowledge accumulation of the firms.
The knowledge stock RDextj,t is increased by public investments I
ext
j,t−1 analogously to
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equation (4.1):
RDextj,t =1−
(
1−RDextj,t−1
) 1 + αext · βext · Iextj,t−1
1 + αext · Iextj,t−1
(7.1)
Firms (at least in the Schumpeter Mark I scenario) can use public knowledge but
the knowledge spillovers from the external institution SP exti,j,t again depend on the
firm’s capabilities to exploit knowledge analogously to equation (7.3). As internal
and external knowledge spillovers and spillovers from the external institution are
understood to be perfect substitutes, the later form SP exti,j,t has also to be considered
for the knowledge build-up in equation (4.1) and is given by:
SP exti,j,t = ω
ext
∑
l
[
1
1 + dtechj,l,t
· tjl,t · e−
tjl,t
γi,t
]
(7.2)
Apart from the usage of a external institution the two technological regimes make
use of a changed formalization of knowledge spillover. Here, the different types of
spillovers in equation (4.10) are weighted with the new parameters ωex and ωin.
Thus, the previous formula for spillovers changes to:
SP proci,j,t = ωex ·
mt∑
l=1
∑
k 6=i
[
(1− dgeoi,t )(1− dgeok,t ) ·
1
1 + dtechj,l,t
· tik,jl,t · e−
tik,jl,t
γi,t
]
+ ωin ·
mt∑
l=1
[
1
1 + dtechj,l,t
· tii,jl,t · e−
tii,jl,t
γi,t
] (7.3)
In the following the model is analyzed with respect to technological development,
main industry characteristics and learning through knowledge spillover. All graphs
are based on 100 simulation runs in the described settings. In most cases the two
stylized technological regimes are compared with the arithmetic mean over all runs.
Apart from the graphical presentation the results are underlined with Wilcoxon rank
sum tests in Appendix A.3. The outcome of the simulation studies, which is going
to be discussed in the following part, appears to be highly significant as all null
hypotheses can be rejected to a confidence interval greater than 99%.
In contrast to the model of Winter (1984) the number of sub-markets in the
industry is not constant. The industry is initialized with a fixed number of sub-
markets and every additional variant represents a successful introduction of a new
product. Results yield that the number of product innovations is quite similar for
both types of technological regimes. The thresholds for product innovations are first
reached by firms in Schumpeter Mark II although more knowledge12 is necessary to
12See parameters a, b and c in Table A.4.
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introduce a new product variant. As the industry evolves, the number of product
innovations is growing faster in Schumpeter Mark I. It is interesting to note that
in the short-run there are on the average earlier and more product innovations in
Schumpeter Mark II whereas later on the number of markets in total is higher in
Schumpeter Mark I. But this only happens as the simulations continue after the 200
periods typically considered in the other experiments.
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(a) Radical product innovations.
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(b) Incremental product innovations.
Figure 7.8: Technological regimes and the outcome for radical and incremental prod-
uct innovations.
Apart from the number of product innovations there exists a structural difference
in the type of product innovations. In order to show this effect, Figure 7.8 draws
graphs of successful radical and incremental product innovations over time in the
two technological regimes. The figure indicates that there are far more radical prod-
uct innovations in Schumpeter Mark I and more incremental product innovations in
Schumpeter Mark II. This result is driven by the assumption that product innova-
tions are easier and more radical in Schumpeter Mark I. Despite the similar number
of product innovations the technological space changes in Schumpeter Mark I much
more radically. Whereas in Schumpeter Mark II firms compete with more tech-
nologically close product variants with limited demand, firms in Schumpeter Mark
I benefit from new consumers which are attracted to the industry through radical
product innovations. There seems to be more competition between sub-markets than
competition in sub-markets in Schumpeter Mark II.
Process innovations complete the picture of the technological development of
the industry. Like Winter (1984) the scenarios are analyzed with best-practice and
average values for process innovations over all firms and sub-markets. Figure 7.9
captures the evolution of the first 100 periods on the level of best-practice (a) and
over 200 periods for the average productivity (b).
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(a) Best-practice.
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(b) Average level of process innovations.
Figure 7.9: Technological regimes and process innovations.
In all cases the industry starts around RD0 = 0.2. The best-practice for process
innovations is rising fast in Schumpeter Mark II. Firms in Schumpeter Mark I seem
to take some time, but after that the steep curve stands for a very fast development
of the best practice. One explanation for this pattern could be the low absorptive
capabilities at the beginning of the simulation runs. Because of this Schumpeter
Mark I firms at first have problems absorbing external knowledge but, as shown in
the graph, once the critical level of absorptive capacity is reached the best-practice
increases very fast. However, firms in Schumpeter Mark II invest in internal R&D
and in this setting the technological frontier develops at a greater pace.
In the evolution of the average knowledge for process innovations firms in Schum-
peter Mark II show better outcomes. Two interesting effects can be seen in the right
figure: First, at the beginning the average level of process innovations is reduced
as more technologically lagging firms enter sub-markets in Schumpeter Mark I. In
Schumpeter Mark II this does not occur, possibly because high technological entry
barriers prevent many firms from penetrating sub-markets. Second, after the first
wave of new product variants there is a slowdown in the Schumpeter Mark II curve
around period 30. This might result from the cumulative structure of knowledge for
new technologies because at this time the first product variants are initialized at a
lower level of knowledge. In the long run the lead of Schumpeter Mark II firms in
terms of process innovations persists but the difference is continuously reduced.
Summing up, the simulation study shows that the technological development is
better in an industry that is characterized by Schumpeter Mark II conditions. The
situation for process innovations is obvious because here the development of the
best practice is faster and firms do in average have lower production cost. In terms
of product innovations there is a shift from early successful firms in Schumpeter
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Mark II to more innovative firms in Schumpeter Mark I in the long run. But taking
the lower number of firms that innovate in Schumpeter Mark II into account, the
technological development in terms of number of product innovations per firm could
be interpreted as superior to the other scenario, too.
The findings for the technological development are in line with the simulation
results of Winter (1984). Further, in the model by Winter (1984) the outcome for
the main industry characteristics is the following: The industry is less concentrated
and less profitable in the Schumpeter Mark I regime and prices are similar in both
scenarios. The interpretation of technological regimes in this paper only partially
reproduces these findings. First, it can be shown that the average profitability is
indeed higher in Schumpeter Mark II. Second, in contrast to Winter (1984) prices
appear not to be equal but lower in the Schumpeter Mark I scenario. And third, for
aspects of concentration evidence is mixed.
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(a) Market concentration.
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(b) Industry concentration in profits.
Figure 7.10: Technological regimes and measures of concentration.
In Figure 7.10 two forms of concentration are demonstrated: The average concen-
tration of quantities on markets (a) and the average concentration of the whole in-
dustry given by aggregated profits (b). Both variables are calculated as a Herfindahl
index, whereas industry concentration is normalized between zero and one because
of the different number of firms in the scenarios. Market concentration is therefore
given by H =
[ ∑
a2i
(
∑
ai)2
]
with ai = xi,j,t, and analogously industry concentration by
H =
[ ∑
a2i
(
∑
ai)2
− 1/n
]
· 1
1−1/n with ai =
∑
tΠi,t.
It is interesting to see that in both technological regimes market concentration
rapidly falls to lower values at start and with the first introduction of new products
market concentration jumps to a higher level. In Schumpeter Mark II the high
technological entry barriers enable the innovating firm to stay as a monopolist on
new markets. But because the average market concentration in Schumpeter Mark
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II is still much below 1, firms enter open markets despite the difficulties. The
low technological entry barriers in Schumpeter Mark I lead to fast entries in new
sub-markets so that the market concentration is much lower. This result was also
obtained by Winter (1984). As the industry evolves, more incremental product
innovations reduce the demand for each product variant. The number of active
firms on established sub-markets goes down because fewer firms can be profitable.
Because of this market concentration is rising in Schumpeter Mark I. In the long
run both curves seem to converge as market concentration in Schumpeter Mark I
increases at a greater pace but at T = 200 market concentration in Schumpeter
Mark II is still higher.
The industry concentration measures how equally the aggregated profits are dis-
tributed over all firms in the industry at a certain point of time. During the first
periods firms in Schumpeter Mark II differ more. But after the first product innova-
tions the curve for Schumpeter Mark I is much steeper, which leads to higher industry
concentration in the longer run. The high value for Schumpeter Mark I is surprising
because the structure of knowledge is less cumulative. The absorptive capacity could
be an explanation for the strongly increasing difference in aggregated profits because
firms with low absorptive capacity cannot use external learning opportunities and
are therefore less profitable. Over time industry concentration increases in both
cases. This means that previously successful firms become more successful show-
ing a strong separation between technologically leading and technologically lagging
companies.13 This effect is even stronger for firms in Schumpeter Mark I.
If we accept the view that the technological development of an industry stands for
dynamic efficiency and the development of prices, profits and market concentration
for static efficiency14, then the findings of the simulations could point at a trade-
off between static and dynamic efficiency. Industries with conditions similar to
Schumpeter Mark II may show more innovations and lower production costs. On
the other hand, this is associated with monopolistic tendencies in the form of higher
prices, higher profits and higher market concentration. It is important to add that in
the long run the Schumpeter Mark I scenario shows more and more radical product
innovations. High profits only lead to a better technological development when firms
concentrate on internal research activities and, thus, high profits in Schumpeter
Mark I would not provoke innovations to the same degree because firms are more
focussed on external learning.
The formulation of knowledge stocks which are located on a circular technological
13In the literature the effect is sometimes described as ’success breeds success’ (e.g. Malerba and
Orsenigo, 2000).
14Of course there is nothing to say about efficiency while comparing two economic examples.
These terms are used in the literature to define the outcome or process of competition (see e.g.
Blaug, 2001).
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space allows a representation of the firms’ technological portfolio. For every firm it
is possible to analyze the height and location of the knowledge stocks. In this
context it is feasible to measure firm specialization which takes into account the
properties of knowledge. A specialized firm has high peaks which are located close
to each other, and a not specialized (or diversified) firm has peaks which are equally
high and uniformly distributed over the circular technological space. Both types of
specialization are calculated with a normalized Herfindahl index, one for the height
of knowledge and one for the location of knowledge. The closer the index is to 1,
the more specialized are the firms on the average, see Section 6.1 for the definition
of specialization.
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(a) Specialization in height.
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(b) Specialization in location.
Figure 7.11: Technological regimes and firms’ specialization.
Figure 7.11 shows the average values over all firms for both forms of specializa-
tion. All curves start at 1 for maximal specialization because each firm is initialized
with knowledge in exactly one technology. In the first phase of the simulation firms
gain knowledge in other technologies as they enter sub-markets and invest in R&D
or learn. Again the introduction of first product innovations has a major influence
on the curves leading to more diversified firms, especially in Schumpeter Mark II.
Both graphs of Schumpeter Mark II seem to converge to a low level of specialization
whereas the graphs for Schumpeter Mark I keep increasing as time goes by. The
interpretation of the picture is obvious: Firms in Schumpeter Mark I are (after an
initial phase) on the average more specialized in terms of height as well as location
of knowledge in the technology space.
The result of higher firm specialization in Schumpeter Mark I is rather surprising
and tests with different parameters (e.g. number of firms or other forms of knowledge
build-up in the public institution) suggest that this result is quite robust. Knowl-
edge and technological progress in Schumpeter Mark II are strongly cumulative at
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firm level. Hence, one would expect highly specialized firms because knowledge is
best transferred through internal spillover with similar peaks located close to each
another. In contrast to this the sources of knowledge in Schumpeter Mark I are
very diversified resulting from the external institution and imitation from competi-
tors. Firms do have very broad opportunities to learn and one would expect more
diversified firms in Schumpeter Mark I.
In order to explain this finding three possible arguments could be of relevance.
First, it could be the case that the scale of learning and R&D projects is much
smaller in Schumpeter Mark I and so firms can only develop knowledge in and
around their starting point. Second, investments in R&D could lead to more di-
versified firms and external learning could generate more specialized firms under
the described circumstances. And third, the scenario of ’creative destruction’ could
have significant influence on the technology space resulting in more specialized firms.
These arguments should be discussed in detail.
Figure 7.12: Sum of learning from different sources in the technological regimes.
For the generation of knowledge firms use investments in R&D, internal learning,
imitation from competitors and learning from the public institution. All elements
are understood as perfect substitutes to create knowledge. Figure 7.12 presents
the sum of investments in R&D and all types of knowledge spillover for process
innovations to see if the scale has an impact on the high level of firm specialization
in Schumpeter Mark I. In Schumpeter Mark II only 5 instead of 10 firms exist in
the industry. The graphs show that the sum of R&D and knowledge spillover in
Schumpeter Mark I is (after an initial phase) at least twice as high. Hence, a firm in
Schumpeter Mark I benefits from R&D and learning on the average at least as much
as a firm in Schumpeter Mark II. Additionally this is supported by evidence that the
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level of absorptive capacity evolves equal in both scenarios. Therefore the amount
of learning and a possible shortfall of absorptive capacity cannot be the reason for
high specialization of firms in Schumpeter Mark I.
The second argument debates not the scale but the structure of the acquired
knowledge. Firms in Schumpeter Mark II can create knowledge very fast in selected
technological areas because investments in R&D do not rely on the existing level of
knowledge. On the contrary, knowledge spillovers depend on the gap between the
specific knowledge stocks. In Schumpeter Mark I firms may have less influence on
the technological areas they want to improve. Instead they rely more on the external
technological development. Because of this, it could be argued that R&D activities
are more focused and guided. Firms in Schumpeter Mark II have more freedom to
change their temporary technological emphasis with high investments in R&D. Firms
can enter profitable sub-markets having in mind that high investments in process
innovations allow a fast catch-up to the incumbents independent of the current
knowledge in this technology. As a second option higher profits in Schumpeter Mark
II lead to higher investments in product innovations and more successful product
innovations (per firm) can be conducted next to profitable markets. More product
innovations in technologies which have so far not been known to the firm cause
more diversified firms in Schumpeter Mark II, too. Although learning possibilities in
Schumpeter Mark I are very broad, firms appear to absorb only technologically close
knowledge and this generates much more specialized firms. Indeed, the structural
difference between more guided investments in R&D and less controlled external
learning may be a reason for more diversified firms in Schumpeter Mark II.
The technological regime of Schumpeter Mark I was characterized as ’creative
destruction’. This view can be supported by Figure 7.8 a), which shows that the
number of radical product innovations are much higher in Schumpeter Mark I. Every
radical product innovation distorts the technological space because it separates two
previous technologies and the technological circle is expanded. The technological
distances between technologies increase and it becomes more difficult to learn in
distant technological areas. Firms in a rapidly changing technological space caused
by more radical product innovations have difficulties to keep a diversified technolog-
ical portfolio. Therefore, major changes in the technology space could be another
explanation for the higher firm specialization in the scenario of Schumpeter Mark I.
Taken together this section supports the empirical finding that the technologi-
cal environment of an industry has a fundamental impact on the competition and
technological development of a industry. Here, the changes in the properties of tech-
nological regimes, as proposed by Malerba and Orsenigo (2000), reproduce most of
the earlier results by Winter (1984) and additional conclusions can be made upon
the emerging type of product innovations and firms’ specialization. Section 7.3 will
155
continue with the question whether and how public policy might influence the pre-
conditions for the innovative competition between firms.
7.3 Evaluation of Policy Measures
This section discusses whether and how public policy may influence the outcome of
the virtual industry. Starting from the standard case of the industry it is argued that
there is room for steering by a superior authority. Four potential aims of regional
innovation policy are introduced and their impact and costs are quantified with the
help of the simulation model.15
7.3.1 Regional Innovation Policy in the Model
Before going into the analysis of concrete policy measures in the simulated industry,
one has to ask about the rationale for policy. In an insightful survey by Metcalfe
(1995) the author distinguishes two major approaches in the debate about innovation
and policy: The equilibrium oriented Neo-classical and the evolutionary school of
thought. Both theories provide a normative foundation for economic policy; this
work borrows ideas from both concepts.
On the one hand, the traditional economic theory is based on the notion of
so-called market failures which prevent economic agents to find a Pareto optimal
equilibrium. Typically the market failures violate one or more conditions for per-
fect competition. Thus, the market mechanism will not lead to the best possible
allocation of resources on different tasks and agents. Metcalfe (1995) mentions the
following examples of market failures, which according to Dosi (1988b) are crucial
in the context of innovation: Indivisibilities in the process of knowledge produc-
tion, uncertainty of the innovative outcome, information or knowledge asymmetries,
market power as a consequence of innovation, (partial) public good character of
knowledge, and externalities in the form of knowledge spillovers. The aim of politi-
cians in the Neo-classical framework is the maximization of a social welfare function
which depends on the personal welfare maximizing behavior of firms and consumers.
The policy maker is understood to be fully informed and knows how to identify and
implement the optimum.
The seminal article for the justification of an innovation policy in an equilib-
rium model is Arrow (1962). The author compares the potential profits from a
cost-reducing process innovation in a monopolistic and competitive setting. In the
latter case it is assumed that the firm may become a monopolist itself if the cost
reduction is high enough. Market demand and the cost for the innovation are the
15Parts of this section are also published in Wersching (2007b).
156
same in both situations. With these assumptions the incentive for an innovation is
lower for a monopolist than for one of the competitive firms because the monopoly
power and profits before the innovation act as a strong disincentive to further inno-
vative endeavors. The most significant result from a policy perspective is the fact
that a social planner has even higher innovative incentives than a monopolist or
one of the competitive firms. Therefore, in the view of Arrow (1962) competition
enhances incentives to innovate, which is similar to the early writings of Schumpeter
(1912). Another seminal work which compares innovation in a social optimum with
a competitive situation is proposed by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980). In this Cournot
oligopoly model with R&D all profits are competed away as firms can freely enter
the market. The main finding highlights the role of an endogenous market structure
which is determined by market demand and innovation possibilities. Thus, both the
degree of concentration and the nature of innovative activity emerge endogenously
but no causal link can be established between them. The market equilibrium is not
characterized by an optimum allocation of resources as there might be under- or
over-investment in R&D.
In Metcalfe (1995) the traditional welfare approach was criticized as not being
dynamic and not considering information asymmetries. The importance of knowl-
edge spillovers especially is emphasized as folllows: ”.. in a world of symmetric
firms, spillovers are logically impossible. [..] Asymmetries have their proper role in
a dynamic framework not an equilibrium one.” (pp. 446-447, Metcalfe, 1995). These
arguments are of course similar to the discussion whether equilibrium or simulation
models are better suited to represent innovation and proximity, see Chapter 3. The
acceptance of heterogeneity as a crucial assumption in the innovative competition
between firms brings us to the evolutionary perspective of economic policy.
The evolutionary approach to technical change tries to explain why technological
competition is seen as the driving force behind structural change and economic
development. Central aspects in this framework are the diversity of behavior of
agents, the relevance of process and change - not equilibrium and state, the fact
that the mainspring of profit opportunity is the possession of privileged knowledge,
and that bounded rationality also counts for policy makers. As Teubal (1997) argues,
the goal of evolutionary policy is not to abandon the market-failure analysis but to
set it into a wider context which incorporates aspects of dynamics and uncertainty.
The main goal for evolutionary policy is the stimulation of innovations taking into
account that policy may sometimes fail (Metcalfe, 1995; Werker, 2006). There is a
wide agreement on this aim of evolutionary policy but it is highly debated how this
goal can be achieved.
To¨dtling and Trippl (2005) propose good reasons why evolutionary policy should
be implemented at a regional level (see also Chapter 2 and Scott and Storper (2003)):
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First, regions differ in their technological specialization and innovative performance
more than nations. Second, knowledge spillovers are understood to occur on a re-
gional level. Third, the exchange of tacit knowledge requires personal contact and
trust, which are both favored by geographical proximity. And fourth, policy compe-
tencies and institutions can often be more easily influenced at a regional level. The
application of an evolutionary policy to the regional level should be called regional
innovation policy. We therefore adopt the view of To¨dtling and Trippl (2005) who
assert that regional innovation policy is based on concepts of the new endogenous
growth theory, the cluster approach, the knowledge economy and the literature on
knowledge spillovers.16 The main characteristics of a regional innovation strategy
can be seen in the focus on the creation and exchange of knowledge in geographically
concentrated industries.17
Having defined regional innovation policy we can now ask when such a policy can
be successful and why we might need political intervention in the model proposed in
this book. Metcalfe (1995) argues that economic policy should not subsidize firms
for activities they would otherwise carried out themselves. In the context of policy
measures to support a cluster in a specific region Brenner (2004) discusses three
possible outcomes of policy: First, a cluster might emerge that would have also
come up without the policy. Second, a cluster might emerge that would not have
come up without the policy. And finally, no cluster might emerge. The first and
third point indicate political failures because economic resources are wasted or do
not lead to the desired outcome. Only the second possibility is socially desirable and
can be seen as an effective policy. Furthermore, the author concludes that policy
should only choose regions with a high likelihood that a cluster will emerge. Once
the cluster exists, Porter (1998) advocates an upgrading of every type of cluster and
he warns that policy should not distort the competition between firms.
In the model of Chapter 4 firms might choose a location at the core or cluster
where they might benefit from local externalities in the form of knowledge spillovers.
The justification for regional innovation policy in the model can be seen in the fact
that scenarios other than standard, which can be interpreted as left-alone or free-
market scenarios, show better outcome for technological development and welfare,
see Section 7.1. Hence, the market solution is regarded to be inferior to special cases
like all firms at the core or all firms on the periphery. We do not know the social
optimum of this model and in the previous sections we argue that there might not
16Relevant literature for the new endogenous growth theory is Lucas (1988); Romer (1986, 1990),
for clusters Porter (1998); Asheim and Gertler (2005), for the knowledge economy Nonaka and
Takeuchi (1995); Cooke and Leydesdorf (2006) and for knowledge spillovers Jaffe et al. (1993);
Audretsch and Feldman (1996b). These topics are discussed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3.
17A distinction between high-tech and low-tech industries or firms is counterproductive in this
context (on this point see also p. 33 in Porter, 1998).
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exist an ideal social optimum because there is a trade-off between maximum and
average outcome for innovations.18 We think that political influence might improve
the outcome of the standard case in terms of process and product innovations as well
as welfare of the industry. Though the argumentation is similar to policy justifica-
tions in equilibrium models like Arrow (1962) or Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), we
evaluate policy interventions by their impact and cost without aiming at an ideal so-
cial optimum. Furthermore, we concentrate on policies which can be analyzed in the
model and which are discussed in the (mostly empirical and descriptive) literature
on regional innovation policy.
In the following we mention those aspects we are not able to address in the
current form of the model. First, we cannot provide arguments whether innovation
policy should be maintained at a national or regional level. Second, we are further
not able to discuss any other form of a local externality than knowledge spillovers
- may it be positive or negative. Examples of other forms of local externalities are
cost of scarce resources in a cluster, local benefits from job-markets, local social or
institutional networks, and specialized input factors for firms in an agglomeration.
Third, as we consider only one cluster we cannot debate processes of convergence
between regions or clusters. We concentrate on the effects within an industry and
can talk about convergence or divergence between firms but not between regions.
The reason why all these aspects are not modeled is that we focus on the impact
of geographical and technological proximity on innovative competition, build-up of
knowledge, and firm heterogeneity. Additionally, localized learning in the horizontal
dimension between direct competitors is highlighted. We refer to the influence of the
endogenous technological development on the demand and on other industry charac-
teristics like concentration, prices and degree of specialization of firms, locations or
industry. Therefore, the analysis concentrates on selected political measures which
in the literature are understood to have a positive influence on the technological
development of an industry and which can be addressed in the model. The chosen
policies are enumerated in Table 7.2.
In the following we bring forward the argument why those policies are relevant
for regional innovation policy, in which way they can be implemented, and how the
potential cost can be estimated.
Enhance Incentive for Agglomeration
The first policy measure is connected to the positive learning externality in the
agglomeration: The more firms choose their location at the core, the higher in general
is the amount of spatially bounded learning through knowledge spillovers. Thus, a
18Only looking at the welfare function as given in equation (4.16) would indicate the 0% core
scenario as the best of all considered scenarios, see Figure 7.7.
159
Policy Name Dimension Measures
1 Enhance Incentivefor Agglomeration
Number of Firms
at the Core
Local Public Research,
Funding of Cluster Firms
2
Foster Learning through
Knowledge Flows
Level of Knowledge
Spillovers
Public Research,
Local Knowledge Networks
3 Increase Appropriability Firm Profits Patent Length,Consumer Budget
4
Control Specialization
of Agglomeration
Specialization of
Agglomeration
Funding of private R&D
(first Process then,
Product Innovations)
Table 7.2: Policy measures in the model.
regional authority should try to promote the attractiveness of the agglomeration so
that more firms of the industry settle in the cluster. In the literature the argument
can be found in several theoretical and political works: Audretsch (1998); Rallet
and Torre (2000); Brenner (2004); Andersson et al. (2004); Torre and Rallet (2005);
To¨dtling and Trippl (2005). The relevant dimension for this kind of policy is the
number of firms at the core. In the model the attractiveness of the agglomeration
can be increased by two options: Either by adding local learning opportunities or
by funding of cluster firms.
We model the political activity such that we come back to the concept of an
external institution. The external institution provides the industry with additional
knowledge funded by public investments. A formalization was already done in Sec-
tion 7.2 and the knowledge build-up process is described in equation (7.1). Since
the political goal is to enhance the attractiveness of the core, only firms at the
core should profit from the local knowledge spillovers of the external institution (see
equation (7.2)).
The second way to influence firm behavior is a subsidy to all firms that choose a
location in the cluster. The formalization is equal to the introduction of additional
cost at the core, see Section 6.2. Instead of bearing these costs of scarce resources
firms now receive an additional payment from the regional authority in order to
bind them to the agglomeration. This payment is of course taken into account in
the evaluation function for the geographical location. See Appendix A.2 for further
information.
The cost for this kind of policy is the sum of all public investments in the local
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external institution and the sum of direct funding to all cluster firms.
Foster Learning through Knowledge Flows
The second policy aims at a general increase of the learning possibilities inside and
outside the cluster. On the one hand, policy can support public research similar
to the science-based industry in Nelson and Winter (1982). All firms might benefit
from the knowledge produced by external institutions and this should enhance the
technological development of the industry. On the other hand, spillovers inside the
agglomeration are another major factor for learning between firms. A very popular
piece of advise for regional innovation policy is to establish and extend networks
between firms in order to enhance the exchange of knowledge. Thus public research
and cluster networking are seen as appropriate methods to increase learning in a
region. There are many references supporting this thesis: E.g. Lundvall and Bor-
ras (1997); Teubal (1997); Maskell and Malmberg (1999); Nauwelaers and Wintjes
(2002); Andersson et al. (2004); Brenner (2004); OECD (2005); To¨dtling and Trippl
(2005). The relevant dimension for learning in the model is the level of knowledge
spillovers. The goal of the second type of policy is to raise the level of knowledge
spillovers between firms and from the public institution to all firms.
In contrast to the previous policy, which wants to attract firms to the core, the
external institution in this case is not local. Hence, all firms are able to benefit from
the experiences of the public research projects as this increases learning most. One
can debate whether this assumption does not contradict the assumption of local
learning which is central to this approach. Another interpretation of the external
institution is that the government performs R&D projects directly with every firm
independent of their current location. The marginal costs for such a co-operation
are negligible in comparison to the costs for creating the knowledge of the external
institution. In that case learning happens at a local level but is not bounded to the
concept of core and periphery and the costs can be estimated with the investments
in the knowledge build-up. The public knowledge is equal for all firms, but the
learning outcome is obviously driven by the absorptive capacity of each firm. The
relevant equations for the external institution are equations (7.1) and (7.2) and the
benefits from the improved network between the firms can be represented with an
increase of the height parameter ωex of external knowledge spillovers in equation
(7.3).
The costs for the second policy are the sum of investments in the public institu-
tion and the cost for networking between firms. The first part of the cost function
is easy to calculate but it is more difficult to estimate the learning improvements
through networking which lead to higher external knowledge spillovers. These higher
external knowledge spillovers are perfect substitutes to direct investments in R&D,
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see equation (4.1). Therefore, we assume that costs for improving learning between
firms in the cluster are the same as their additional outcome for external knowledge
spillovers. Of course in reality the policy would not be that effective in the way that
every Euro spent for networking directly increases learning in the same amount but
we use it as a rough estimation of the political expenses.
Increase Appropriability
The next type of policy emphasizes the role of economic profits from successful
innovations. The R&D investments of the firms have to be refunded through an
improvement of the market position of the innovating firm. Only if the economic
payoffs of innovations are high enough will a company invest in risky R&D projects
(Levin et al., 1987). The benefits of innovation are summarized under the term
appropriability. Following Malerba and Orsenigo (1996, 2000) the appropriability
condition of an industry stands for the ease of extracting profits from innovation
and the protection of intellectual property rights, see also Section 7.2. The ease
of extracting profits from innovation is influenced by demand conditions in combi-
nation with patents which assure the protection of intellectual property rights. In
the literature on innovation and innovation policy the importance of the demand
side for innovations and the relevance of intellectual property rights is stressed:
E.g. Schumpeter (1942); Rosenberg (1982); Porter (1990, 1998); Brenner (2004);
Lambooy (2005). Firm profits are the indicator for the success of policy aiming
at appropriability. An increase of profits in this model directly heightens the in-
vestments for process and product innovations. Hence, the goal of this policy is to
increase the profits of innovating firms.
The payoffs from innovations and the demand side can be affected by political
interventions in the model. By assumption a firm enjoys a temporary monopoly
for each new product variant for a certain time, see Section 4.1.1. Despite the fact
that no other firm can enter this sub-market for τ periods, the setting of prices is
limited by the prices and technological distances to the neighboring product vari-
ants. But during the so called patent length the innovator does not have to fear a
direct competitor on the new sub-market. A first policy to increase appropriability
is therefore the extension of the patent length: The longer a patent is valid, the
higher the payoffs from successful product innovations. As mentioned before the
appropriability depends on the demand setting of the industry. Hence, the second
part of this policy supports either all or a specific group of consumers. For simplicity
we model this in the form of an increase of the individual demand parameter Bm,
see Section 4.2. This means that the budget of all consumers is subsidized by the
government. No differentiation between groups of consumers is made because they
only differ in their technological preferences. From the setting of the model the in-
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crease of patent length favors product innovations whereas the effect on the demand
side has an impact on the payoffs from both product and process innovations.
As the patent length has already been established in the standard setting of the
model, we assume that there are no significant additional costs for changing the legal
system. The mechanisms to ensure the protection of intellectual property rights do
not change - they only work for a longer time. On the other hand, the subsidies
for consumers can be quantified in the model as the difference between politically
influenced and standard budgets.
Control Specialization of Agglomeration
The last type of policy sets priority to the technological specialization of the ag-
glomeration. This topic is also connected to the question whether a specialized or
diversified environment creates more knowledge spillovers (see Section 2.3) and the
change of technological specialization over the industry life cycle (see section 6.3).
Approaches in the regional innovation policy tend to point toward a different role of
policy at different stages of the development of a region. For example To¨dtling and
Trippl (2005) argue that metropolitan regions are often characterized by fragmenta-
tion of the knowledge base whereas old industrial regions are often over-specialized
and suffer from a lock-in to mature technologies. Both characteristics could work
as barriers for innovation and innovation policy should try to countervail them.
Therefore, during initial periods policy may encounter the fragmented knowledge
of the firms in order to form some kind of knowledge core competencies of the ag-
glomeration because this would increase the benefits from local learning. As the
industry evolves, the problem of over-specialization of the agglomeration could be
solved by policies that stimulate mostly new technologies. Thus, the political activ-
ities should try to control the specialization of the agglomeration in the described
manner. Other theoretical and empirical contributions also support this view: E.g.
Krugman (1991b); Grabher (1993); Harrison and Glasmeier (1997); Porter (1998);
Boschma and Lambooy (2000); Bathelt et al. (2004); To¨dtling and Trippl (2005);
Bathelt (2005); Boschma (2005b). The corresponding measure in this context is the
technological specialization of core as it was defined in Section 6.1. In relatively
young industries this policy should enforce specialization and in more mature in-
dustries the focus is set on broadening the knowledge base of the agglomeration.
As there is agreement about the goal, it is not easy to define concrete measures to
control the specialization of an agglomeration.
The recommended policy to monitor specialization seems plausible in the chosen
model, too. At the beginning each firm possesses knowledge in only one particular
area of the technology space and a specialization policy would advance the amount
of local external knowledge spillovers since medium values for the knowledge gaps
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in technological close technologies of cluster firms favor learning. As the industry
evolves, it is shown in Section 6.3 that core indicates a high level of technologi-
cal specialization, which has a negative impact on the technological development of
cluster firms. Policy might have two options to influence the technological special-
ization of the cluster: Either public institutions conduct research projects in specific
technological areas, or private research is directly subsidized in order to manipulate
the direction of the technological development. The first aspect is already captured
in policies 1 and 2 so that we will concentrate on the direct funding of private R&D.
In the first early stages of the industry life cycle the aim is to foster specialization
of core. One way to achieve this is the support of cluster firms so that they improve
their most advanced technology. This is done because the cluster will establish
the main technological areas in parts of the technology circle which are already
at a relatively advanced level. The knowledge in those core competencies of the
cluster may spill over to other firms at the core, which again guides their innovative
activities to the area of interest. The creation of a technological focus in the cluster
results in technological specialization. Hence, in the first periods the policy should
subsidize cluster firms with R&D investments in the technology with the highest
level of knowledge for process innovations.
At later stages of the industry life cycle the second part of the policy tends to
enhance the diversification of the agglomeration. In the setup of the model the best
option to broaden the knowledge base is to introduce new technologies in isolated
areas of the technology space. Hence, as the industry evolves, the policy focuses
on funding private research on product innovations. Thus, all cluster firms are
supported with additional investments in the knowledge for product innovations in
the technology which exhibits the greatest technological distance to its neighbors in
the technology space. In this way new areas are established, which favors the market
position of cluster firms and at the same time prevents a technological lock-in of the
agglomeration.
The costs for the fourth type of a policy are the sum for all public subsidies to
the private research of cluster firms.
Having introduced the different political measures it becomes clear that a po-
litical intervention sometimes favors several goals. In other cases the action may
have negative effects on different political goals. Several political trade-offs might
emerge due to the design of policies. First, a funding of non-local public research
in policy 2 may reduce the incentive to agglomerate, which was defined as a goal
of policy 1. On the other hand, the extension of local networks in policy 2 again
favors agglomeration. Second, in policies 1 and 2 the support of public research and
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networking leads to higher external knowledge spillovers, which might work against
the appropriability of innovations. Third, the selective funding of firms in policy
1 and 4 may distort firm behavior, which is indeed the idea behind and reason for
this type of policies. Fourth, a higher appropriability in policy 3 might work against
competition policy because it might favor higher prices and market concentration.
And finally, in policy 4 there is an important turning point as the policy switches
from enhancing specialization to preventing a lock-in due to over-specialization of
the cluster. The topic of correct timing is important and stressed by To¨dtling and
Trippl (2005). We will assume a random time horizon for the duration of the two
parts of policy 4. Thus, in general there exists a time interval without any political
influence.
The four types of regional innovation policies are implemented in the model
to draw conclusions concerning their impact and interaction. While designing the
policies we encountered the problem of choosing the intensity that also determines
the cost of the political activities. We see two possible modeling strategies: Either
we analyze the outcome of different policies which are based on similar expenses,
or we set the parameters in such a way that the desired result can be observed and
then compare the cost and outcomes of the policies. We choose the latter option to
ensure that the policy effects the relevant dimension (see Table 7.2) and that the
expenses are not useless because they did not reach a critical threshold. Building
on this modeling strategy we discuss the influence of the different policies on main
industry characteristics afterward.
The chosen parameters values are summarized in Table A.5 in the Appendix A.2.
Only changes to the standard scenario are listed. The standard setting is understood
to be the reference case without political intervention. Finally, we now turn to the
quantitative results of the computational experiments.
7.3.2 Simulation Results for Policies
The analysis of the simulation experiments concentrates on the four major dimen-
sion of political interventions: Number of firms in agglomeration, level of learning
through knowledge spillovers, firm profits, and specialization of the agglomeration.
The influence of each policy on these dimensions is investigated followed by a discus-
sion of the costs and welfare effects. The outcome for other industry characteristics
is mentioned after that. The section closes with our main conclusions and recom-
mendations for regional innovation policy.
The first political intervention tries to enhance the incentive for agglomeration
through learning from a local public institution and through direct subsidies to
cluster firms. Therefore the crucial indicator of success is the number of firms at
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the core which should rise due to the public influence. Figure 7.13 shows the firms
which choose a location in the agglomeration for all types of policies. All graphs
represent the average outcome of 100 simulation runs.
Figure 7.13: Policies and the number of firms in the agglomeration.
The thin line stands for the standard scenario and is equal to the graph in Figure
6.2 whereas all other thick lines display the changes due to the different policies.
Apart from policy 3 the other policies seem to have a substantial impact on the
number of firms which choose a close geographical location to their competitors.
The most successful policy to enhance the incentive for core is policy 1, which can
be seen from the fact that the dashed line shows the highest values and even slightly
increases over time. Policy 4 also results in more firms choosing cluster although
the policy mainly focuses on the specialization of the agglomeration. On the other
hand, the dotted line of policy 2 indicates that on the average only one firm stays
at the core. Statistical tests in Appendix A.3 support the impression of the figure.
The main finding concerning the incentive for agglomeration is the fact that
policies 1 and 4 attract firms to the cluster whereas policy 2 discourages firms from
agglomerating. Thus, the measures of policy 1 in the form of local public research
and funding of cluster firms work in convincing firms to move from periphery to core.
The tendency for core in the evaluation function for location, described by equations
(4.30) respectively (A.10), are supported as firms enjoy additional local knowledge
spillovers and a cost reduction in the agglomeration. Besides, the opposing effect of
high knowledge leads is not that strong because many opportunities for local learning
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allow all cluster firms to have a broad and pronounced knowledge base. This can
for example be concluded from the fact that the average knowledge for process
innovation is highest in policy 1. Since there are no firms with a particularly high
knowledge lead over their competitors, more firms choose geographical proximity,
which again favors local learning. This self-reinforcing process results in the very
high numbers of firms at the core for policy 1. The opposite effect arises in policy 2,
where firms can learn from the external institution independent of the geographical
location. Therefore the potential gains from external knowledge spillovers at the
core are reduced, which drives firms out of the agglomeration. This finding shows a
clear goal conflict between policy 1 and policy 2 since local learning enhances and
global learning reduces the incentive for agglomeration. This is in line with our
intuitive suggestions at the end of the proceeding section.
In the case of policy 4 the government supports the innovative efforts of cluster
firms. This effect is not directly captured in the evaluation function for location
but works indirectly through an increase of local learning for all firms at the core as
the public investments build up private knowledge in chosen areas. Apparently, the
effect is not as high as in policy 1. The measures of policy 3 do not alter the outcome
for the number of firms at the core since the increase of the consumer budget and the
extension of patent length applies for all firms and should not distort the location
choices of the firms.
In order to assess the adverse selection effect of clusters, which was the topic of
Section 6.2, we have a closer look at the fraction between average profits of cluster
firms divided by average profits of firms on the periphery. In all considered scenarios
but policy 1 firms at the core are more successful at the beginning but soon after the
introduction of the first new product variants the fraction falls below 1 and reaches
values around 0.3 after 200 periods. Even in the case of policy 4 the minority of
peripheral firms is much more profitable than the majority of firms in the agglomer-
ation. This is not true in case of policy 1. Here the majority of cluster firms always
has higher profits than the few firms in geographical isolation. The graph stabilizes
at 1.2, which shows that on the average firms in the agglomeration enjoy about 20%
higher profits than firms on the periphery. Hence, the only scenario without the
adverse selection mechanism is policy 1. Only in this case is the incentive for core
high enough even for technologically leading firms so that they prefer geographical
proximity.
One of the main advantages of the simulation model is the fact that we can quan-
tify the amount of internal and external learning within and between firms. We then
turn to the second relevant dimension, which is the total amount of learning in the
industry. Figure 7.14 depicts overall learning in the industry, which we understand
as the sum of internal and external knowledge spillovers for process and product in-
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novations and the knowledge spillovers from the (local or non-local) public research
institution. All types of lines stand for the same scenarios as in the previous pic-
ture. Again the thin line represents the reference case and here the lowest amount
of learning is achieved over time. Statistical tests in Appendix A.3 indicate that
all policies increase learning and that the group of policy 1 and 4 lies significantly
higher than the group of policy 2 and 3 at T = 200.
Figure 7.14: Overall learning in the policy scenarios.
In the second policy the local interaction between firms in networks is intensified,
which has a positive impact on the degree of external knowledge spillovers. On
the other hand, an external public institution provides knowledge for all firms in
the industry. Both measures lead to an increase of learning in the industry in
comparison to standard but the outcome shows that other types of policies are even
more successful in enhancing learning. Apart from policy 3, which evolves similar to
policy 2, the activities in policy 1 and 4 seem to generate more knowledge spillovers.
In policy 1 total learning increases very fast at the beginning and then stabilizes
at a high level. In policy 4 the outcome is driven by the political efforts which are
mostly active at the beginning and at the end of the simulated periods. Although the
evolutions in policy 1 and 4 differ, both scenarios indicate similar levels at T = 200.
In order to disentangle the emerging patterns for learning we discuss the different
types of knowledge spillovers. As the parameters for the public research in the
external institution in policy 1 and 2 are the same (see Table A.5) and in policy 1
almost all firms are located at the core, the resulting levels of knowledge spillovers
from the external institution are similar, too. The internal learning within firms is
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highest but the external knowledge spillovers between firms for process and product
innovation are lowest in policy 2. The reason for this outcome is of course the low
number of firms in the agglomeration, which is shown in Figure 7.13.
We conclude that the measures in policy 2 are not suited for enhancing total
learning because a higher degree of knowledge spillovers19 and global learning op-
portunities lower the incentive for core and this reduces learning between firms. It
seems that knowledge spillovers between firms in the agglomeration are substituted
through learning from the public external institution. The amount of learning is
only higher than standard because of the research in the external institution funded
by the government.
It was argued that if firms economically benefit from innovation, the technological
development of an industry could improve. Because of this we choose the average
level of aggregated firm profits as the third key dimension and present it in Figure
7.15. The graphs and tests in Appendix A.3 give evidence that policies 1, 2 and
4 reach similar levels as standard. Although the mean and median of the other
policies is slightly higher than standard, the result is not significant in the statistical
test. Only policy 3 increases the average aggregated profits at a confidence interval
greater than 99%.
Figure 7.15: The impact of policies on the average aggregated firm profits.
The extension of the patent length and the direct support for consumers in policy
3 make the firms on the average more profitable. The total consumer budget for the
19See also Figure 6.5 which indicates that a higher degree of knowledge spillovers lowers the
incentive for agglomeration.
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industry is also highest in this scenario. In all other scenarios the evolution of the
consumer budget is lower than in policy 3 but evolves similarly. After t = 100 the
support for product innovations in policy 4 leads to more radical product innovations,
which raises the total budget of the industry.
The consequences of policy 3 are quite straightforward: Firms economically ben-
efit from the higher consumer budget, and the appropriability of product innovations
is extended. The consumers still prefer the same type of products but now they can
either buy a higher quantity or pay a higher price. Indeed the prices in the policy 3
scenario are highest over all periods. As the production costs stay constant, even the
technologically lagging firms earn higher profits. This can be seen from the fact that
policy 3 has the lowest number of bankrupt firms and the lowest level of industry
concentration in profits. The question whether higher profits due to political activity
do indeed enhance the technological development of the industry is not obvious. On
the one hand, there is a clear positive influence on the number of successful product
innovations as policy 3 has the most new products until it is later on overtaken by
policy 4. On the other hand, the best-practice and average level of knowledge for
process innovations is still higher than standard but lower than the other policies.
Of course the higher number of technologies makes it harder to keep a high level
of knowledge in each of those technologies. We will come back to this point in the
context of policies and technological development.
The last dimension for the analysis of policy is specialization of the agglomer-
ation. As shown in Section 6.1 the interpretation of specialization captures two
aspects, namely specialization in height and specialization in location. The special-
ization of an agglomeration is based on the knowledge of all firms that are at that
time located in the cluster. As discussed above, from a policy perspective it would be
beneficial to enforce specialization in early times and diversification later on. This is
done because diversification prevents a lock-in of mature industries. The evolution
of specialization of the agglomeration, measured as the mean over specialization in
height and location of all cluster firms, is introduced in Figure 7.16. The standard
scenario together with policy 3 take a middle position between very high specializa-
tion in policy 2 and lower values for policy 4 and policy 1. There is also statistical
evidence for this ranking in Appendix A.3. The patterns for each individual form of
specialization qualitatively show the same result.
As a first finding we admit that in the first half of the simulations policy 4 does
not succeed in generating a more specialized agglomeration than standard. The
subsidies to help cluster firms extend their core competencies even lead to a more
diversified agglomeration, which can be seen in the low values of the specialization
indicator. At later times, around period T = 100 when policy influence is lowest, the
cluster gets more specialized but does not reach the level of the reference case. If we
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Figure 7.16: Policies and specialization of the agglomeration over time.
look at the specialization of the whole industry, we discover a major change in the
case of policy 4. After an initial phase the specialization in policy 4 increases fast and
reaches a peak around T = 50 when the specialization policy starts to slow down.
In this peak the specialization of the industry in policy 4 is approximately twice as
high as in standard. In all other scenarios the specialization of the industry evolves
similar. Therefore, the early policy 4 does not succeed in generating specialization
of the agglomeration but it does foster the specialization of the whole industry.
Two reasons for the diversified agglomeration in early periods can be given de-
spite the specialization efforts of the policy: Learning and the design of the measure
itself. The focus of policy 4 concentrates on the highest knowledge peaks of cluster
firms and changes if the highest possible level is reached. Thus, in this scenario
the best-practice develops very fast with the help of policy. Firms in the cluster
get support in several technologies, which works against specialization. The other
mechanism is learning through knowledge spillovers in the agglomeration as most
of the firms choose close geographical proximity. Through the public activity the
amount of knowledge spillovers rises but learning in several technological areas again
favors diversification. Indeed firms in policy 4 are on the average less specialized in
comparison to the other scenarios. This is particularly true for the first half of the
simulated time horizon. Hence, mostly the learning opportunities in combination
with a high incentive to agglomerate counter-effect the political goal and lead to
diversified firms and a diversified agglomeration.
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In the second half of the simulations policy 4 switches to fostering diversification
of the agglomeration. We can see in Figure 7.16 that the efforts succeed as the
degree of specialization of core stays constant or even decreases over time. When we
compare the first and the last political goal, we detect that the ranking in the number
of firms at the core over time is the opposite of the outcome for specialization of core.
For example policy 2 (1) has highest (lowest) specialization with lowest (highest)
average number of cluster firms. The cause is learning through knowledge spillovers
in combination with the mechanisms described in the previous paragraph. Hence,
there appears not only to be a negative correlation but also a causal relationship
between the number of cluster firms and the specialization of the agglomeration. The
more firms agglomerate, the lower is the propensity for high specialization and thus
for a lock-in situation of the agglomeration. A policy that enhances the incentive to
cluster at the same time works against an over-specialization of the agglomeration.
So far we have debated the effects and the interdependencies of the different
policies. Not only the consequences but also the costs for implementing the policies
differ. Building on the measurement introduced before we present the evolution of
the current policy costs in Figure 7.17. The amount of money which is spent in each
period increases for policies 1 to 3 and is mostly constant with a slowdown in middle
periods in the case of policy 4. In later times the implementation of policy 1 is the
most expensive one, followed by policies 3, 2 and 4. In the reference scenario no
policy costs occur. The picture shows current costs in every period and additionally
we investigate the sum of policy costs over all periods with the help of statistical
tests in Appendix A.3. The analysis suggests that the above ranking holds for the
total cost and is highly significant, too.
Figure 7.17: The current costs of each policy over time.
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The costs for most of the policies rise because the complexity of the technology
space increases over time, which results in higher costs for the external institution
in policies 1 and 2. The same holds for policy 3 as more radical product innovations
extend the financial support of the consumer budget. Additionally, the costs for
policy 1 rise with the quantity produced in the agglomeration. The direct support
of cluster firms in policy 4 is rather constant since the number of firms at the core
does not fluctuate much in this scenario. By assumption the point in time where
the policy switches from specialization to diversification is set randomly. On the
average this leads to lower expenses of policy 4 between t = 50 and t = 150 and
reaches its minimum at t = 100, see also Table A.5. To get an idea of the height
of the political costs we calculate them in percentage of the consumer budget. We
find that at the end of the simulations on the average the expenses for policy 1
are approximately 54%, for policy 3 around 16%20, for policy 2 around 10%, and
finally for policy 4 around 4% of the consumer budget. In the case of policy 1 this
means that the government has expenses which are more than half of the amount
all consumers spend on products of this industry. Because of this, it appears to be
very difficult to justify political interventions in the form of policy 1. For regional
innovation policy the other policies rather seem to be affordable.
The last industry characteristic we look at is the welfare of the industry. Welfare,
as defined in Section 4.2, is a global indicator which aggregates information about
technology space, prices as well as firm profits and it stands for the sum of the
benefits of firms and consumers. However, the costs of political interventions are
not included. Figure 7.18 presents the evolution of welfare in the different scenarios.
The outcome at T = 200 shows that policy 3 performs significantly better than
policy 4 and that policy 4 achieves higher values than policy 1 which is again better
than standard. These results can be obtained to a confidence interval greater than
90%. The statistical test in Appendix A.3 suggests no significant difference between
policy 2 and standard. The high values in the first period emerge due to the chosen
initial conditions and are not relevant.21
According to our observations welfare increases in all considered scenarios over
time. In particular the values escalate after the first new products around t = 20.
Over the whole time horizon the highest welfare is reached in policy 3 and the
bottom line is represented by standard. Hence, all policies advance the mean values
of welfare though the increase at T = 200 is not significant in the case of policy
2. The development of the curves stays qualitatively the same if we consider the
20The theoretical expected value from the randomly generated parameter change due to policy
3 is 0.5 · (4− 3)/3 = 0.1667.
21By assumption all firms in the fist period simultaneously choose xmin as output quantity, see
Section 4.3.2. After that, the quantity decision is based on more sophisticated decision rules which
incorporate the strategic effects on competitors and consumers.
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Figure 7.18: Policies and the evolution of welfare of the industry.
evolution of consumer or producer surplus separately.
The only major change in the ranking of welfare over time occurs in policy 4. Here
the policy manages to develop welfare from the last position before period t = 100
to the second best position at T = 200. During this time the policy concentrates
on diversification of the agglomeration through subsidizing product innovations of
cluster firms. This form of policy appears to have a very positive influence on welfare.
The result is driven by the fact that radical product innovations especially increase
the welfare of the industry. As shown in the picture the measures of policy 3, which
extend the patent length and support consumers’ budget, generate the highest level
of welfare. The politically induced higher appropriability of the industry favors both
- innovating firms and consumers. The firms enjoy higher economic profits and this
again supports the private innovation efforts. The consumers in policy 3 can spend
more money and are free in their choice of product variants. Despite the higher
prices in that scenario the consumers benefit most from this policy. The same is
true for the firms as they exhibit the highest level of producer surplus.
In short we now introduce important results of other main industry character-
istics without visual presentation. We start with the technological development of
the industry which incorporates product and process innovations. Policy 3 exhibits
the most radical and incremental product innovations until it is overtaken by policy
4. The major increases in the number of new product variants in policy 4 happen in
consequence of the diversification policy in the second half of the simulations. Policy
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1 manages to generate more product innovations than standard, but the outcome
in policy 2 is very close to the reference case. The ranking for the development of
the best-practice for process innovations is the following: Policy 4 performs best,
followed by equal values for policy 1 and 2. The slowest increase of the highest
knowledge peak can be observed in policy 3. This pattern is driven by the political
interventions which either support the best-practice, e.g. in policy 4 in early periods,
or set the technological frontier due to the external institution in policies 1 and 2.
The funding of the external institution also leads to very good results for the average
level of process innovation in policies 1 and 2. The average process innovations in
policy 3 evolve just close to, but above standard. At the beginning the mean pro-
cess innovations in policy 4 are better than in the other policy scenarios but later
on the high number of product innovations lowers the average level. At the end of
the simulations the values even fall below standard.
We also have a look at prices, market and industry concentration. The develop-
ment of prices indicates that on the average prices are higher in the case of policy 3
and slightly lower in policy 4 than in the other policies which lie close to standard.
In the long run the prices converge to the same level in all scenarios. From the
relatively high prices in policy 3 one would expect high market concentration but
this is only the case during the periods following the wave of new products at t = 20.
Despite the high number of product variants in policy 3, after that the markets are
less concentrated than in policy 4. In a mature industry the market concentration
even falls below the value of policy 1. Hence, the markets are dominated by fewer
firms in these scenarios. As market concentration shows the differences of output
quantities on a market, the industry concentration gives an idea of the distribution
of aggregated profits across all firms of the industry. A high level of industry con-
centration would indicate that few firms earn much more profits than the majority.
In fact, at the end of the simulated time the highest industry concentration can
be observed in standard, followed by a group consisting of policies 1, 4 and 2, and
policy 3 has the lowest industry concentration.
This is an important finding because it shows that an industry which is left on its
own generates higher differences between firm profits than any scenario with political
influence. In an industry without political interventions the more competitive firms
benefit more relative to the less competitive firms. The profits of the highly com-
petitive firms might for example be higher in policy 3, but the difference compared
to the weaker competitors is relatively lower. In other words, the political measures
mainly help less competitive firms not to fall behind and, at least in terms of profits,
to keep track with the technological leaders. The separation between successful and
not successful firms is strongest if the competition is not distorted by any policy.
This is a nice exemplification of the possible negative influence of public authorities
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on competition mentioned by Porter (1998).
In the following we summarize the main points and propose a normative judg-
ment in terms of a cost-benefit analysis for every policy. We start with policy 1.
Here the goal is to enhance the incentive for core as the local positive externalities
increase with the number of firms in the agglomeration. The policy indeed makes
it possible to increase the number of firms taking part in the local learning with
the help of direct subsidies and public research in the cluster. The total amount for
learning is highest compared to the other cases and most of the knowledge spillovers
happen between firms and not from the external institution to firms. The policy
influence is that pronounced that not only the technologically lagging firms but also
the most profitable firms choose geographical proximity. Hence, this is the only
scenario where the adverse selection effect of clusters does not emerge. As the over-
whelming majority of firms locate in the cluster, the technology base of core is very
diversified and no technological lock-in occurs. Especially, the support of local re-
search facilities favors the development of the best-practice and the intense learning
in the agglomeration leads to a fast diffusion of knowledge and a high average knowl-
edge. With the number of established new products, which has a strong impact on
welfare, policy 1 takes a middle position. The high market and industry concentra-
tion indicate that the industry is selective in the sense that more competitive firms
perform better relative to less competitive firms. The many positive features of this
kind of policy intervention come with very high implementation costs. In particular
the direct support for cluster firms boosts policy costs. Therefore, we conclude that
policy costs - higher than half of the whole consumers’ budget for this industry - are
too high to justify this policy despite the positive effect on attracting technologically
advanced firms to the cluster. One possible solution could be to concentrate on the
support of local research, which alone seems affordable. The local research institu-
tion is also alone responsible for many of the positive consequences in connection
with policy 1.
The funding of a public research institution is much less expensive than the
overall costs in the previous policy, which can be seen from the analysis of costs for
policy 2. Apart from the public institution which provides cluster and peripheral
firms with knowledge, this policy also captures costs for the intensified learning
between firms in the agglomeration. The main problem of this policy is that it
conflicts with the goal of previous policy 1: The public non-local institution as well
as the higher degree of knowledge spillovers drive firms out of the agglomeration
and this almost annihilates external knowledge spillovers. Therefore, policy 2 is only
responsible for a small increase in total knowledge flows because learning between
firms is mostly substituted through learning from external institution. Further, the
low number of cluster firms results in a fatal lock-in of the cluster. The low level
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of learning mainly has an impact on product innovations whereas the best-practice
and average process innovations develop satisfactorily. This happens because of
the external institution and the fact that the technology space consists of only a
few technologies. Another major argument against this policy is given due to the
low welfare effects since policy 2 cannot generate a significantly higher welfare than
standard. Hence, despite the reasonable costs we do not recommend measures like
policy 2 because they do not succeed in reaching the aim of a substantial increase
of knowledge transfers and welfare.
The aim of policy 3 is to increase appropriability with an extension of patent
length and a financial support for all consumers. Indeed, the policy succeeds in
generating additional firm profits. The technological development of the industry
shows that in the first two thirds of the simulation this scenario has the most new
incremental and radical product innovations. The high number of technologies makes
it hard for firms to keep a high average level of knowledge but here the outcome
for best-practice and average knowledge is still higher than in standard. High firm
profits and many radical product innovations result in the highest welfare level
of all considered scenarios. The welfare at the end is about 50% higher than in
standard. On the other hand, the relatively high policy costs and the lowest industry
concentration can be seen as potential drawbacks of policy 3. The profits of the firms
are relatively more equal and very high compared to the other scenarios. The less
competitive firms benefit more than competitive firms because longer patents hinder
firms from penetrating new markets and an entry of firms in this industry is not
possible by assumption. In conclusion, despite the high costs we recommend policy
3 because of the welfare analysis, the positive technological outcome, and the fact
that not the government but the consumers guide the direction of the technological
development with their increased budget. At the same time we have to keep in mind
that the politically induced entry-barriers may conflict with competition policy.
In the case of policy 4 it is argued that in the early phases of an agglomeration
policy should try to enforce specialization and later diversification of the cluster. We
implement these efforts by subsidies to initially process innovations and later product
innovations. The outcome shows that it is not possible to enhance specialization
because the support links firms to core, which favors local learning, and the high
amount of external knowledge spillovers prevents specialization of the agglomeration.
Later on the policy is more successful in the diversification activities. The high
number of cluster firms in conjunction with learning favor the goals of policies 1 and
2. The financial support for product innovations advances the number of incremental
and radical innovations. This has a positive influence on the development of the
welfare. Although the specialization policy assists the evolution of the best-practice,
the numerous product innovations in the second half of the time horizon let the
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average level of knowledge for process innovation fall below the reference scenario.
One possible drawback of the policy is the high market concentration due to both
forms of political influence: Specialization activities help cluster firms to extend a
technological lead and prevent entry, whereas diversification policy favors product
innovations which are associated with a temporary monopoly, too. Taking the low
implementation costs into account we think that the positive effects outweigh the
negative and we thus recommend policies of that type. The diversification strategy
even seems to be more favorable than policy-induced specialization.
As the main findings of this section we conclude that policy can influence the
form of competition and the technological development of an industry but the out-
come and costs of policies are very different. All discussed policies lead to more
learning and, thus, more innovations but in general firms with lower technological
capabilities are subsidized. Like in the previous Section 7.2 there appears to exist a
trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency because a better technological devel-
opment of the industry is often connected with monopolistic tendencies. Although
the costs for an external institution rise with the complexity of the technology space,
a local external institution attracts firms to the agglomeration and might prevent a
technological lock-in. A policy focusing purely on non-local learning does not result
in substantially higher knowledge transfers because firms substitute private through
public learning. The same is true for an intensification of the learning processes
between firms in close geographical proximity. More knowledge spillovers do not
enhance the incentive for agglomeration, see Section 6.2. An advisable policy is to
improve appropriability with longer patents and subsidized consumer budgets as the
welfare increases most with this measure. Applied local public research should focus
on new technological areas instead of improving existing technologies in order to
diversify the technological spectrum of the agglomeration.
Building on the results we will try to provide advice for a regional innovation
policy, despite the fact that the model only considers a very special case of a hori-
zontally related agglomeration. The analysis shows that financial support to firms
has to be relatively high in order to attract firms to the agglomeration. Thus, pol-
icy should concentrate their efforts on the support of research either in cooperation
with firms in the form of innovation projects or in public research institutions. Fur-
ther, it is of high importance that public research is provided on a regional level
and that companies are motivated to start exchanging knowledge in geographical
proximity. The policy may create a local forum in which firms and public research
can interact and firms can meet each other. Public research activities should rather
aim at broadening the technology space than at deepening existing technologies.
Furthermore, we think that policy should support consumers rather than firms be-
cause consumers know best which product variant they are willing to purchase and
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thereby guide technological progress. The establishing and protection of intellectual
property rights is useful to increase the appropriability of innovations. The theoret-
ical analysis also indicates that policy measures might distort competition and that
less competitive firms benefit more than technologically advanced firms. This might
work against one of the greatest advantages of the market, namely the selection
mechanism.
7.4 Summary
The topic of this chapter is the analysis of the simulation model from a policy
perspective. The focus is set on the influence of geographical and technological
proximity on the innovation outcome and welfare analysis. We give an idea of how
location distributions of firms, industry conditions, and policy interventions change
the quantitative results of the model.
In Section 7.1 we find that the technological development in standard is better
for firms on the periphery. This explains the result in Chapter 6, where firms on the
periphery are much more profitable than firms in the agglomeration. We continue
with the analysis of settings which differ in their fixed number of firms at the core.
We discover that more radical product innovations occur in the 0% core scenario
and more incremental product innovations happen in 100% core. This result also
holds in the case of process innovations and emerges due to the difference between
internal and external learning. Further, the model suggests that the more firms are
located in the agglomeration, the lower are profits in the scenarios with no possible
change of geographical proximity. The welfare indicator, as defined in Section 4.2,
would prefer 0% core mostly because of the higher number of radical new product
variants and higher firm profits. Moreover, welfare is lowest in the scenario with
standard parameter choice.
Section 7.2 debates the consequences of a technological environment or regime
on innovations. Here several parameters of the model are altered to represent two
archetypes of technological regimes: Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II.
The two scenarios differ in the opportunity, cumulativeness, and appropriability con-
ditions as well as the knowledge base of the industry. Concerning the technological
development we find more radical product innovations in Schumpeter Mark I but
more incremental product innovations, higher best-practice and a faster diffusion of
knowledge for process innovations in Schumpeter Mark II. The latter outcome comes
with higher market concentration and lower industry concentration. These findings
indicate that there is no ideal technological regime because both types have their
own merits which contribute to different political goals. One can speak of a potential
trade-off between dynamic efficiency in terms of a more innovative and static effi-
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ciency in terms of a more competitive industry. Furthermore, firms in Schumpeter
Mark II appear to be less specialized in their technological portfolio, which is caused
by the type of learning through knowledge spillovers and by the effect of ’creative
destruction’. This part of the book is also interesting from a methodological point of
view since it proves that theoretical results from simulation models can be replicated
and testified by a third person. Here, this is done with the simulation model by Win-
ter (1984) and most qualitative findings are reproduced with our model. Apart from
the comparison between the two models we propose new arguments to the debate
about technological regimes.
Section 7.3 reveals a normative character in the discussion of regional innovation
policies. We start by providing a rationale for political activities in the setting of our
model. Equilibrium and evolutionary analysis in the literature as well as the argu-
ments of Section 7.1 seem to justify political interventions. Four policy options and
their potential costs are highlighted: Enhance incentives for agglomeration, foster
learning through knowledge flows, increase appropriability, and control specialization
of agglomeration. The first policy advances the number of firms at the core sharply,
which also favors local learning. Firms and the agglomeration indicate a very di-
versified knowledge base and the industry is almost as selective as the standard
scenario. The main drawback of the first policy are the very high implementation
costs. The second policy option is less costly but the measures discourage firms from
agglomerating, which almost offsets all external knowledge spillovers. Furthermore,
no significant welfare improvements occur. This is not the case with the third pol-
icy. Here, the welfare attains the highest level which is however combined with high
policy costs. The activities focusing on appropriability increase firm profits, which
has a positive influence on product innovations. Although the many new product
variants lower the average knowledge for process innovations, it could be advisable
to implement this form of policy. Both measures of the fourth policy lead to a tech-
nologically diversified agglomeration. An increase in the number of cluster firms,
good results for innovations and low implementation costs are arguments in favor of
this policy option. The only point against it are monopolistic tendencies indicated
by high levels of market concentration. The section closes with concrete advice for
a regional innovation policy.
At this point the chapters with new findings for innovation and proximity end.
The simulation experiments build upon the description of the model which again
rests on the theoretical debate in the literature proposed in the previous chapters.
We will now turn to the last chapter with an overview and conclusions of the book.
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Part IV
Lessons Learned
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
This book treats the influence of different interpretations of proximity on innovative
competition between firms. We concentrate on geographical and technological prox-
imity and investigate their impact on learning through knowledge spillovers and the
technological outcome in the form of product and process innovations. A deeper un-
derstanding of innovation and proximity helps managers to develop and extend their
own capabilities, which determine the economic prosperity of the firm in the long
run, and politicians to create and implement adequate policy measures to strengthen
the competitiveness of a region or country and foster economic growth. Therefore,
our research tries to disentangle relevant mechanisms using a computational tool for
the experimental study of a dynamic industry.
Although many scholars have proposed economic models which deal with inno-
vation and proximity, we opt for a new formulation in the form of an agent-based
simulation model. We prefer this methodology because we can implement at the
same time innovation dynamics, endogenous location decisions, complex learning
functions, and a changing technology space which is also related to the preferences
of consumers. We argue that these features are necessary and enable an examina-
tion of various fields. Further, we see the process of verification and validation as an
elementary part of the model. We perform a sensitivity analysis to indicate crucial
parameters and compare model outcome with empirical regularities.
The application of the model to selected issues constitutes the largest part of the
book. In the following we want to highlight the main findings of our approach and
answer the research questions raised in the introductory Chapter 1. While doing so
we bear in mind that our answers are not universally valid but limited in several
ways which we discuss afterward.
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Answers to Research Questions:
1. Should firms seek for geographical proximity to competitors? Do positive ef-
fects of external learning outweigh negative effects due to the loss of knowledge
lead?
The answers to these questions can be found in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. During
our experiments we have developed a very pessimistic perspective on the bene-
fits of local learning between competitors. The main causes for this insight can
be seen in the adverse selection effect in agglomerations (see question 3) and
the coordinating role of knowledge spillovers. Both mechanisms work against
local benefits as the potential of external learning decreases and the firms in
the agglomeration become technologically similar, which erodes firm profits.
The fact that higher knowledge spillovers even lower the number of firms in the
cluster also supports this insight. Firms should choose geographical proximity
if firms located in the agglomeration exhibit advanced knowledge in several
areas of the technology space. However, our results suggest that in general
this is not the case. For an economically successful firm there is not much to
gain but a lot to lose from knowledge spillovers in geographical proximity to
competitors.
2. Does the importance of geographical proximity change during time?
Section 6.2 deals with the evolution of the incentive to agglomerate. Our ex-
periments have shown that the importance of geographical proximity is not
stable but decreasing over time. In our opinion the main cause for this effect
is the rising significance of internal as opposed to external knowledge spillovers.
As the industry evolves, the amount of knowledge spillovers within firms in-
creases and even overtakes the sum of knowledge spillovers between firms in
the agglomeration. Over time firms concentrate on their own research activ-
ities, and external learning in most cases does not strengthen their own core
competencies. This self-reinforcing effect again lowers the attractiveness of the
agglomeration but cluster firms are tied to the agglomeration due to a lock-in
mechanism, see Section 6.3. Firms leaving the agglomeration still have to com-
pete in the same areas of the technology space and now they lose the benefits
of local knowledge spillovers - even if these effects are very limited. In conclu-
sion we find a strong incentive for geographical proximity in young industries
but the potential gains from local learning, and therefore the significance of
geographical proximity, decrease over time.
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3. What kind of firms enter agglomerations: Technologically advanced or tech-
nologically weak firms?
Our simulation experiments indicate that, in general, technologically weak
firms seek the exchange of knowledge through local learning, see Section 7.1.
The number of product innovations, the development of best-practice as well
as the average level of process innovations show clearly that firms in the ag-
glomeration are technologically behind those in peripheral locations. Even
more distinctive is the evolution of firm profitability, see Section 6.2. The sim-
ulation outcome demonstrates that profits of cluster firms stagnate or decline
whereas profits of firms in geographical isolation are much higher and even
increase over time. Hence, we observe a clear adverse selection effect which
attracts mostly technologically weak and less profitable firms to the agglomer-
ation. Although this effect is quite surprising for the theoretical contributions
to innovation and proximity, we note that several empirical studies support
our result.
4. Are firms that specialize in their innovation efforts more economically success-
ful than firms that diversify?
This topic is covered in Sections 6.1 and 6.3. The regression analysis shows that
in the standard scenario those firms earn higher profits which are more willing
to enter new markets, stay longer in already served markets, or attach a higher
weight to market potential than to proximity to their own technological focus
in the market entry and product innovation decision. Thus, in this setting
more diversified innovation efforts appear to be more profitable. In the inves-
tigation of industries with different firm strategies the scenario where all firms
follow a knowledge-oriented (or specialization) strategy performs best, followed
by random behavior and standard parameter values. Here a profit-oriented (or
diversification) strategy evolves similar to standard and has significantly lower
levels of aggregated profits than the outcome for knowledge-oriented strategies.
Therefore, if all firms target attractive market niches and neglect their own
technological strengths, the overall profits are lowest. This supports the view
of technological core competencies and, hence, specialization of firms. In con-
junction with the first result we recommend that firms should concentrate on
their own technological focus aiming at specialization, but a single firm might
benefit from diversification efforts in attractive areas if all other competitors
follow balanced or specialization strategies. Furthermore, we emphasize that
knowledge spillovers - just as coordinated firm behavior - lead to technological
similarities, which diminishes firm profits due to increased competition.
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5. What kind of agglomerations emerge: Technologically specialized or diversified
agglomerations?
Section 6.3 is concerned with the technological specialization of the two pos-
sible locations. We detect that agglomeration becomes specialized over time,
which means that the technology space indicates a clustering of few accen-
tuated peaks whereas the technology space of the remaining firms displays a
higher number of peaks which are more equal in height and evenly distributed.
The adverse selection effect in combination with knowledge spillovers leads to
this result where cluster firms only manage to achieve pronounced knowledge
in some technologies and compete mostly in the same markets. As highlighted
in Section 7.3, overspecialization is often a problem in old industrial regions.
This situation also emerges in the simulation model and constitutes a techno-
logical lock-in because firms in the agglomeration are not able to extend to
and to absorb knowledge from other parts of the technology space.
6. What technological environment supports the flow of knowledge spillovers?
The discussion of the technological environment is addressed in Sections 6.3
and 7.2. In the literature numerous articles debate the questions whether a
specialized or a diversified surrounding favors knowledge spillovers. We do
not agree with this simplistic view on the appearance of knowledge spillovers.
Instead we put forward the argument that the main characteristics of tech-
nological regimes determine both - the height of knowledge spillovers and
the degree of technological specializations. Indeed we observe differences not
only in height but also in structure of the knowledge flows in the selected
two archetypes of an innovative industry. Furthermore, knowledge spillovers
might even shape the technological environment (not vice versa) because they
enhance specialization.
7. Can political interventions aiming to foster the technological development be
justified?
Section 7.1 provides a comparison of scenarios which differ in their number
of firms located in the agglomeration. The simulation experiments suggest
that the standard scenario is inferior to other scenarios in terms of welfare,
product, and process innovations. For example the situation without learning
between competitors leads to a higher best-practice and more radical product
innovations which at the same time has a positive impact on our welfare indi-
cator. On the other hand, the diffusion of knowledge happens faster the more
firms participate in the learning process. There appears to exist a trade-off
between higher best-practice without and higher average knowledge with ex-
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ternal knowledge spillovers. Although there is no setting which dominates all
others in every considered indicator, we believe that the existence of scenarios
with higher welfare than a left-alone industry justifies political interventions.
8. What are possible measures of regional innovation policy in this context and
do they work?
In our review of regional innovation policy in Section 7.3 we work out four
policies which might be useful: Enhance incentive for agglomeration, foster
learning through knowledge flows, increase appropriability, and control spe-
cialization of agglomeration. We implement these policies to evaluate their
effectiveness. While doing so we discover large differences in the cost of poli-
cies. Further, interventions in favor of one political goal sometimes conflict
with another, e.g. the possibility of global learning for all firms independent
of their location drives firms out of the agglomeration. Innovation policy may
also conflict with competition policy as the measures mostly help firms with
lower technological capabilities and a better technological development is often
connected to monopolistic tendencies. Regarding the cost-benefit analysis we
recommend a support of appropriability conditions and local learning mecha-
nisms aiming at the diversification of the local knowledge pool.
The proposed answers to the research questions are of course not exhaustive,
rather they present our arguments to the ongoing theoretical debate on those im-
portant issues. Our arguments rest on our view and understanding of the economy,
which again determines the formulation of the agent-based simulation model. Like
all (simulation) models this model is limited due to the chosen functional form and
setting of parameters. For example another interpretation of the demand side, firm
strategies or learning processes would probably alter the results. Although we give
attention to the specification of the parameters (and many of them are not as influ-
ential as the functional form), our findings rest on a limited parameter range as it
is not possible to consider the full parameter space.
During discussions with other scholars our approach was criticized in the way
that simulation models are too generic and should always try to calibrate critical
parameters to match quantitative and empirically obtained parameters from specific
industries. We argue that one can also use simulation models to formulate sophisti-
cated behavior of agents in a complex environment in order to identify more general
mechanisms which could not be studied with conventional methods. Like in the case
of all theoretical insights the propositions we derived have to be confronted with re-
ality to prove their validity. The outcome of the simulation model is compared to
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empirical studies but here we do not take into account differences between indus-
tries. Another approach could be seen in the calibration of the model according to
specific industry characteristics and then try to reproduce stylized facts of a certain
industry. The calibration of the model to a certain industry would lead to new
insights about the process of innovations in different industries. We - at least in a
first step - prefer to investigate more qualitative effects which might hold for several
(or even all) industries. The industry specific analysis of the model is possible and
will be left for future work.
Although we speak about learning all the time, firms in our model are not able to
adjust their decision rules. The lack of learning in the form of adaptive firm strategies
may be seen as a major disadvantage of the model. On the other hand, the rigid
behavior of the agents is also a merit because it exaggerates certain aspects which
otherwise would not emerge that clearly or simply would not have been recognized.
For example adaptive routines might lead to smaller differences in profits between
cluster firms and firms on the periphery. The aim of this work is not to build the
most realistic model but to disclose relevant functions driving the results. In this case
overstatement may help to stress certain mechanisms. Hence, in order to identify
elementary effects we restrict our experiments to constant routines. Nevertheless,
to go further we need to test our outcome with adaptive decision rules and discuss
whether some of the mechanisms mentioned become less evident or not.
Furthermore, this model concentrates on knowledge spillovers between direct
competitors as the only agglomeration and de-agglomeration forces.1 Of course one
can introduce other advantages and disadvantages of agglomerations into the model
such as knowledge flows to and from suppliers or customers, benefits from specialized
inputs or labor market pooling. Another drawback of the model can be seen in the
fixed number of firms in the industry. The modeling of industry entry and exit
as well as new firm formation, e.g. through spinoffs, are other possible extensions
worth trying. Further, we can think of separating the technology from the product
space and introduce more independent consumer agents which also might adapt their
preferences during a simulation. In the current form the model only incorporates
the interaction on a product market. Thus, adding labor, credit or capital markets
enables the discussion of a wide scope of fascinating research questions.
As a last possible extension to the model we think of a more complex geographi-
cal landscape, for example several agglomerations or a cellular automata framework.
Especially, a model consisting of several regions or countries allows a debate on the
topic of convergence and cohesion. If we assume the existence of local positive ex-
ternalities, every government has to decide whether it should differentiate between
advanced or lagging regions. The question of regional equality and economic effi-
1In some scenarios congestion costs are also considered, see e.g. Section 6.2.
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ciency becomes crucial and economic policy has to decide whether it should avoid,
tolerate, or even foster regional concentration of economic activity. This is relevant
for single countries like Germany and at the same time for institutions like the Eu-
ropean Union. Following this argument the general goals of the Lisbon strategy
mentioned in the introduction are liable to criticism. For example Werker (2006)
argues that it is not possible to stimulate growth and achieve cohesion at the same
time because positive cumulative and self-reinforcing processes go hand in hand
with an agglomeration of economic activities.2 This topic definitely begs for more
research and more interactions between scientists and policy makers.
We are convinced that the methodology of agent-based simulation is able to
contribute to these issues. There still remain several questions to be dealt with and
further examination on the topic of innovation and proximity will yield many fruitful
results which are of great importance for academia as well as for firm managers and
politicians.
2See also Martin (1998) and Martin (1999a) on this point.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Consumer Surplus
In order to perform a welfare analysis, we develop a consumer surplus function.
The consumer surplus for every sub-market j depends on the range of attracted
consumers indicated by a¯j,t and b¯j,t in equation (4.14), the actual price pj,t and a
consumer specific maximum price pmaxj,t (a). This last value indicates the maximum
price a consumer located in a would pay on sub-market j. If the price pj,t, on this
sub-market exceeds this level, the consumer in a would buy a product variant from
the next neighboring relevant markets j− or j+. Which sub-market the consumer
will choose depends on the prices, the technological distances between the markets
and of course on the technological location of the consumer.
Figure A.1: Calculation of the maximum price pmaxj,t (a) for a consumer located in a.
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The situation is sketched in Figure A.1. In this situation the consumer evaluates
according to equation (4.12) the three alternative product variants j−, j and j+ as
well as the corresponding technological distances. As long as the price pj,t is smaller
or equal pmaxj,t (a) the consumer will demand on market j. The possible range of
values is indicated in the figure with a thick dashed line.
In order to differentiate several cases we first compute the value a∗ which stands
for the indifferent consumer between the markets j− and j+ neglecting sub-market
j:
pj−,t + a∗ = pj+,t + dtechj−,j,t + d
tech
j,j+,t − a∗
⇒ a∗ = 1/2 · (pj+,t − pj−,t + dtechj−,j,t + dtechj,j+,t) (A.1)
Because j− and j+ are the relevant neighbors of market j the value for a∗ has
to lie in the interval [dtechj−,j,t − aj,t, dtechj−,j,t + bj,t]. Here two cases appear which lead to
different functions for the maximum price. First, it could be a situation like the one
in Figure A.1 where a∗ lies left to market j, or a∗ ≤ dtechj−,j,t. Second, a∗ lies right to
market j, or a∗ > dtechj−,j,t. In each of the cases three different parts are defined, which
give the maximum price pmaxj,t (a) a consumer in a is willing to pay at market j.
In the first case for a∗ ≤ dtechj−,j,t, which corresponds to the figure, pmaxj,t (a) is given
by:
pmaxj,t (a) =

pj−,t + a− (dtechj−,j,t − a), for dtechj−,j,t − aj,t ≤ a < a∗;
pj+,t + d
tech
j,j+,t, for a
∗ ≤ a < dtechj−,j,t;
pj+,t + (d
tech
j,j+,t − (a− dtechj−,j,t))− (a− dtechj−,j,t), for dtechj−,j,t ≤ a < dtechj−,j,t + bj,t.
=

pj−,t − dtechj−,j,t + 2a, for dtechj−,j,t − aj,t ≤ a < a∗;
pj+,t + d
tech
j,j+,t, for a
∗ ≤ a < dtechj−,j,t;
pj+,t + d
tech
j,j+,t + 2d
tech
j−,j,t − 2a, for dtechj−,j,t ≤ a < dtechj−,j,t + bj,t.
(A.2)
In the first part till a∗ the left relevant market j− determines the height of the
maximum price. After a∗ the right relevant market j+ sets the maximum price in
j because after that point consumers have a greater utility by choosing market j+
instead of j− as an alternative. Between a∗ and dtechj−,j,t prices on j do not depend on
the location of the consumer and have to be lower than pj+,t+d
tech
j,j+,t as the consumers
would otherwise change to market j+. After that range consumers would only accept
a lower price because their location gets closer to j+.
Analogously to (A.2) the maximum price pmaxj−,t (a) for the second case a
∗ > dtechj−,j,t
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is formulated:
pmaxj,t (a) =

pj−,t − dtechj−,j,t + 2a, for dtechj−,j,t − aj,t ≤ a < dtechj−,j,t;
pj−,t + dtechj−,j,t, for d
tech
j−,j,t ≤ a < a∗;
pj+,t + d
tech
j,j+,t + 2d
tech
j−,j,t − 2a, for a∗ ≤ a < dtechj−,j,t + bj,t.
(A.3)
With the maximum price it is possible to calculate the consumer surplus for every
customer as the space between the actual and the maximum price of the demand
function. At this point it is important to differentiate between the range of attracted
consumers which are active consumers on sub-market j indicated by a¯j,t and b¯j,t
from equation (4.14) and the range that is necessary to compute the maximum
price given by aj,t and bj,t. This ranges will be different, if prices of the last period
(needed for a¯j,t and b¯j,t) and prices of this period (needed for aj,t and bj,t) change.
For the consumer surplus the smaller value min{a¯j,t, aj,t} respectively min{b¯j,t, bj,t}
is relevant, because all consumers behind aj,t and bj,t would not choose sub-market
j (what means that they already pay the maximum price) and all consumers buying
on market j are restricted by the range [a¯j,t, b¯j,t].
Therefore, the aggregated consumer surplus CSj,t for all consumers active on
market j is given by:
CSj,t =
∫ dtechj−,j,t+min{b¯j,t,bj,t}
dtechj−,j,t−min{a¯j,t,aj,t}
(∫ pmaxj,t (a)
pj,t
(
Bm
p
)
dp
)
da
= Bm
∫ dtechj−,j,t+min{b¯j,t,bj,t}
dtechj−,j,t−min{a¯j,t,aj,t}
(
ln(pmaxj,t (a))− ln(pj,t)
)
da
= Bm
∫ dtechj−,j,t+min{b¯j,t,bj,t}
dtechj−,j,t−min{a¯j,t,aj,t}
ln(pmaxj,t (a)) · da
−Bm · ln(pj,t) · (min{a¯j,t, aj,t}+min{b¯j,t, bj,t}) (A.4)
After the calculation of a∗ from (A.1) the equation (A.2) (or respectively (A.3))
has to be inserted into (A.4). The integral in the formula can be solved and it is
possible to compute the consumer surplus for each sub-market. Thus, the consumer
surplus of the industry CSt is the sum over all sub-market specific values: CSt =∑
j CSj,t.
Furthermore, it is important to mention that the consumer surplus is related
to the current technology space and current prices. Besides, the calculation of the
budgets Bj,t is based on the actual technology space but on the prices of last period.
The consumer surplus does not take into account markets which are dominated in
the computation of the budget.
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The calculation of the consumer surplus for every sub-market was implemented
with the help of a function which calculates the general solution to the following
integral: ∫ a2
a1
ln(c1 + c2 · a)da
=
[
1
c2
(c1 + c2 · a) · (ln(c1 + c2 · a)− 1)
]a2
a1
=
1
c2
[(c1 + c2 · a2) · (ln(c1 + c2 · a2)− 1)
− (c1 + c2 · a1) · (ln(c1 + c2 · a1)− 1)] (A.5)
Knowing the solution to the above integral, the calculation of the consumer
surplus in the two cases given by (A.2) and (A.3) inserted into (A.4) is possible. For
middle values of a the maximum price is independent of a and, thus, the integration
is straightforward.
For a∗ ≤ dtechj−,j,t:
CSj,t = Bm
∫ dtechj−,j,t+min{b¯j,t,bj,t}
dtechj−,j,t−min{a¯j,t,aj,t}
ln(pmaxj,t (a)) · da
−Bm · ln(pj,t) · (min{a¯j,t, aj,t}+min{b¯j,t, bj,t})
= Bm
∫ a∗
dtechj−,j,t−min{a¯j,t,aj,t}
ln(pj−,t − dtechj−,j,t + 2a) · da
+Bm
∫ dtechj−,j,t
a∗
ln(pj+,t + d
tech
j,j+,t) · da
+Bm
∫ dtechj−,j,t+min{b¯j,t,bj,t}
dtechj−,j,t
ln(pj+,t + d
tech
j,j+,t + 2d
tech
j−,j,t − 2a) · da
−Bm · ln(pj,t) · (min{a¯j,t, aj,t}+min{b¯j,t, bj,t}) (A.6)
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For a∗ > dtechj−,j,t:
CSj,t = Bm
∫ dtechj−,j,t+min{b¯j,t,bj,t}
dtechj−,j,t−min{a¯j,t,aj,t}
ln(pmaxj,t (a)) · da
−Bm · ln(pj,t) · (min{a¯j,t, aj,t}+min{b¯j,t, bj,t})
= Bm
∫ dtechj−,j,t
dtechj−,j,t−min{a¯j,t,aj,t}
ln(pj−,t − dtechj−,j,t + 2a) · da
+Bm
∫ a∗
dtechj−,j,t
ln(pj−,t + dtechj−,j,t) · da
+Bm
∫ dtechj−,j,t+min{b¯j,t,bj,t}
a∗
ln(pj+,t + d
tech
j,j+,t + 2d
tech
j−,j,t − 2a) · da
−Bm · ln(pj,t) · (min{a¯j,t, aj,t}+min{b¯j,t, bj,t}) (A.7)
In the special case that the industry consists only of one sub-market or one sub-
market dominates all others, the maximum price should depend on the highest price
consumers were already willing to pay. If there are other (not relevant) markets, the
highest price in the last period is taken. Otherwise all last periods are considered.
pmaxt =
{
maxj,t{pj,t}, if mt = 1;
maxj{pj,t−1}, if mt > 1 and only one relevant sub-market.
(A.8)
With the total circumference of the technological circle dtecht analogously the
consumer surplus in this case can be calculated as:
CSj,t = Bm
∫ dtecht
0
ln(pmaxt ) · da−Bm · ln(pj,t) · (dtecht )
= Bm · dtecht (ln(pmaxt )− ln(pj,t)) (A.9)
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A.2 Parameter Settings
Parameter Value Parameter Value
T 200 Runs 100
n 10 c 0.935
d 0.94 e 0.95
τ 3 τex 3
xmin 0.5 ρ 0
cmin 0.3 cini 0.5
cgeo 0 Bm 3
αi [3, 4] βi [0.75, 0.85]
κi,en [0, 1] Fi [0.2, 0.4]
κi,ex [0, 0.1] κi,S [0, 1]
δi,SP [0, 1] δi,Π [0, 1]
δi,RD [0, 1] δi,T [0, 1]
qprodi [0.24, 0.32] q
proc
i [0.08, 0.16]
Table A.1: Parameter settings for the standard case.
If the parameters are indicated as an interval, the values for the parameters are
chosen uniformly distributed in the given range for every simulation run.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
RD0 0.2 σ20 0.0025
dtech0 2 σ
2
tech 0.25
S0 10 m0 5
Table A.2: Initial conditions in the standard case.
The starting value for firm-specific knowledge for process innovations and the
resulting technological distances are drawn from a normal distribution with the cor-
responding mean and variance.
Scenario δi,Π δi,T
Balanced or Standard [0,1] [0,1]
Profit-Oriented [0,1] [0,0.2]
Knowledge-Oriented [0,0.2] [0,1]
Random irrelevant irrelevant
Table A.3: Parameter setting for the firm strategy scenarios.
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Schumpeter Mark I Schumpeter Mark II
External Institution
Yes
(Iextj,t ∈ [1, 2], ωext = 1,
αext ∈ [3, 4], βext ∈ [0.75, 0.85])
No
Process Innovations
Low Investments
(qproci ∈ [0.02, 0.04])
High Investments
(qproci ∈ [0.08, 0.16])
Product Innovations Easier and more radical(c = 0.93, d = 0.935, e = 0.94)
Higher thresholds
and mostly incremental
(c = 0.935, d = 0.94, e = 0.95)
Initial Knowledge
for new Technologies
Non-Cumulative
(RD0j ∈ [RD0, 0.5])
Cumulative(
RD0j =
RDproci,j−1,t+RD
proc
i,j+1,t
2
)
Patent Length
Short Patent Protection
(τ = 1)
Long Patent Protection
(τ = 10)
Knowledge Spillover
High external and
low internal Spillovers
(ωex = 0.1, ωin = 0.1)
No external, but
high internal Spillovers
(ωex = 0, ωin = 1)
Number of Firms
in the Industry
Many
(n = 10)
Few
(n = 5)
Table A.4: The corresponding parameters for the representation of technological
regimes.
Policy Name Parameters
1
Enhance Incentive
for Agglomeration
R ∈ [−0.002,−0.004], δi,R ∈ [0, 1],
Iextj,t ∈ [0.1, 0.2], ωext = 1,
αext ∈ [3, 4], and βext ∈ [0.75, 0.85]
2
Foster Learning through
Knowledge Flows
ωex = 1.2, Iextj,t ∈ [0.1, 0.2], ωext = 1,
αext ∈ [3, 4], and βext ∈ [0.75, 0.85]
3 Increase Appropriability τ ∈ [5, 10] and Bm ∈ [3, 4]
4
Control Specialization
of Agglomeration
Iproci,j,t = I
proc
i,j,t + [0.3, 0.6], if (1 ≤ t ≤ [50, 100]
∧ dgeoi,t = 0 ∧ j = maxl{RDproci,l,t }) and
Iprodi,j,t = I
prod
i,j,t + [0.3, 0.6], if ([100, 150] ≤ t ≤ 200
∧ dgeoi,t = 0 ∧ j = maxl{dtechl−1,l,t + dtechl,l+1,t})
Table A.5: The corresponding parameters for the policy measures.
For policy 1 we alter equation (6.3) to the term shown in equation (A.10). We do
this because in the standard case production cost inside and outside the core do not
differ and, therefore, are not taken into account for the evaluation of geographical
location. The difference between the two equations is that in equation (A.10) equal
costs don’t have an influence on the evaluation as the term for cost becomes equal
to 0.5. The lower the cost at the core due to the subsidy the higher is the incentive
for core.
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vgeoi,t =
[
E
(
RDproci,j,t
RDprocj,t
)] δi,RD
δi,RD+δi,SP+δi,R
·
[
E
(
SP proci,j,t (d
geo
i,j,t = 1)
SP proci,j,t (d
geo
i,j,t = 0)
)] δi,SP
δi,RD+δi,SP+δi,R
·
[
max
{
E
(
ci,j,t(d
geo
i,t = 0)
ci,j,t(d
geo
i,t = 1)
)
− 1
2
, 0
}] δi,R
δi,RD+δi,SP+δi,R
(A.10)
Further, the subsidy in policy 1 does not depend on the number of firms at the
core as all cluster firms get the same amount for every produced good. Thus we use
the following adapted equation (A.11).
ci,j,t = c
ini
[
cmin + (1− cmin)(1−RDproci,j,t )
]
+ (1− dgeoi,t ) ·R (A.11)
For policy 3 only integers in the interval for the length of the patent τ are
considered.
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A.3 Statistical Tests
One way to examine the robustness of the simulation results is to apply a two-sample
Wilcoxon rank sum test (sometimes called Mann-Whitney U-test, Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon, or Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test), which is based solely on the order in
which the observations from the two samples fall. This test was proposed initially
by Wilcoxon (1945) and extended by Mann and Whitney (1947), see also Feltovich
(2003) for a recent discussion. The Wilcoxon rank sum test requires the two samples
to be independent and the observations to be ordinal or continuous measurements.
The main advantage of this test is that the observations need not to come from
normal distributions.
In the following the null and alternative hypothesis are formulated to compare
the outcome of several runs with different parameter settings. The results of several
simulation runs are listed according to the considered section and the tests were
performed with the help of the statistical software S-Plus. Generally, one rejects the
null hypothesis if the p-value is smaller than or equal to the assumed significance
level.
Section 6.2:
1. Number of Firms at the core at T = 200:
H0: Standard Scenario ≤ Additional Cost at the core
H1: Standard Scenario > Additional Cost at the core
Results: Z = 3.7122, p-value = 0.0001
2. Number of Firms at the core at T = 200:
H0: High Spillover ≥ Low Spillover
H1: High Spillover < Low Spillover
Results: Z = -1.6929, p-value = 0.0452
3. Number of Firms at the core at T = 200:
H0: High Spillover ≥ Standard Scenario
H1: High Spillover < Standard Scenario
Results: Z = -1.5351, p-value = 0.0624
4. Number of Firms at the core at T = 200:
H0: Standard Scenario ≥ Low Spillover
H1: Standard Scenario < Low Spillover
Results: Z = -0.2218, p-value = 0.4123
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5. Sum of Knowledge Spillovers over all Firms in T = 100:
H0: Internal Knowledge Spillovers ≥ External Knowledge Spillovers
H1: Internal Knowledge Spillovers < External Knowledge Spillovers
Results: Z = -1.9751, p-value = 0.0241
6. Sum of Knowledge Spillovers over all Firms in T = 400:
H0: Internal Knowledge Spillovers ≤ External Knowledge Spillovers
H1: Internal Knowledge Spillovers > External Knowledge Spillovers
Results: Z = 3.5538, p-value = 0.0002
7. Average Aggregated Profits at T = 200:
H0: Core ≥ Periphery
H1: Core < Periphery
Results: Z = -10.7228, p-value = 0
Section 6.3:
1. Industry Specialization in Location at T = 200:
H0: Knowledge-Oriented ≤ Standard Scenario
H1: Knowledge-Oriented > Standard Scenario
Results: Z = 4.2185, p-value = 0
2. Industry Specialization in Location at T = 200:
H0: Standard Scenario ≤ Profit-Oriented
H1: Standard Scenario > Profit-Oriented
Results: Z = 5.0175, p-value = 0
3. Industry Specialization in Location at T = 200:
H0: Standard Scenario = Random
H1: Standard Scenario 6= Random
Results: Z = 0.959, p-value = 0.3375
4. Firm Specialization in Height at T = 200:
H0: Profit-Oriented ≤ Standard Scenario
H1: Profit-Oriented > Standard Scenario
Results: Z = 4.8978, p-value = 0
5. Firm Specialization in Height at T = 200:
H0: Standard Scenario ≤ Random
H1: Standard Scenario > Random
Results: Z = 1.5198, p-value = 0.0643
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6. Firm Specialization in Height at T = 200:
H0: Random ≤ Knowledge-Oriented
H1: Random > Knowledge-Oriented
Results: Z = 1.6933, p-value = 0.0904
7. Average Firm Profits at T = 200:
H0: Knowledge-Oriented ≤ Random
H1: Knowledge-Oriented > Random
Results: Z = -3.3817, p-value = 0.0004
8. Average Firm Profits at T = 200:
H0: Knowledge-Oriented ≤ Standard Scenario
H1: Knowledge-Oriented > Standard Scenario
Results: Z = 4.1208, p-value = 0
9. Average Firm Profits at T = 200:
H0: Random ≤ Standard Scenario
H1: Random > Standard Scenario
Results: Z = 0.5168, p-value = 0.3027
10. Average Firm Profits at T = 200:
H0: Random ≤ Profit-Oriented
H1: Random > Profit-Oriented
Results: Z = 1.653, p-value = 0.0492
11. Average Firm Profits at T = 200:
H0: Standard Scenario ≤ Profit-Oriented
H1: Standard Scenario > Profit-Oriented
Results: Z = 1.3084, p-value = 0.0954
Section 7.1:
1. Maximum Knowledge for Process Innovations at T = 200:
H0: Periphery ≤ Core
H1: Periphery > Core
Results: Z = -6.0511, p-value = 0
2. Average Knowledge for Process Innovations at T = 200:
H0: Periphery ≤ Core
H1: Periphery > Core
Results: Z = 5.4378, p-value = 0
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3. Number of Successful Product Innovations till T = 200:
H0: Periphery ≤ Core
H1: Periphery > Core
Results: Z = 8.5306, p-value = 0
4. Radical Product Innovations till T = 200:
H0: 0% core ≤ 50% core
H1: 0% core > 50% core
Results: Z = 2.985, p-value = 0.0014
5. Radical Product Innovations till T = 200:
H0: 50% core ≤ Standard / Variable
H1: 50% core > Standard / Variable
Results: Z = 1.4902, p-value = 0.0681
6. Radical Product Innovations till T = 200:
H0: Standard / Variable = 100% core
H1: Standard / Variable 6= 100% core
Results: Z = -0.4507, p-value = 0.6522
7. Radical Product Innovations till T = 200:
H0: 0% core ≤ 100% core
H1: 0% core > 100% core
Results: Z = 3.872, p-value = 0.0001
8. Incremental Product Innovations till T = 200:
H0: 50% core ≤ 0% core
H1: 50% core > 0% core
Results: Z = -1.858, p-value = 0.0316
9. Incremental Product Innovations till T = 200:
H0: 100% core ≤ 50% core
H1: 100% core > 50% core
Results: Z = 7.9716, p-value = 0
10. Incremental Product Innovations till T = 200:
H0: 100% core ≤ Standard / Variable
H1: 100% core > Standard / Variable
Results: Z = 9.6065, p-value = 0
11. Incremental Product Innovations till T = 200:
H0: 50% core ≤ Standard / Variable
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H1: 50% core > Standard / Variable
Results: Z = -3.3996, p-value = 0.0003
12. Incremental Product Innovations till T = 200:
H0: 0% core = Standard / Variable
H1: 0% core 6= Standard / Variable
Results: Z = 0.8753, p-value = 0.3814
13. Maximum Process Innovations at T = 200:
H0: 0% core ≤ 50% core
H1: 0% core > 50% core
Results: Z = 5.3486, p-value = 0
14. Maximum Process Innovations at T = 200:
H0: 50% core ≤ Standard / Variable
H1: 50% core > Standard / Variable
Results: Z = 1.4196, p-value = 0.0779
15. Maximum Process Innovations at T = 200:
H0: Standard / Variable ≤ 100% core
H1: Standard / Variable > 100% core
Results: Z = 3.0298, p-value = 0.0012
16. Average Process Innovations at T = 100:
H0: 100% core ≤ Standard / Variable
H1: 100% core > Standard / Variable
Results: Z = 4.5985, p-value = 0
17. Average Process Innovations at T = 100:
H0: Standard / Variable ≤ 50% core
H1: Standard / Variable > 50% core
Results: Z = 2.2223, p-value = 0.0131
18. Average Process Innovations at T = 100:
H0: 50% core ≤ 0% core
H1: 50% core > 0% core
Results: Z = 4.3517, p-value = 0
19. Average Aggregated Profits till T = 200:
H0: 0% core ≤ Standard / Variable
H1: 0% core > Standard / Variable
Results: Z = 5.318, p-value = 0
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20. Average Aggregated Profits till T = 200:
H0: Standard / Variable ≤ 100% core
H1: Standard / Variable > 100% core
Results: Z = 3.2045, p-value = 0.0007
21. Average Aggregated Profits till T = 200:
H0: 100% core ≤ Standard / Variable - Firms at the core
H1: 100% core > Standard / Variable - Firms at the core
Results: Z = -6.9747, p-value = 0
22. Average Aggregated Profits till T = 200:
H0: Standard / Variable - Firms on the periphery ≤ 0% core
H1: Standard / Variable - Firms on the periphery > 0% core
Results: Z = 0.722, p-value = 0.2351
23. Average Aggregated Profits till T = 200:
H0: 0% core ≤ 50% core
H1: 0% core > 50% core
Results: Z = 4.6363, p-value = 0
24. Average Aggregated Profits till T = 200:
H0: 50% core ≤ 100% core
H1: 50% core > 100% core
Results: Z = 3.6761, p-value = 0.0001
25. Consumer Surplus at T = 200:
H0: 0% core ≤ 50% core
H1: 0% core > 50% core
Results: Z = 2.5521, p-value = 0.0054
26. Consumer Surplus at T = 200:
H0: 50% core ≤ 100% core
H1: 50% core > 100% core
Results: Z = 1.8338, p-value = 0.0333
27. Consumer Surplus at T = 200:
H0: 50% core ≤ Standard / Variable
H1: 50% core > Standard / Variable
Results: Z = -1.5039, p-value = 0.0663
28. Consumer Surplus at T = 200:
H0: 100% core ≤ Standard / Variable
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H1: 100% core > Standard / Variable
Results: Z = -1.3823, p-value = 0.0834
29. Producer Surplus at T = 200:
H0: 0% core ≤ 50% core
H1: 0% core > 50% core
Results: Z = 1.3915, p-value = 0.082
30. Producer Surplus at T = 200:
H0: 50% core ≤ Standard / Variable
H1: 50% core > Standard / Variable
Results: Z = 1.5039, p-value = 0.0663
31. Producer Surplus at T = 200:
H0: Standard / Variable ≤ 100% core
H1: Standard / Variable > 100% core
Results: Z = -0.9871, p-value = 0.8382
32. Producer Surplus at T = 200:
H0: 0% core ≤ 100% core
H1: 0% core > 100% core
Results: Z = 1.383, p-value = 0.0833
33. Welfare at T = 200:
H0: 0% core ≤ 50% core
H1: 0% core > 50% core
Results: Z = 1.7702, p-value = 0.0383
34. Welfare at T = 200:
H0: 50% core ≤ Standard / Variable
H1: 50% core > Standard / Variable
Results: Z = 1.4783, p-value = 0.0697
35. Welfare at T = 200:
H0: Standard / Variable ≤ 100% core
H1: Standard / Variable > 100% core
Results: Z = -0.6194, p-value = 0.7322
36. Welfare at T = 200:
H0: 0% core ≤ 100% core
H1: 0% core > 100% core
Results: Z = 2.2308, p-value = 0.0128
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Section 7.2:
1. Number of Incremental Product Innovations over the simulated periods:
H0: Schumpeter Mark I ≥ Schumpeter Mark II
H1: Schumpeter Mark I < Schumpeter Mark II
Results: Z = 7.8566, p-value = 0
2. Number of Radical Product Innovations over the simulated periods:
H0: Schumpeter Mark I ≤ Schumpeter Mark II
H1: Schumpeter Mark I > Schumpeter Mark II
Results: Z = 4.603, p-value = 0
3. best-practice for Process Innovation at T = 50:
H0: Schumpeter Mark I ≥ Schumpeter Mark II
H1: Schumpeter Mark I < Schumpeter Mark II
Results: Z = 7.6393, p-value = 0
4. Average Level of Process Innovations at T = 200:
H0: Schumpeter Mark I ≥ Schumpeter Mark II
H1: Schumpeter Mark I < Schumpeter Mark II
Results: Z = 8.1426, p-value = 0
5. Average Market Concentration at T = 200:
H0: Schumpeter Mark I ≥ Schumpeter Mark II
H1: Schumpeter Mark I < Schumpeter Mark II
Results: Z = 7.4242, p-value = 0
6. Industry Concentration at T = 200:
H0: Schumpeter Mark I ≤ Schumpeter Mark II
H1: Schumpeter Mark I > Schumpeter Mark II
Results: Z = 5.494, p-value = 0
7. Average Firm Specialization in Knowledge at T = 200:
H0: Schumpeter Mark I ≤ Schumpeter Mark II
H1: Schumpeter Mark I > Schumpeter Mark II
Results: Z = 11.5902, p-value = 0
8. Average Firm Specialization in Location at T = 200:
H0: Schumpeter Mark I ≤ Schumpeter Mark II
H1: Schumpeter Mark I > Schumpeter Mark II
Results: Z = 10.5225, p-value = 0
Section 7.3:
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1. Number of Firms at the core at T = 200:
H0: Policy 1 ≤ Standard
H1: Policy 1 > Standard
Results: Z = 9.4964, p-value = 0
2. Number of Firms at the core at T = 200:
H0: Policy 2 ≥ Standard
H1: Policy 2 < Standard
Results: Z = -11.6066, p-value = 0
3. Number of Firms at the core at T = 200:
H0: Policy 3 = Standard
H1: Policy 3 6= Standard
Results: Z = 1.0198, p-value = 0.3078
4. Number of Firms at the core at T = 200:
H0: Policy 4 ≤ Standard
H1: Policy 4 > Standard
Results: Z = 2.4553, p-value = 0.007
5. Sum of all Knowledge Spillovers at T = 200:
H0: Policy 1 ≤ Standard
H1: Policy 1 > Standard
Results: Z = 9.5146, p-value = 0
6. Sum of all Knowledge Spillovers at T = 200:
H0: Policy 2 ≤ Standard
H1: Policy 2 > Standard
Results: Z = 5.0065, p-value = 0
7. Sum of all Knowledge Spillovers at T = 200:
H0: Policy 4 = Policy 1
H1: Policy 4 6= Policy 1
Results: Z = 0.7489, p-value = 0.4539
8. Sum of all Knowledge Spillovers at T = 200:
H0: Policy 2 = Policy 3
H1: Policy 2 6= Policy 3
Results: Z = 1.5674, p-value = 0.117
9. Sum of all Knowledge Spillovers at T = 200:
H0: Policy 1 ≤ Policy 2
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H1: Policy 1 > Policy 2
Results: Z = 6.8855, p-value = 0
10. Average Level of aggregated Profits till T = 200:
H0: Policy 3 ≤ Policy 4
H1: Policy 3 > Policy 4
Results: Z = 4.0927, p-value = 0
11. Average Level of aggregated Profits till T = 200:
H0: Policy 4 = Policy 2
H1: Policy 4 6= Policy 2
Results: Z = -0.4911, p-value = 0.6233
12. Average Level of aggregated Profits till T = 200:
H0: Policy 4 = Policy 1
H1: Policy 4 6= Policy 1
Results: Z = -0.7281, p-value = 0.4665
13. Average Level of aggregated Profits till T = 200:
H0: Policy 4 = Standard
H1: Policy 4 6= Standard
Results: Z = 0.5363, p-value = 0.5917
14. Specialization of the Core at T = 200:
H0: Policy 3 = Standard
H1: Policy 3 6= Standard
Results: Z = 0.2407, p-value = 0.8098
15. Specialization of the Core at T = 200:
H0: Policy 2 ≤ Standard
H1: Policy 2 > Standard
Results: Z = 4.4808, p-value = 0
16. Specialization of the Core at T = 200:
H0: Policy 4 ≥ Standard
H1: Policy 4 < Standard
Results: Z = -1.9266, p-value = 0.027
17. Specialization of the Core at T = 200:
H0: Policy 1 ≥ Policy 4
H1: Policy 1 < Policy 4
Results: Z = -5.2313, p-value = 0
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18. Specialization of the Core at T = 200:
H0: Policy 1 ≥ Policy 4
H1: Policy 1 < Policy 4
Results: Z = -5.2313, p-value = 0
19. Total Policy Cost till T = 200:
H0: Policy 2 ≤ Policy 4
H1: Policy 2 > Policy 4
Results: Z = 8.999, p-value = 0
20. Total Policy Cost till T = 200:
H0: Policy 3 ≤ Policy 2
H1: Policy 3 > Policy 2
Results: Z = 7.1567, p-value = 0
21. Total Policy Cost till T = 200:
H0: Policy 1 ≤ Policy 3
H1: Policy 1 > Policy 3
Results: Z = 7.0663, p-value = 0
22. Welfare of the Industry at T = 200:
H0: Policy 3 ≤ Policy 4
H1: Policy 3 > Policy 4
Results: Z = 2.0549, p-value = 0.0199
23. Welfare of the Industry at T = 200:
H0: Policy 4 ≤ Policy 1
H1: Policy 4 > Policy 1
Results: Z = 1.3585, p-value = 0.0871
24. Welfare of the Industry at T = 200:
H0: Policy 1 ≤ Standard
H1: Policy 1 > Standard
Results: Z = 2.1868, p-value = 0.0144
25. Welfare of the Industry at T = 200:
H0: Policy 2 = Standard
H1: Policy 2 6= Standard
Results: Z = 1.1044, p-value = 0.2694
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